TROY
UNIVERSITY - MASTER OF SCIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
SAMPLE
COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION - THIS IS A
CLOSED BOOK, CLOSED NOTE EXAMINATION
Students
will have three hours to complete their answers. Select ONE question from each section.
PART I. PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
1. Since the end of the Cold War, what effect have changes
in the world had on state sovereignty? How has sovereignty been diminished or
changed, and who or what has done it?
1. To what extent do the demands of economic security clash
with those of political security in U.S. foreign policy?
2. Ascertain the major trend and events in the post-Cold War
era by discussing the shifts from "a balance of power" to
"global equilibrium of power."
PART II. DEVELOPING NATIONS / REGIONAL AFFAIRS
Section
II covers Developing Nations and Regional Affairs. In addition to historical
political economists such as Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, David Ricardo,
Karl Marx, and Lenin, theorists associated with development such as Immanuel
Wallerstein, Theotonio Dos Santos, and Hernando De Soto should be added.
Commentators on globalization such as Joseph Stiglitz and Thomas Friedman are
important for Section II and for much of the rest of the comprehensive
examination as well. Staying current with regional and global economic issues
is a good idea: what are sovereign wealth funds, for example, and how might
they affect US national security; and, how will the 2008-2010 economic crisis
affect US foreign policy, security, and interests?
1. Many developing nations have lax environmental and labor
regulations that allow multinational corporations (MNCs) to produce at a lower
cost in these countries. How is this a problem for the
United States? What should US policy be?
1. By focusing on colonialism in one region of the world,
discuss its impact in terms of claims that the West practiced political and
economic exploitation.
2. In the 1970s and 1980s, international economic aid tended
to be project oriented. In the 1900s, international advisors have called for a
greater emphasis on program-oriented aid. What is the economic logic behind
this shift and what are the political associated with this shift?
Students
will have three hours to complete their answers. Select ONE question from each
section.
PART III. NATIONAL SECURITY(essentially US foreign policy and
related issues)
Section
III looks at National Security and deals with important world security issues,
particularly as they affect the United States. Completing either IR 5524
American Foreign Policy or IR 6635 National Security Policy would be an
advantage for this section, but other preparation can work as well. The Financial Times newspaper and The Economist newsmagazine are good
sources of up-to-date information, but other sources are also available such as
the US Department of State and White House websites – reviewing the “US
National Security Strategy” is a good idea, for example.
The
world is changing rapidly and you should be familiar with issues such as the
rise of China and the other BRICS, the status of the War on Terror and
US/allied operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, conditions within the European
Union and other areas of vital US interest, and the status of US hegemony.
American
foreign policy, shaped for decades by an ongoing Cold War with the former
Soviet Union, is today still adjusting to post-Cold War realities. The
dangerous, but relatively simple, bipolar world of two competing nuclear
superpowers has dissolved into a unipolar or multipolar world, depending upon
one's view of U.S. dominance of the international arena.
U.S. foreign and national security policy has
shifted from containing Soviet communism to addressing conflicts in smaller,
but still dangerous, hotspots throughout the world. Often in conjunction with
international bodies like the United Nations or NATO, much of American foreign
policy now focuses on peacekeeping efforts in places like the Kosovo, Iraq, or
Afghanistan.
Debates over many foreign policy and national
security issues continue to be drawn along traditional left-right lines. A
leading example is defense spending, where conservatives call for significant
increases and liberals a shifting of resources to domestic needs. But the left
and right are themselves each split between internationalists, who believe the
U.S. should maintain a strong international presence, and isolationists who
believe the U.S. should avoid unnecessary international entanglements. Indeed,
this split has a much longer history in American foreign policy, extending well
back before the Cold War and World War II, when isolationists opposed U.S.
entry until the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.
American foreign policy, of course,
encompasses much more than matters of war and peace. As the world becomes more
intertwined, economically, issues of globalism, foreign trade, international
investment and foreign aid are all increasingly important. All of these issues
are the focus of this section.
1. President Bush says that the United States is engaged in
a “Global War on Terror.” In conceptual terms, what does such a war entail?
What are the strengths and weaknesses of this approach to terrorism?
1. Relate the notion of proxy and surrogate warfare between
the 1960s and 1990s to the superpower status of the United States and the
U.S.A.
2. It can be said that international politics is inherently
power politics. Discuss this proposition.
PART IV. INSTRUMENTS
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (e.g., diplomacy,
international law, and international organizations).
Section
IV looks at Instruments of International Relations, such as international law,
international organizations, and diplomacy, among other issues, and can
sometimes be a problem for students. Additional research might be useful, such
as surveying the websites of significant intergovernmental organizations [IGOs
– such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank, International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and United Nations] and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs – such as the Red Cross, Amnesty International, and Greenpeace) and
looking into international law issues on the websites of organizations such as
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court
(ICC).
This section (and others) can include “world” issues such as environmental and
health concerns and their effect on international relations.
1. How do international institutions affect the behavior of
nations? Can they modify or mitigate the state of anarchy in international
relations? Give at least one example.
1. Some analysts maintain that the outcome of any war has
been heavily influenced by failure of intercultural communication among
protagonists. Explain, giving examples.
2. Identify different types of interest groups Compare the
differences in the role and functions of the interest group between developed
and developing countries.
SECTION 4 NOTES
Pick one of the three theories
outlined in “One World, Rival Theories” in order to answer the following
question. Was the United States justified in its invasion of Iraq? Give
counter-arguments based on one of the other theories.
The
decision by the United States government to invade the sovereign country of Iraq
represents one of the most controversial moves by the government of a liberal
democracy in the 21st century. In the modern era of the twenty-four hour news
cycle, it is easy to frame the debate over such issues through thirty second
sound. However, in the study of political science, theories such as realism,
liberalism, and idealism have been developed for use as a lens through which to
analyze the actions and motivations of state leaders.
The purpose
of this essay is to identify the realist arguments in favor of using American force
in Iraq as well as the counter arguments developed from the liberalist point of
view.
In his article, “One World, Rival
Theories,” Jack Snyder portrays realism, liberalism, and idealism as theories
that “shape both public discourse and policy analysis [1].” He defines the core
beliefs of realism as the relations between “self-interested states compet[ing]
for power and security,” and those of liberalism as stating that the “spread of
democracy, global ties, and international organizations will strengthen peace.”
Under realism, the main instruments of international relations are wielded by
states and comprised of military power and state diplomacy. Within the realm of
liberalism, states come together in international institutions and global
commerce in order to advance towards a common good.
In the case of Iraq, the United
States had several reasons to sense a threat to its national security. The
first was the perceived ability of Saddam Hussein to produce chemical, biological,
and/or nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD). At a juncture in history where
Al-Qaeda, a non-state actor, had recently executed the most deadly attack on
the American homeland in generations, the ability of a state such as Iraq to
supply terrorists with weapons they could use to engage the United States in
asymmetric warfare stood as a significant threat. Also, after initiating two
wars in the Middle East, a region whose oil reserves represent a strategic
resource to the United States, Saddam Hussein remained a potential
destabilizing threat.
The primary
tenet of realism is that states are responsible for advancing their own security
and interests through the use of military power and state diplomacy. Although Saddam
Hussein had represented a potentially destabilizing threat to the Middle East’s
oil supplies for decades, the combination of the September 11 attacks and
perceived ability for Iraq to develop WMD left American realists in a position
where they believed the United States faced a real and immediate threat. The
realist’s toolbox consists primarily of state diplomacy and military power.
After previously endorsing sanctions, the oil-for-food program, and engaging in
limited air strikes, American realists believed their options for carrot and
stick diplomacy were both exhausted and ineffectual. That left the option of
exercising military power, which American realists favored and eventually saw employed.
The primary
tenet of liberalism is the use of international institutions and global commerce
to spread democracy, international cooperation, and economic ties. Their motivations
are embodied by the concept that democracies do not fight one another. Therefore,
the primary counter argument of a liberalist to the US invasion of Iraq would have
been that international institutions, such as the United Nations, stood a
better chance of identifying and enforcing a long term solution than immediate
military action.
Primarily, this argument is driven
by the notion that strong international norms promote their own adherence.
Therefore, they would argue, the United States is better serving its own
security interests by using the United Nations to confront its threats, than by
setting a precedent that could be used in the future by other countries in a manner
inconsistent with American security objectives.
In
conclusion, the use of political theories as a lens allows for the debate of
actions by states in a logical framework that bypasses a large part of the
emotion and political wrangling of media portrayal. By understanding the
varying methods used to confront a perceived threat by both realists and
liberalists, the debate shifts towards the optimal manner in which to implement
the tools of both viewpoints in a balanced manner, instead of simply blind support
or rejection of state policies.
[1] Jack Snyder, "One World,
Rival Theories," Foreign Policy,
November/December 2004, pp. 53-62.
·
focuses
on the shifting distribution of power and the enduring propensity for conflict,
military power depends on economic growth and strong political institutions
·
key
assumptions: states are the primary actors, anarchy is the international
condition, states behave rationally, states seek to keep the system in balance
(against capability, threat)
·
realism
depicts the international system as composed of unitary, rational states
motivated by a desire for security
·
neoclassical realists assume that
states respond to the uncertainties of international anarchy by seeking to
control and shape their external environment. As their relative power rises
states will seek more influence abroad, and as it falls their actions and
ambitions will be scaled back accordingly.
·
neorealism (or structural
realism) focuses on the international system and argues that the relative
position of a state in the system is the best explanation of its behavior.
·
argues
that pragmatism about power can yield a more peaceful world
·
provides
simple but powerful explanations for war, alliances, imperialism, obstacles to
cooperation, and other international phenomena
·
stresses
that policy must be based on positions of real strength and often favors modest
and prudent approaches, states must not over-reach
·
argues
international institutions cannot constrain a hegemonic power
·
realism has been modified
because states with similar domestic systems often act differently in the
foreign policy sphere and dissimilar states in similar situations often act
alike.
·
theorists have sought to
understand the influence of internal factors on external behavior. But there is
not yet a coherent theory that links domestic with internationally politics causally.
·
the
triumph of the West in the Cold War boosted liberalism
·
argues
that realism cannot account for progress and foresees a journey away from the
anarchic world as trade and finance forge ties between nations, and democratic
norms spread
·
globalization
is changing the nature of world politics: interstate use and threat of
military force have virtually disappeared in certain areas of the world
·
highlights
the cooperative potential of mature democracies, especially when working
together through effective institutions
·
argues
that international institutions help overcome selfish state behavior by
encouraging states to forego immediate gains for the greater benefits of
enduring cooperation
·
institutions
cannot force states to behave in ways that are contrary to their interests, but
even powerful states are increasingly reliant on institutions
·
argues
that realism cannot explain this growth in the number and importance of
institutions
·
"soft
power" is becoming more important
·
theory of democratic peace holds that
democracies never fight wars against each other. But they are prone to
launch messianic struggles against warlike authoritarian regimes to “make the
world safe for democracy.” In economic relations between democratic states,
however, threats and coercion are ever present.
·
liberalism highlights the rising
number of democracies and the turbulence of democratic
transitions. Countries transitioning to democracy, with weak political
institutions, are more likely than other states to get into international and
civil wars
·
points
out that the rising democratic tide creates the presumption that all nations
ought to enjoy the benefits of self-determination which can also lead to
conflict
·
doubts
that nascent democracy and economic liberalism can always cohabitate
·
argues
that foreign policy is and should be guided by ethical and legal standards
·
stresses
that a consensus on values must underpin any stable political order
·
constructivists
believe that debates about ideas are the fundamental building blocks of
international life
·
a theory that emphasizes the role of
ideologies, identities, persuasion, and transnational networks is highly
relevant to understanding the post-9/11 world.
·
constructivists
find absurd the idea of some identifiable and immutable “national interest,”
which some realists cherish
·
constructivists often study the role
of transnational activist networks—such as Human Rights Watch or the
International Campaign to Ban Landmines—in promoting change. These
movements often make pragmatic arguments as well as idealistic ones, but their
distinctive power comes from the ability to highlight deviations from deeply
held norms of appropriate behavior.
·
illuminates
the changing norms of sovereignty, human rights, and international justice, as
well as the increased potency of religious ideas in politics
·
the USA is a 'true revolutionary power'. Ronald
Steel (NYT 1996): "We purvey a culture based on mass
entertainment and mass gratification ...the cultural message ... goes out
across the world to capture, and also to undermine, other societies"
·
both liberal human rights movements and
radical Islamic movements have transnational structures and principled
motivations that challenge the traditional supremacy of self-interested states
in international politics.
·
Niall Ferguson,
“Power,” Foreign Policy, January/February 2003
·
Ethan B. Kapstein, “Is
Realism Dead? The Domestic Sources of International Politics”, International
Organization, 1995
·
Robert O. Keohane,
"International institutions: Can interdependence work?", Foreign
Policy, 1998
·
Robert Keohane and
Joseph Nye “Globalization: What’s New, What’s Not (and So What?),” Foreign
Policy, Spring 2000:
·
David McCraw, "The Howard Government's Foreign Policy: Really
Realist?" Australian Journal of Political Science, September 2008, 43:3,
465 - 480
·
Gideon Rose,
“Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, World
Politics, 1998
·
Jack Snyder, "One
World, Rival Theories", Foreign Policy, November / December 2004
·
Stephen M. Walt,
"International Relations: One World, Many theories", Foreign Policy,
1998
·
Stephen M. Walt,
"The relationship between theory and practice in international
relations", Annual Review of Political Science, 2005
·
James Watson, “China’s
Big Mac Attack,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2000
IDEALISM
In the American study of international
relations, idealism usually refers to the school of thought personified
in American diplomatic history by Woodrow Wilson, such that it is
sometimes referred to as Wilsonianism, or Wilsonian Idealism.
Idealism holds that a state should make its internal political philosophy the goal of its
foreign policy. For example, an idealist might believe that ending poverty at
home should be coupled with tackling poverty abroad. Wilson's idealism was a
precursor to liberal international relations theory, which would arise
amongst the "institution-builders" after World War I. It particularly
emphasized the ideal of American
exceptionalism.
Idealism is also
marked by the prominent role played by international law and international organizations in its conception of
policy formation. One of the most well-known tenets of modern idealist thinking
is democratic
peace theory,
which holds that states with similar modes of democratic governance do not
fight one another. Wilson's idealistic thought was embodied in his Fourteen points speech, and in the
creation of the League
of Nations.
Idealism transcends
the left-right political spectrum.
Idealists can include both human rights campaigners
(traditionally, but not always, associated with the left) and American neoconservatism which is usually
associated with the right.
Idealism may find itself in opposition to Realism, a worldview which argues that a
nation's national
interest
is more important than ethical or moral considerations;
however, there need be no conflict between the two (see Neoconservatism for an example of a
confluence of the two). Realist thinkers include Hans Morgenthau, Niccolò
Machiavelli,
Otto
von Bismarck,
George
F. Kennan
and others. Recent practitioners of Idealism in the United States have included
Ronald
Reagan
and George
W. Bush.[4]
LIBERALISM
Liberal international relations theory arose after World War
I in response to the inability of states to control and limit war in their
international relations. Early adherents include Woodrow Wilson and Norman Angell, who argued vigorously
that states mutually gained from cooperation and that war was so destructive to
be essentially futile.
Liberalism was not recognized as a coherent
theory as such until it was collectively and derisively termed idealism by E. H. Carr.
A new version of "idealism" that focused on human rights as the basis of the
legitimacy of international law was advanced by Hans Köchler.
Liberalism is one of the main schools of international relations theory. Its roots lie in the
broader liberal thought originating
in the Enlightenment. The central issues
that it seeks to address are the problems of achieving lasting peace and
cooperation in international relations, and the various methods that could
contribute their achievement.
Broad areas of study within liberal
international relations theory include:
·
The
democratic
peace theory,
and, more broadly, the effect of domestic political regime types and domestic politics
on international relations; states with similar modes of democratic governance
do not fight one another;
·
The
commercial peace theory, arguing that free
trade has pacifying effects on international relations. Current explorations of
globalization and interdependence are a broader
continuation of this line of inquiry;
·
Institutional peace
theory,
which attempts to demonstrate how cooperation can be sustained in anarchy, how long-term interests can be
pursued over short-term interests, and how actors may realize absolute gains
instead of seeking relative gains;
·
Related,
the effect of international organizations on international
politics, both in their role as forums for states to pursue their interests,
and in their role as actors in their own right;
·
The
role of international
law
in moderating or constraining state behavior;
·
The
effects of liberal norms on international
politics, especially relations between liberal states;
·
The
role of various types of unions in international
politics, such as highly institutionalized alliances (e.g. NATO), confederations, leagues, federations, and evolving
entities like the European
Union;
and,
·
The
role, or potential role, of cosmopolitanism in transcending the state and affecting
international relations.
Main
article: Liberal international relations theory
Liberalism
manifested a tempered version of Wilson's idealism in the wake of World War I.
Cognizant of the failures of Idealism to prevent renewed isolationism following World War
I, and its inability to manage the balance of power in Europe to prevent
the outbreak of a new war, liberal thinkers devised a set of international institutions
based on rule of law and regularized interaction. These international
organizations, such as the United Nations and the NATO, or even international regimes such as
the Bretton
Woods system,
and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), were
calculated both to maintain a balance of power as well as regularize
cooperation between nations.
Democratic peace theory (or simply the
"democratic peace") is the theory that democracies don't go to war with each other.[1] How well the theory
matches reality depends a great deal on one's definition of
"democracy" and "war".[2] For example,
Some have preferred terms like "mutual
democratic pacifism"[3] or
"inter-democracy nonaggression hypothesis" for the theory, to clarify
that it is not the peace itself that is
democratic, but rather the countries involved.[4]
Among proponents of the theory, several
explanations have been offered for it:
·
that
democratic leaders must answer to the voters for war, and therefore have an
incentive to seek alternatives;
·
that
such statesmen have practice settling matters by discussion, not by arms, and
do the same in foreign policy;
·
that
democracies view non-democracies as threatening, and go to war with them over
issues which would have been settled peacefully between democracies;
·
that democracies tend to be wealthier than
other countries, and the wealthy tend to avoid war, having more to lose.
Physicist turned historian Spencer R. Weart disagrees with this,
saying, "It is not because of their advanced economic development--wealthy
countries fight wars about as often as poor ones."[5]
Among those who dispute the theory, there are
also several opinions: that the claim is a statistical artifact, explicable by
chance; and that definitions of democracy and war can be deliberately
cherry-picked to show a pattern that may not be there.
NEOLIBERALISM
In the study of international
relations,
neoliberalism refers to a school of thought which believes that
nation-states are, or at least should be, concerned first and foremost with absolute gains rather than relative gains to other
nation-states. This theory is often mistaken with neoliberal economic ideology, although
both use some common methodological tools, such as game theory.
As a part of liberal
international relations theory, absolute
gain is a term used to describe how (primarily) states will act in the
international community. The theory says that international actors will look at
the total effect of a decision on the state or organization and act
accordingly. The international actor's interests not only include power ratios
but also encompass the economic and cultural effects of an action as well. The
theory is also interrelated with a non-zero-sum game which proposes that through use of comparative
advantage, all states who engage in
peaceful relations and trade can expand wealth. This differs from theories that
employ relative
gain, which seeks to describe the
actions of states only in respect to power balances and without regard to other
factors, such as economics. Relative gain is related to zero-sum game,
which states that wealth cannot be expanded and the only way a state can become
richer is to take wealth from another state.
Relative gain,
in international
relations, describes the actions of states only in
respect to power balances and without regard to other factors, such as economics. In
international relations, cooperation may be necessary to balance power, but
concern for relative gains will limit that cooperation due to the low quality
of information about other states' behavior and interests. Relative gain is
related to zero-sum game, which states that wealth cannot be expanded and the
only way a state can become richer is to take wealth from another state.[1]
Relative gains differ from absolute
gain, which is the total effect of a
decision on the state or organization, regardless of gains made by others.
Neoliberalism, liberal
institutionalism or neo-liberal institutionalism[21] is an advancement of
liberal thinking. It argues that international institutions can allow nations
to successfully cooperate in the international system.
Robert O. Keohane and
Joseph S. Nye, in response to neorealism, develop an opposing theory they dub
"Complex
interdependence."
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye explain, “…complex interdependence sometimes
comes closer to reality than does realism.”[3] In explaining this,
Keohane and Nye cover the three assumptions in realist thought: First, states
are coherent units and are the dominant actors in international relations;
second, force is a usable and effective instrument of policy; and finally, the
assumption that there is a hierarchy in international
politics.[4] The heart of Keohane and Nye’s
argument is that in international politics there are, in fact, multiple
channels that connect societies exceeding the conventional Westphalian system of states.
This manifests itself in many forms ranging from informal governmental ties to multinational corporations and organizations.
Here they define their terminology; interstate relations are those channels
assumed by realists; transgovernmental relations occur when one relaxes
the realist assumption that states act coherently as units; transnational
applies when one removes the assumption that states are the only units. It is
through these channels that political exchange occurs, not through the limited
interstate channel as championed by realists. Secondly, Keohane and Nye argue
that there is not, in fact, a hierarchy among issues, meaning that not only is
the martial arm of foreign policy not the supreme tool by which to carry out a
state's agenda, but that there are a multitude of different agendas that come
to the forefront. The line between domestic and foreign policy becomes blurred
in this case, as realistically there is no clear agenda in interstate
relations. Finally, the use of military force is not exercised when complex
interdependence prevails. The idea is developed that between countries in which
a complex interdependence exists, the role of the military in resolving
disputes is negated. However, Keohane and Nye go on to state that the role of
the military is in fact important in that "alliance’s political and
military relations with a rival bloc."
OTHER
Europe is living in a “Kantian worldly heaven”, while
America is living in a “Hobbesian authorized universe.”
The heavenly Kantian world refers to the concept of a
perpetual peace as described by Immanuel Kant, the German 18th
century philosopher. This concept highlights the idea that to reach eternal
peace on an international scale, a foedus
pacificum should be formed. This is a peace federation which is approved
of by countries that accept the Republican arrangement which honors moral
autonomy, individualism and social order.
The Hobbesian universe refers to Thomas Hobbes’s dark
view of society. This British philosopher from the 17th century
regarded the natural human state to be one of anarchy, a constant war of all
against all. Hobbes saw life as solitary, brutish, poor,
nasty, and short. In these circumstances, a Leviathan power is needed
which has absolute authority and the power to control anarchistic and brutal
tendencies.
Woodrow Wilson
(Idealism)
Samual Huntington (Clash Of Civilizations) “In his Clash of Civilizations, Samuel
Huntington argues that international conflicts in the future will be
characterized by cultural difference in contrast to the ideological differences
of the Cold War era.”
Alexander Hamliton –Argued for the primacy of politics over
economics in his “Report on Manufactures”. Hamiliton’s view is considered an
intellectual precursor to economic
nationalism or neomercantilism in its advocacy of economic
self-sufficiency. He asserted that the U.S. government should actively promote
a highly diversified economy based on industrial production. A strong, diverse
domestic economy is crucial to a natiion’s security because it enables a state
to take care of itself in times of crisis. Hamilton advocates a central role
for the government in the development and protection of key national industries
and the management of the economy.
Adam Smith – Opposed Mercantilism (the practice of
maintaining a trade surplus on the erroneous belief that doing so increase
wealth), he argued for free trade and open markets and paved the way for
Comparative Advantage. His The Wealth of
Nations addresses the essence of human beings and the role of government in
society. According to Smith, human beings have a natural inclination to “truck,
barter, and exchange one thing for another.” Human beings are essentially
economic creatures driven by a quest to acquire and dispose of property.
Society is born out of economic exchange between individuals. Smith argues that
self-interest motivates individuals to act, yet this selfish behavior can have
a surprising result—social harmony. Unlike Hobbes, who argues that selfish behavior makes
life particularly nasty, Smith argues that the “market” can harness the selfish
impulses of individuals and propel a society to progressively higher levels of
development. According to Smith, the market is governed by an “invisible hand”
that regulates the behavior of individuals in a society. Self-interested
individuals interacting with other self interested individuals will create
competition to generate the goods and services a society needs and wants at a
price it is willing to pay. Goods and services are not produced out of kindness
and goodwill. They are provided out of self-interest of the producer.
Competition ensures that no one provider will artificially raise prices to take
advantage of consumers, because a competitor will offer the same good or
service at a fair price. For Smith, self-regulating market promotes the welfare
of individuals and societies.
David Ricardo – Comparative
Advantage: Builds on the work of
Adam Smith and highlights the importance of international trade for states in
his classic work, The Principles of
Political Economy and Taxation. International trade is important to states
because domestic economies are constrained by limited resources and conflicting
interests, while the international economy provides additional avenues for
growth and expansion. States benefit from international trade by exporting
products in which they have a comparative advantage.
Karl Marx – Communism’s most zealous intellectual
advocate. According to Marx, capitalism contained the seeds
of its own destruction. Communism was the inevitable end to the process of
evolution begun with feudalism and passing through capitalism and socialism. Marx wrote
extensively about the economic causes of this process in Capital. Volume one was
published in 1867 and the later two volumes, heavily edited by Engels, were
published posthumously in 1885 and 1894.
The
labor theory of value, decreasing
rates of profit, and increasing concentration of wealth are key components of
Marx’s economic thought. His comprehensive treatment of capitalism stands in
stark contrast, however, to his treatment of socialism and communism, which
Marx handled only superficially. He declined to speculate on how those two
economic systems would operate.
•
Market
Prices
–
Something
is worth what someone is willing to pay for it.
–
Entirely
Subjective
•
Labor
Theory of Value (Marx)
–
Something
is worth the amount of labor put into it
–
Objective
Lenin
Immanuel Kant - In Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch[72]
Kant listed several conditions that he thought necessary for ending wars and
creating a lasting peace. They included a world of constitutional
republics.[73] His
classical
republican theory was extended in the Science
of Right', the first part of the Metaphysics of
Morals (1797).[74]
"Kant's
political teaching may be summarized in a phrase: republican government and
international organization. In more characteristically Kantian terms, it is
doctrine of the state based upon the law (Rechtsstaat)
and of eternal peace. Indeed, in each of these formulations, both terms express
the same idea: that of legal constitution or of "peace through law." ... Taken simply by itself, Kant's political
philosophy, being essentially a legal doctrine, rejects by definition the
opposition between moral education and the play of passions as alternate
foundations for social life. The state is defined as the union of men under
law. The state rightly so called is constituted by laws which are necessary a
priory because they flow from very concept of law. A regime can be judged by no
other criteria nor be assigned any other functions, than those proper to the
lawful order as such." [75]
He
opposed "democracy," which at his time meant direct democracy,
believing that majority rule posed a threat to individual liberty. He stated,
"...democracy is, properly speaking, necessarily a despotism, because it
establishes an executive power in which 'all' decide for or even against one
who does not agree; that is, 'all,' who are not quite all, decide, and this is
a contradiction of the general will with itself and with freedom."[76] As
most writers at the time he distinguished three forms of government i.e.
democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy with mixed government
as the most ideal form of it.
REALISM focuses on state security and power above all
else. Early realists such as E.H.
Carr
and Hans Morgenthau argued that states are self-interested,
power-seeking rational actors, who seek to maximize their security and chances
of survival. Cooperation between states is a way to maximize each individual
state's security (as opposed to more idealistic reasons). Similarly, any act of
war must be based on self-interest, rather than on idealism. Many realists saw World War II as the vindication of
their theory.
It should be noted that classical writers
such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Theodore
Roosevelt,
are often cited as "founding fathers" of realism by contemporary
self-described realists.[citation needed] However, while their
work may support realist doctrine, it is not likely that they would have
classified themselves as realists (in this sense of the term). Realists are
often split up into two groups: Classical or Human Nature Realists (as
described here) and Structural or Neorealists (below).
Political realism believes that politics,
like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in
human nature. To improve society, it is first necessary to understand the laws
by which society lives. The operation of these laws being impervious to our
preferences, persons will challenge them only at the risk of failure. Realism,
believing as it does in the objectivity of the laws of politics, must also
believe in the possibility of developing a rational theory that reflects,
however imperfectly and one-sidedly, these objective laws. It believes also,
then, in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and
opinion-between what is true objectively and rationally, supported by evidence
and illuminated by reason, and what is only a subjective judgment, divorced
from the facts as they are and informed by prejudice and wishful thinking.
The placement of Realism under positivism is
far from unproblematic however. E.H. Carr's 'What is History' was a deliberate
critique of positivism, and Hans Morgenthau's aim in 'Scientific Man vs Power
Politics' - as the title implies - was to demolish any conception that
international politics/power politics can be studied scientifically.
Realism or political realism[8] has been the dominant
theory of international
relations
since the conception of the discipline.[9] The theory claims to
rely upon an ancient tradition of thought which includes writers such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Rousseau. Early realism can be
characterized as a reaction against interwar idealist thinking. The outbreak of
World War II was seen by realists
as evidence of the deficiencies of idealist thinking. There are various strands
of modern day realist thinking. However, the main tenets of the theory have
been identified as statism, survival, and self-help.[9]
COMMON
ASSUMPTIONS
Realist theories tend to uphold that:
·
The
international system exists in a state of constant antagonism.
·
There
is no actor above states capable of regulating their interactions; states must
arrive at relations with other states on their own, rather than it being
dictated to them by some higher controlling entity
(see international anarchy).
·
In
pursuit of national security, states strive to attain as many resources as
possible.
·
States
are unitary actors each moving towards their own national interest. There is a general
distrust of long-term cooperation or alliance.
·
The
overriding national interest of each state is its survival.
·
Relations
between states are determined by their levels of power derived primarily
from their military and economic
capabilities.
·
The
interjection of morality and values into international relations causes
reckless commitments, diplomatic rigidity, and the escalation of conflict.
·
Sovereign states are the principal
actors in the international system and special attention is afforded to large
powers as they have the most influence on the international stage. International institutions, non-governmental
organizations, multinational corporations, individuals and other sub-state or
trans-state actors are viewed as having little independent influence.
In summary, realists believe that mankind is
not inherently benevolent but rather self-centered and competitive. This
perspective, which is shared by theorists such as Thomas Hobbes, views human nature
as egocentric (not necessarily selfish) and conflictual unless there exist
conditions under which humans may coexist. This view contrasts with the
approach of liberalism to international relations.
Realists believe that states are inherently
aggressive (offensive
realism)
and/or obsessed with security (defensive realism), and that
territorial expansion is only constrained by opposing power(s). This aggressive
build-up, however, leads to a security dilemma whereby increasing
one's security may bring along even greater instability as an opposing power
builds up its own arms in response (an arms race). Thus, security
becomes a zero-sum game where only relative
gains can be made.
Realists believe that there are no universal principles
with which all states may guide their actions. Instead, a state must always be
aware of the actions of the states around it and must use a pragmatic approach
to resolve problems as they arise.
·
Statism: Realists believe that nation states are the
main actors in international politics.[10] As such it is a
state-centric theory of international relations. This contrasts with liberal
international relations theories which accommodate roles for non-state actors and international
institutions. This difference is sometimes expressed by describing a realist
world view as one which sees nation states as billiard balls, liberals would
consider relationships between states to be more of a cobweb.
·
Survival: Realists believe that the international
system is governed by anarchy, meaning that there is no central authority.[8] Therefore,
international politics is a struggle for power between self-interested states.[11]
·
Self-help: Realists believe that no other states can be
relied upon to help guarantee the state's survival.
Realism makes several key assumptions. It
assumes that nation-states are unitary, geographically-based actors in an anarchic international system with no authority
above capable of regulating interactions between states as no true
authoritative world
government
exists. Secondly, it assumes that sovereign states, rather than IGOs,
NGOs or MNCs, are the primary actors in international affairs. Thus, states, as
the highest order, are in competition with one another. As such, a state acts
as a rational autonomous actor in
pursuit of its own self-interest with a primary goal to maintain and ensure its
own security—and thus its sovereignty and survival. Realism holds that in
pursuit of their interests, states will attempt to amass resources, and that relations
between states are determined by their relative levels of power. That level of power
is in turn determined by the state's military, economic, and political
capabilities.
Some realists (human nature realists)[12] believe that states
are inherently aggressive, that territorial expansion is constrained only by
opposing powers, while others (offensive/defensive realists)[13] believe that states
are obsessed with the security and continuation of the state's existence. The
defensive view can lead to a security dilemma where increasing
one's own security can bring along greater instability as the opponent(s)
builds up its own arms, making security a zero-sum game where only relative
gains can be made.
Realist thinkers include Hans Morgenthau, Niccolò
Machiavelli,
Otto
von Bismarck,
George
F. Kennan
and others.
While Realism as a formal discipline in
international relations did not arrive until World War II, its primary
assumptions have been expressed in earlier writings:[2][3]
·
Sun
Tzu
(or Sunzi), an ancient Chinese military strategist who wrote the Art of War.
·
Thucydides, an ancient Greek
historian who wrote the History of the Peloponnesian War and is also cited as
an intellectual forebearer of realpolitik.
·
Chanakya (or
Kautilya) early Indian statesman, and writer on the Arthashastra.
·
Han
Feizi,
Chinese scholar who theorised Legalism (or Legism) and who
served in the court of the King of Qin - later unifier of China ending the Warring
States Period.
His writings include The Two Handles (about punishments
and rewards as tools of governance). He theorised about a neutral, manipulative
ruler who would act as Head of State while secretly controlling the executive
through his ministers - the ones to take real responsibility for any policy.
·
Niccolò
Machiavelli,
a Florentine political philosopher, who wrote Il Principe (The Prince)
in which he held that the sole aim of a prince (politician) was to seek power,
regardless of religious or ethical considerations.
·
Cardinal
Richelieu,
French statesman who destroyed domestic factionalism and guided France to a
position of dominance in foreign affairs.
·
Thomas Hobbes, an English
philosopher who wrote Leviathan in which he stated
the state of nature was prone to a "war of all against all".
·
Frederick
the Great,
Prussian monarch who transformed Prussia into a great European power through
warfare and diplomacy.
·
Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, French diplomat who
guided France and Europe through a variety of political systems.
·
Prince Klemens Wenzel von Metternich, Koblenz-born
Austrian statesman opposed to political revolution.
·
Carl
von Clausewitz,
18-19th century Prussian general and military theorist who wrote On War (Vom Kriege).
·
Otto von Bismarck, Prussian statesman
who coined the term balance of power. Balancing power
means keeping the peace and careful realpolitik practitioners try to
avoid arms races.
·
20th
century proponents of realism include Henry Kissinger, the National
Security Adviser and Secretary of State to President Richard Nixon, French General and
President Charles
de Gaulle,
and Soviet leader Joseph
Stalin.
Classical realism states that it is
fundamentally the nature of man that pushes states and individuals to act in a
way that places interests over ideologies. Classical realism is defined as the
"drive for power and the will to dominate [that are] held to be
fundamental aspects of human nature".[4]
Modern realism began as a serious field of
research in the United States during and after World War II. This evolution was
partly fueled by European war migrants like Hans Morgenthau.
·
George F. Kennan - Containment
·
Nicholas Spykman - Geostrategy, Containment
·
Herman Kahn - Nuclear strategy
Thucydides (classical realism)
·
States are unequal in power
·
Choices are limited and have consequences
·
Power overrides Justice
·
States must be pragmatic in making
decisions
He
has also been called the father of the school of political realism, which views the
relations between nations as based on might rather than right.[2] His text is still
studied at advanced military colleges worldwide, and the Melian dialogue remains a seminal
work of international relations theory.
Machiavelli- (classical realism)
·
World is dangerous and opportune place
·
Power and deception are primary means of
foreign policy
·
Christian ethics are counterproductive
·
State of Nature – All at war with all,
Security Dilemma
·
State is Leviathan created to protect
individuals
·
State of nature between states persists
The first modern philosopher to articulate a detailed
contract theory was Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). According to Hobbes, the lives of
individuals in the state of nature were "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short",
a state in which self-interest and the absence of rights and contracts
prevented the 'social', or society. Life was 'anarchic' (without leadership/
the concept of sovereignty). Individuals in the state of nature were apolitical
and asocial. This state of nature is followed by the social contract.
The social contract was an 'occurrence' during which
individuals came together and ceded some of their individual rights so that others would cede theirs (e.g. person A gives up his/her right
to kill person B if person B does the same). This resulted in the establishment
of the state, a sovereign entity (like the individuals, now under its rule,
used to be) which would create laws to regulate social interactions. Human life
was thus no longer "a war of all against all".
But
the state system, which grew out of the social contract, was anarchic (without
leadership). Just as the individuals in the state of nature
had been sovereigns and thus guided by self-interest and the absence of rights,
so states now acted in their self-interest in competition with each other.
Just like the state of nature, states were thus bound to be in conflict because
there was no sovereign over and above the state (i.e. more powerful) capable of
imposing social-contract laws. Indeed, Hobbes' work helped to serve as a basis
for the realism theories of international relations, advanced by E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau.
The US has taken a
centralized authority system stance that was discussed by the classic realists
Thomas Hobbes in which the state alone is entrusted with acting out against
potential aggressors
His 1651 book Leviathan established the
foundation for most of Western political philosophy from the perspective of social contract theory.[2]
In Leviathan, Hobbes set out his
doctrine of the foundation of states and legitimate
governments – originating social
contract theory.
Leviathan was written during the English Civil War; much of the book is
occupied with demonstrating the necessity of a strong central authority to
avoid the evil of discord and civil war.
Hobbes was a champion
of absolutism
for the sovereign
but he also developed some of the fundamentals of European liberal
thought:
the right of the individual; the natural equality of all men; the artificial
character of the political order (which led to the later distinction between civil society and the state); the
view that all legitimate political power must be "representative" and
based on the consent of the people; and a liberal interpretation of law which
leaves people free to do whatever the law does not explicitly forbid.[3]
He was one of the founders of modern
political philosophy. His understanding of humans as being matter and motion,
obeying the same physical laws as other matter and motion, remains influential;
and his account of human nature as self-interested cooperation, and of
political communities as being based upon a "social contract" remains one of
the major topics of political
philosophy.
E.H. Carr
(Realist Cretique Of Idealism)
Carr
contributed to the foundation of what is now known as classical realism in International relations theory. Through study of
history (work of Thucydides and Machiavelli) and reflection and
deep epistemological disagreement with Idealism, the dominant International relations
theory between the World Wars, he came up with realism. In his book The Twenty Years' Crisis, Carr defined three
dichotomies of realism and utopianism (Idealism), derived from Machiavellian
realism:
In the first place, history is a sequence of
cause and effect, whose course can be analysed and understood by intellectual
effort, but not (as the utopians believe) directed by "
imagination ". Secondly; theory does not (as the utopians assume)
create practice, but practice theory. In Machiavelli's words, " good counsels, whence so ever they come, are born of
the wisdom of the prince, and not the wisdom of the prince from good counsels
". Thirdly, politics are not (as the utopians pretend) a function of
ethics, but ethics of politics. Men " are kept
honest by constraint ". Machiavelli recognised the importance of morality,
but thought that there could be no effective morality where there was no effective
authority. Morality is the product of power. [Carr, 1939]
In the second part of the book The Twenty Years' Crisis, Carr defined six
distinctions between Realism and Utopianism. The first being two schematic
descriptions of idealism and realism (utopia and reality). The utopian believes
in the possibility of transforming society by an act of will. The main problem
of the utopian is his/her lack of information regarding the constraints that
the reality poses upon us. Not regarding these constraints seriously, the
utopian cannot assess his/her current position and thus is unable to move from
the actual state of affairs to his/her desire. A Utopian may want a world in
peace, but have no viable plan of action to bring peace on Earth, only the
belief that it should be so and the conviction that such a belief will bring
peace into being.
On the other hand, the realists take the
society we live in as a historical consequence. The social reality is the product of a
long chain of causality, a predetermined result. Thus, it cannot be changed by
an act of will. The realist, taking things as they are, deprives him/herself
from the possibility of changing the world.
The second distinction is that between theory
and practice. For the utopian, we derive the answer to "what should be
done?" from theory. The all-important question is to be able to conceive
of a utopia. Once the target is constructed in mind, all we have to do is to
get there. Thus, utopian confuses what "is" and what "ought to
be". When a utopian says "men are equal", he actually means
"men ought to be equal". The difference is crucial and confusing in
actual politics. For the realist, theory is derived from reality, the actual
state of affairs. While the utopian tries to reproduce reality with reference
to theory, the realist tries to produce theory from reality. Thus, for a
realist, a theory based on the equality of men is simply wrong or wishful
thinking. The realist theory is descriptive, and you cannot derive policy from
that theory; it is not prescriptive.
For Carr, one has to see the interdependence
of the two. Most of our reality is the product of some ideas that took shape in
the form of institutions or applied rules. Every theory carries in it a part of
reality and vice versa. The problems we face in reality force us to think and
imagine new ways of reality. The theory (solution) we produce changes reality
and becomes part of reality. When that reality creates new problems, we come up
with further theory to solve them and it goes on like this. That is a circle of
causality.
The third distinction is that between the
intellectual who derives the truth from books and the bureaucrat who derives it
from actual experience. The intellectual believes in the predominance of theory
and thus thinks of himself as the true guide of the so-called man of action.
The bureaucrat is bound up with the existing order. He has no formula or theory
that guides him. He merely tries to make the existing order, within which he
exists, continue to exist.
The fourth distinction is that between left
and right. The left is progressive in the utopian sense while the right is
conservative in the realist sense.
The fifth is between radical and conservative
(left and right, though Carr notes, that not always radicals and conservatives
represent those political orientation). Radicals are utopians, intellectuals,
theoretician, while conservatives are realists, bureaucrats and people from
practice.
Finally, the same distinction appears between
ethics and politics. The utopian believes in the predominance of ethics as a
guide to policy. The realist believes that ethics is derived from the relations
of power as they stand. Thus, politics predominates. For Carr, the ability to
see from both angles is the right way to go about.
Hanns Morgenthau (Realists)- Politics Among Nations (1960, 3rd ed)
Six Principles
·
Politics rooted in human nature
(unchanging, self-interested, etc.)
·
Politics is autonomous sphere distinct from
economics and ethics
·
Self-interest is a basic fact of the human
condition
·
Political ethics are different from private
morality
·
Imposing ideologies on other states is
dangerous for system and the state
·
Statecraft is sober
exercise in limits of choice and human imperfections.
Schelling- (Realists) Strategy
of Conflict (1980), Arms and Influence
Schelling's
book, The Strategy of Conflict (1960),[5]
has pioneered the study of bargaining and strategic behavior in what Schelling refers to, in the book, as
"conflict behavior".
·
Focuses of foreign policy decision making
(as opposed to systems models)
·
Diplomacy is bargaining under threat of
military action
·
How can threats be sued to get adversary to
do what you want?
·
Coercion: Threats, Credibility, Thresholds
·
Compellence vs Deterrence
Main
article: Neorealism (international relations)
Neorealism derives from classical realism except
that instead of human nature, its focus is predominantly on the international
system. While states remain the principal actors, greater attention is
given to the forces above and below the states through levels of analysis or structure-agency
debate.
The international system is seen as a structure acting on the state with
individuals below the level of the state acting as agency on the state
as a whole.
While neorealism shares a focus on the international
system with the English School, neorealism differs in the emphasis it
places on the permanence of conflict. To ensure state security, states must be
on constant preparation for conflict through economic and military build-up.
Prominent neorealists:
Neorealism or
structural realism[14] is a development of
realism advanced by Kenneth
Waltz
in Theory of International Politics. It is, however, only
one strand of neorealism. Joseph Grieco has combined
neo-realist thinking with more traditional realists. This strand of theory is
sometimes called "modern realism".[15] Waltz's neorealism
contends that the effect of structure must be taken into account in explaining
state behavior. Structure is defined twofold as a) the ordering principle of
the international system which is anarchy and b) the distribution of
capabilities across units. Waltz also challenges traditional realism's emphasis
on traditional military power, instead characterizing power in terms of the combined
capabilities of the state.[16]
Neorealism derives from classical realism
except that instead of human nature, its focus is predominantly on the international
system. While states remain the principal actors, greater attention is
given to the forces above and below the states through levels of analysis or structure-agency
debate.
The international system is seen as a structure acting on the state with
individuals below the level of the state acting as agency on the state
as a whole.
While neorealism shares a focus on the international
system with the English School, neorealism differs in the emphasis it
places on the permanence of conflict. To ensure state security, states must be
on constant preparation for conflict through economic and military build-up.
o
States
are principal actors,
o
States
are unitary
o
Sates
are rational and seek to maximize security (defend sovereignty)
o
World
is in a state of anarchy, self-help is the rule
o
Kauppi
and Viotti: Neorealists focus on distribution of power, Traditional realists
include norms
o
Robert
Keohane: Neo realists – security is goal of state; traditionals- power is goal
of state
o
War
o
Alliances
(intervening variable)
o
International
system: distribution of capabilities
·
Key Propositions:
o
Security
Dilemma: (Kenneth Waltz)anything one state does to
make itself more secure (i.e., more powerful) makes other states feel less
secure. Security is Zero-sum game, cooperation is unlikely
o
Balance
of Power Theory: (Kenneth Waltz) War is least likely between two nations with
the same capabilities Bi-polar systems are more stable that
multi-polar systems.
o
Hegemonic
Stability Theory: (Robert Gilpin): War
is least likely in a system dominated by one large power.
o
Power
Transition Theory: War is most likely when a challenger to a hegemon is rising.
o
Relative
Gains (Joe Grieco): Nations will tend to trade with allies to prevent a shift
in relative capabilities.
o
Alliance
Formation (Stephen Walt): Balancing vs Bandwagoning
o
System
Structure (Stephen Krasner): World system reflects the distribution of capabilities
Kenneth Waltz – (NeoRealism) Theory
of International Politics (1979)
·
Focuses on structure of international
system
·
Seeks scientific explanation of IR
·
Balance of Power
Theory
·
Waltz's initial contribution to the field of
political science was his 1959 book, "Man, the State, and
War", which classified theories of international relations into three
categories, or levels of analysis. The first level explained international
politics as being driven primarily by actions of individuals, or outcomes of
psychological forces. The second level explained international politics as
being driven by the domestic regimes of states, while the third level focused
on the role of systemic factors, or the effect that international anarchy was
exerting on state behavior. "Anarchy" in this context is meant not as
a condition of chaos or disorder, but one in which there is no sovereign body
that governs nation-states.
·
Waltz's
key contribution to the realm of political science is in the creation of
neorealism (or structural realism, as he calls it), a theory of International
Relations which posits that states' actions can often be explained by the
pressures exerted on them by international competition, which limits and
constrains their choices. Neorealism thus aims to explain recurring patterns of
state behavior, such as why the relations between Sparta and Athens resembled
in important ways the relations between the US and the USSR.
·
Waltz argues that the world exists in a state
of perpetual international anarchy. Waltz distinguishes the anarchy of the
international environment from the order of the domestic one. In the domestic
realm, all actors may appeal to, and be compelled by, a central authority -
'the state' or 'the government' - but in the international realm, no such
source of order exists. The anarchy of international politics – its lack of a
central enforcer – means that states must act in a way that ensures their
security above all, or else risk falling behind. This is a fundamental fact of
political life faced by democracies and dictatorships alike: except in rare
cases, they cannot count on the good will of others to help them, so they must
always be ready to fend for themselves.
·
Like
most neorealists Waltz accepts
that globalization is posing new challenges to states, but he does not believe
states are being replaced, because no other non-state actor can equal the
capabilities of the state. Waltz has suggested that globalization is a fad of
the 1990s and if anything the role of the state has expanded its functions in
response to global transformations.
·
Neorealism
was Waltz's response
to what he saw as the deficiencies of classical realism. Although the terms are
sometimes used interchangeably, neorealism and realism have a number of
fundamental differences. The main distinction between the two theories is that
classical realism puts human nature, or the urge to
dominate, at the center of its explanation for war, while neorealism stakes no
claim on human nature and argues instead that the pressures of anarchy shape
outcomes regardless of human nature or domestic regimes.
·
Waltz's theory, as he explicitly makes clear in
"Theory of International Politics", is not a theory of foreign policy
and does not attempt to predict or explain specific state actions, such as the
collapse of the Soviet Union. The theory explains only general principles of
behavior that govern relations between states in an anarchic international
system, rather than specific actions. These recurring principles of behavior
include balancing of power (the theory was revised by Stephan Walt, modifying
the "balance of power"
concept to "balance of threat"), entering into individually
sub-optimal arms races, and exercising restraint in proportion to relative
power. In Theory of International Politics (1979:6) Waltz suggests that
explanation rather than prediction is expected from a good social science
theory, since social scientists cannot run controlled experiments that give the
natural sciences so much predictive power.
Main
article: English school of
international relations theory
The English School holds that the
international system, while anarchical in structure, forms a "society of
states" where common norms and interests allow for more order and
stability than what might be expected in a strict realist view. Prominent
English School writer Hedley Bull's 1977 classic entitled The Anarchical
Society is a key statement of this position.
Prominent liberal realists:
First
published Mon Jul 26, 2010
In the discipline of international relations
there are contending general theories or theoretical perspectives. Realism,
also known as political realism, is a view of international politics that
stresses its competitive and conflictual side. It is usually contrasted with
idealism or liberalism, which tends to emphasize cooperation. Realists consider
the principal actors in the international arena to be states, which are
concerned with their own security, act in pursuit of their own national
interests, and struggle for power. The negative side of the realists' emphasis
on power and self-interest is their skepticism regarding the relevance of
ethical norms to relations among states. National politics is the realm of
authority and law, whereas international politics, they sometimes claim, is a
sphere without justice, characterized by active or potential conflict among
states.
Not all realists, however, deny the presence
of ethics in international relations. The distinction should be drawn between
classical realism—represented by such twentieth-century theorists as Reinhold
Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau—and radical or extreme realism. While classical
realism emphasizes the concept of national interest, it is not the
Machiavellian doctrine “that anything is justified by reason of state” (Bull
1995, 189). Nor does it involve the glorification of war or conflict. The
classical realists do not reject the possibility of moral judgment in
international politics. Rather, they are critical of moralism—abstract moral
discourse that does not take into account political realities. They assign
supreme value to successful political action based on prudence: the ability to
judge the rightness of a given action from among possible alternatives on the
basis of its likely political consequences.
Realism encompasses a variety of approaches
and claims a long theoretical tradition. Among its founding fathers,
Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes are the names most usually mentioned.
Twentieth-century classical realism has today been largely replaced by
neorealism, which is an attempt to construct a more scientific approach to the
study of international relations. Both classical realism and neorealism have
been subjected to criticism from IR theorists representing liberal, critical,
and post-modern perspectives.
Like other classical political theorists,
Thucydides (460–411 B.C.E.) saw politics as involving moral questions. Most
importantly, he asks whether relations among states to which power is crucial
can also be guided by the norms of justice. His History of the Peloponnesian War is in fact
neither a work of political philosophy nor a sustained theory of international
relations. Much of this work, which presents a partial account of the armed
conflict between Athens and Sparta that took place from 431 to 404 B.C.E.,
consists of paired speeches by personages who argue opposing sides of an issue.
Nevertheless, if the History
is described as the only acknowledged classical text in international
relations, and if it inspires theorists from Hobbes to contemporary international
relations scholars, this is because it is more than a chronicle of events, and
a theoretical position can be extrapolated from it. Realism is expressed in the
very first speech of the Athenians recorded in the History—a speech given at the debate that
took place in Sparta just before the war. Moreover, a realist perspective is
implied in the way Thucydides explains the cause of the Peloponnesian War, and
also in the famous “Melian Dialogue,” in the statements made by the Athenian
envoys.
International relations realists emphasize
the constraints imposed on politics by the nature of human beings, whom they
consider egoistic, and by the absence of international government. Together
these factors contribute to a conflict-based paradigm of international
relations, in which the key actors are states, in which power and security
become the main issues, and in which there is little place for morality. The
set of premises concerning state actors, egoism, anarchy, power, security, and
morality that define the realist tradition are all present in Thucydides.
(1) Human nature is a starting point for
realism in international relations. Realists view human beings as inherently
egoistic and self-interested to the extent that self-interest overcomes moral
principles. At the debate in Sparta, described in Book I of Thucydides' History, the Athenians
affirm the priority of self-interest over morality. They say that
considerations of right and wrong have “never turned people aside from the
opportunities of aggrandizement offered by superior strength” (chap. 1 par.
76).
(2) Realists, and especially today's
neorealists, consider the absence of government, literally anarchy, to be the primary
determinant of international political outcomes. The lack of a common
rule-making and enforcing authority means, they argue, that the international
arena is essentially a self-help system. Each state is responsible for its own
survival and is free to define its own interests and to pursue power. Anarchy
thus leads to a situation in which power has the overriding role in shaping
interstate relations. In the words of the Athenian envoys at Melos, without any
common authority that can enforce order, “the independent states survive [only]
when they are powerful” (5.97).
(3) Insofar as realists envision the world of
states as anarchic, they likewise view security as a central issue. To attain
security, states try to increase their power and engage in power-balancing for
the purpose of deterring potential aggressors. Wars are fought to prevent
competing nations from becoming militarily stronger. Thucydides, while
distinguishing between the immediate and underlying causes of the Peloponnesian
War, does not see its real cause in any of the particular events that
immediately preceded its outbreak. He instead locates the cause of the war in
the changing distribution of power between the two blocs of Greek city-states:
the Delian League, under the leadership of Athens, and the Peloponnesian
League, under the leadership of Sparta. According to him, the growth of
Athenian power made the Spartans afraid for their security, and thus propelled
them into war (1.23).
(4) Realists are generally skeptical about
the relevance of morality to international politics. This can lead them to
claim that there is no place for morality in international relations, or that
there is a tension between demands of morality and requirements of successful
political action, or that states have their own morality that is different from
customary morality, or that morality, if any, is merely used instrumentally to
justify states' conduct. A clear case of the rejection of ethical norms in
relations among states can be found in the “Melian Dialogue” (5.85–113). This
dialogue relates to the events of 416 B.C.E., when Athens invaded the island of
Melos. The Athenian envoys presented the Melians with a choice, destruction or
surrender, and from the outset asked them not to appeal to justice, but to
think only about their survival. In the envoys' words, “We both know that the
decisions about justice are made in human discussions only when both sides are
under equal compulsion, but when one side is stronger, it gets as much as it
can, and the weak must accept that” (5.89). To be “under
equal compulsion” means to be under the force of law, and thus to be subjected
to a common lawgiving authority (Korab-Karpowicz 2006, 234). Since such
an authority above states does not exist, the Athenians argue that in this
lawless condition of international anarchy, the only right is the right of the
stronger to dominate the weaker. They explicitly equate right with might, and
exclude considerations of justice from foreign affairs.
We can thus find strong support for a realist
perspective in the statements of the Athenians. The question remains, however,
to what extent their realism coincides with Thucydides' own viewpoint. Although
substantial passages of the “Melian Dialogue,” as well as other parts of the History support a
realistic reading, Thucydides' position cannot be deduced from such selected
fragments, but rather must be assessed on the basis of the wider context of his
book. In fact, even the “Melian Dialogue” itself provides us with a number of
contending views.
Political realism is usually contrasted by IR
scholars with idealism or liberalism, a theoretical perspective that emphasizes
international norms, interdependence among states, and international
cooperation. The “Melian Dialogue,” which is one of the most frequently
commented-upon parts of Thucydides' History,
presents the classic debate between the idealist and realist views: Can
international politics be based on a moral order derived from the principles of
justice, or will it forever remain the arena of conflicting national interests
and power?
For the Melians, who employ idealistic
arguments, the choice is between war and subjection (5.86). They are courageous
and love their country. They do not wish to lose their freedom, and in spite of
the fact that they are militarily weaker than the Athenians, they are prepared
to defend themselves (5.100; 5.112). They base their arguments on an appeal to
justice, which they associate with fairness, and regard the Athenians as unjust
(5.90; 5.104). They are pious, believing that gods will support their just
cause and compensate for their weakness, and trust in alliances, thinking that
their allies, the Spartans, who are also related to them, will help them
(5.104; 5.112). Hence, one can identify in the speech of the Melians elements
of the idealistic or liberal world view: the belief that nations have the right
to exercise political independence, that they have mutual obligations to one
another and will carry out such obligations, and that a war of aggression is
unjust. What the Melians nevertheless lack are resources and foresight. In
their decision to defend themselves, they are guided more by their hopes than
by the evidence at hand or by prudent calculations.
The Athenian argument is based on key realist
concepts such as security and power, and is informed not by what the world
should be, but by what it is. The Athenians disregard any moral talk and urge
the Melians to look at the facts—that is, to recognize their military inferiority,
to consider the potential consequences of their decision, and to think about
their own survival (5.87; 5.101). There appears to be a
powerful realist logic behind the Athenian arguments. Their position,
based on security concerns and self-interest, seemingly involves reliance on
rationality, intelligence, and foresight. However, upon close examination,
their logic proves to be seriously flawed. Melos, a relatively weak state, does
not pose any real security threat to them. The eventual destruction of Melos
does not change the course of the Peloponnesian War, which Athens will lose a
few years later.
In the History,
Thucydides shows that power, if it is unrestrained by moderation and a sense of
justice, brings about the uncontrolled desire for more power. There are no
logical limits to the size of an empire. Drunk with the prospect of glory and
gain after conquering Melos, the Athenians engaged in war against Sicily. They
paid no attention to the Melian argument that considerations of justice are
useful to all in the longer run (5.90). And, as the Athenians overestimate
their strength and in the end lose the war, their self-interested logic proves
to be very shortsighted indeed.
It is utopian to ignore the reality of power
in international relations, but it is equally blind to rely on power alone.
Thucydides appears to support neither the naive idealism of the Melians nor the
cynicism of their Athenian opponents. He teaches us to be on guard “against
naïve-dreaming on international politics,” on the one hand, and “against the
other pernicious extreme: unrestrained cynicism,” on the other (Donnelly 2000,
193). If he can be regarded as a political realist, his realism is nonetheless
not a prefiguring of either realpolitik,
in which traditional ethics is denied, or today's scientific neorealism, in
which moral questions are largely ignored. Thucydides' realism, neither immoral
nor amoral, can rather be compared to that of Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron,
and other twentieth-century classical realists, who, although sensible to the
demands of national interest, would not deny that political actors on the
international scene are subject to moral judgment.
Idealism in international relations, like
realism, can lay claim to a long tradition. Unsatisfied with the world as they
have found it, idealists have always tried to answer the question of “what
ought to be” in politics. Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero were all political
idealists who believed that there were some universal moral values on which
political life could be based. Building on the work of his predecessors, Cicero
developed the idea of a natural moral law that was applicable to both domestic
and international politics. His ideas concerning righteousness in war were
carried further in the writings of the Christian thinkers St. Augustine and St.
Thomas Aquinas. In the late fifteenth century, when Niccolò Machiavelli was
born, the idea that politics, including the relations among states, should be
virtuous, and that the methods of warfare should remain subordinated to ethical
standards, still predominated in political literature.
Machiavelli (1469–1527) challenged this
well-established moral tradition, thus positioning himself as a political
innovator. The novelty of his approach lies in his critique of classical
Western political thought as unrealistic, and in his separation of politics
from ethics. He thereby lays the foundations for modern politics. In chapter XV
of The Prince,
Machiavelli announces that in departing from the teachings of earlier thinkers,
he seeks “the effectual truth of the matter rather than the imagined one.” The
“effectual truth” is for him the only truth worth seeking. It represents the
sum of the practical conditions that he believes are required to make both the
individual and the country prosperous and strong. Machiavelli replaces the
ancient virtue
(a moral quality of the individual, such as justice or self-restraint) with virtù, ability or vigor.
As a prophet of virtù,
he promises to lead both nations and individuals to earthly glory and power.
Machiavellianism is a radical type of
political realism that is applied to both domestic and international affairs.
It is a doctrine which denies the relevance of morality in politics, and claims
that all means (moral and immoral) are justified to achieve certain political
ends. Although Machiavelli never uses the phrase ragione di stato or its French equivalent, raison d'état, what
ultimately counts for him is precisely that: whatever is good for the state and
not ethical scruples or norms
Machiavelli justified immoral actions in
politics, but never refused to admit that they are evil. He operated within the
single framework of traditional morality. It became a specific task of his
nineteenth-century followers to develop the doctrine of a double ethics: one
public and one private, to push Machiavellian realism to even further extremes,
and to apply it to international relations. By asserting that “the state has no
higher duty than of maintaining itself,” Hegel gave an ethical sanction to the
state's promotion of its own interest and advantage against other states
(Meinecke 357). Thus he overturned the traditional morality. The good of the
state was perversely interpreted as the highest moral value, with the extension
of national power regarded as a nation's right and duty. Referring to
Machiavelli, Heinrich von Treitschke declared that the state was power,
precisely in order to assert itself as against other equally independent
powers, and that the supreme moral duty of the state was to foster this power.
He considered international agreements to be binding only insofar as it was
expedient for the state. The idea of an autonomous ethics of state behavior and
the concept of realpolitik
were thus introduced. Traditional ethics was denied and power politics was
associated with a “higher” type of morality. These concepts, along with the
belief in the superiority of Germanic culture, served as weapons with which
German statesmen, from the eighteenth century to the end of the Second World
War, justified their policies of conquest and extermination.
Machiavelli is often praised for his
prudential advice to leaders (which has caused him to be regarded as a founding
master of modern political strategy) and for his defense of the republican form
of government. There are certainly many aspects of his thought that merit such
praise. Nevertheless, it is also possible to see him as the thinker who bears
foremost responsibility for demoralization of Europe. The argument of the
Athenian envoys presented in Thucydides' “Melian Dialogue,” that of
Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic,
or that of Carneades, to whom Cicero refers—all of these challenge the ancient
and Christian views of the unity of politics and ethics. However, before
Machiavelli, this amoral or immoral mode of thinking had never prevailed in the
mainstream of Western political thought. It was the force and timeliness of his
justification of resorting to evil as a legitimate means of achieving political
ends that persuaded so many of the thinkers and political practitioners who
followed him. The effects of Machiavellian ideas, such as the notion that the
employment of all possible means was permissible in war, would be seen on the
battlefields of modern Europe, as mass citizen armies fought against each other
to the deadly end without regard for the rules of justice. The tension between
expediency and morality lost its validity in the sphere of politics. The
concept of a double ethics, private and public, that created a further damage
to traditional, customary ethics was invented. The doctrine of raison d'état ultimately
led to the politics of Lebensraum,
two world wars, and the Holocaust.
Perhaps the greatest problem with realism in
international relations is that it has a tendency to slip into its extreme
version, which accepts any policy that can benefit the state at the expense of
other states, no matter how morally problematic the policy is. Even if they do
not explicitly raise ethical questions, in the works of Waltz and of many other
of today's neorealists, a double ethics is presupposed and words such realpolitik no longer have
the negative connotations that they had for classical realists, such as Hans
Morgenthau.
Thomas Hobbes (1588–1683) was part of an
intellectual movement whose goal was to free the emerging modern science from
the constraints of the classical and scholastic heritage. According to
classical political philosophy, on which the idealist perspective is based,
human beings can control their desires through reason and can work for the
benefit of others, even at the expense of their own benefit. They are thus both
rational and moral agents, capable of distinguishing between right and wrong,
and of making moral choices. They are also naturally social. With great skill
Hobbes attacks these views. His human beings, extremely individualistic rather
than moral or social, are subject to “a perpetual and restless desire of power
after power, that ceases only in death” (Leviathan
XI 2). They therefore inevitably struggle for power. In setting out such ideas,
Hobbes contributes to some of the basic conceptions fundamental to the realist
tradition in international relations, and especially to neorealism. These
include the characterization of human nature as egoistic, the concept of
international anarchy, and the view that politics, rooted in the struggle for
power, can be rationalized and studied scientifically.
One of the most widely known Hobbesian
concepts is that of the anarchic state of nature, seen as entailing a state of
war—and “such a war as is of every man against every man” (XII 8). He derives
his notion of the state of war from his views of both human nature and the
condition in which individuals exist. Since in the state of nature there is no
government and everyone enjoys equal status, every individual has a right to
everything; that is, there are no constraints on an individual's behavior.
Anyone may at any time use force, and all must constantly be ready to counter
such force with force. Hence, driven by acquisitiveness, having no moral
restraints, and motivated to compete for scarce goods, individuals are apt to
“invade” one another for gain. Being suspicious of one another and driven by
fear, they are also likely to engage in preemptive actions and invade one
another to ensure their own safety. Finally, individuals are also driven by
pride and a desire for glory. Whether for gain, safety, or reputation,
power-seeking individuals will thus “endeavor to destroy or subdue one another”
(XIII 3). In such uncertain conditions where everyone is a potential aggressor,
making war on others is a more advantageous strategy than peaceable behavior,
and one needs to learn that domination over others is necessary for one's own
continued survival.
Hobbes is primarily concerned with the
relationship between individuals and the state, and his comments about
relations among states are scarce. Nevertheless, what he says about the lives
of individuals in the state of nature can often also be interpreted as a
description of how states exist in relation to one another. Once states are
established, the individual drive for power becomes the basis for the states'
behavior, which often manifests itself in their efforts to dominate other
states and peoples. States, “for their own security,” writes Hobbes, “enlarge
their dominions upon all pretences of danger and fear of invasion or assistance
that may be given to invaders, [and] endeavour as much as they can, to subdue
and weaken their neighbors” (XIX 4). Accordingly, the quest and struggle for
power lies at the core of the Hobbesian vision of relations among states. The
same would later be true of the model of international relations developed by
Hans Morgenthau, who was deeply influenced by Hobbes and adopted the same view
of human nature. Similarly, the neorealist Kenneth Waltz would follow Hobbes'
lead regarding international anarchy (the fact that sovereign states are not
subject to any higher common sovereign) as the essential element of
international relations.
By subjecting themselves to a sovereign,
individuals escape the war of all against all which Hobbes associates with the
state of nature; however, this war continues to dominate relations among
states. This does not mean that states are always fighting, but rather that
they have a disposition to fight (XIII 8). With each state deciding for itself
whether or not to use force, war may break out at any time. The achievement of
domestic security through the creation of a state is then paralleled by a
condition of inter-state insecurity. One can argue that if Hobbes were fully
consistent, he would agree with the notion that, to escape this condition,
states should also enter into a contract and submit themselves to a world
sovereign. Although the idea of a world state would find support among some of
today's realists, this is not a position taken by Hobbes himself. He does not
propose that a social
contract among nations be implemented to bring international anarchy to
an end. This is because the condition of insecurity in which states are placed
does not necessarily lead to insecurity for individuals. As long as an armed
conflict or other type of hostility between states does not actually break out,
individuals within a state can feel relatively secure. He does not expect that
war could ever be removed from the face of earth or banned.
The denial of the existence of universal
moral principles in the relations among states brings Hobbes close to the
Machiavellians and the followers of the doctrine of raison d'état. His theory of international
relations, which assumes that independent states, like independent individuals,
are enemies by nature, asocial and selfish, and that there is no moral
limitation on their behavior, is a great challenge to the idealist political
vision based on human sociability and to the concept of the international
jurisprudence that is built on this vision. However, what separates Hobbes from
Machiavelli and associates him more with classical realism is his insistence on
the defensive character of foreign policy. His political theory does not put
forward the invitation to do whatever may be advantageous for the state. His
approach to international relations is prudential and pacific: sovereign states,
like individuals, should be disposed towards peace which is commended by
reason.
What Waltz and other neorealist readers of
Hobbes's works sometimes overlook is that he does not perceive international
anarchy as an environment without any rules. By suggesting that certain
dictates of reason apply even in the state of nature, he affirms that more
peaceful and cooperative international relations are possible. Neither does he
deny the existence of international law. Sovereign states can sign treaties with
one another to provide a legal basis for their relations. At the same time,
however, Hobbes seems aware that international rules will often prove
ineffective in restraining the struggle for power. States will interpret them
to their own advantage, and so international law will be obeyed or ignored
according to the interests of the states affected. Hence, international
relations will always tend to be a precarious affair. This grim view of global
politics lies at the core of Hobbes's realism.
Twentieth-century realism was born in
response to the idealist perspective that dominated international relations
scholarship in the aftermath of the First World War. The idealists of the 1920s
and 1930s (also called liberal internationalists or utopians) had the goal of
building peace in order to prevent another world conflict. They saw the
solution to inter-state problems as being the creation of a respected system of
international law, backed by international organizations. This interwar
idealism resulted in the founding of the League of Nations in 1920 and in the
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 outlawing war and providing for the peaceful
settlements of disputes. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, scholars such as Norman
Angell, Alfred Zimmern, and Reymond D. Fosdick, and other prominent idealists
of the era, gave their intellectual support to the League of Nations. Instead
of focusing on what some might see as the inevitability of conflict between
states and peoples, they chose to emphasize the common interests that could
unite humanity, and attempted to appeal to rationality and morality. For them,
war did not originate in an egoistic human nature, but rather in imperfect
social conditions and political arrangements, which could be improved. Yet
their ideas were already being criticized in the early 1930s by Reinhold
Niebuhr and within a few years by E. H. Carr. The League of Nations, which the
United States never joined, and from which Japan and Germany withdrew, could
not prevent the outbreak of the Second World War. This fact, perhaps more than
any theoretical argument, produced a strong realist reaction. Although the
United Nations, founded in 1945, can still be regarded as a product of idealist
political thinking, the discipline of international relations was profoundly
influenced in the initial years of the post-war period by the works of
“classical” realists such as John H. Herz, Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and
Raymond Aron. Then, during the 1950s and 1960s, classical realism came under
challenge of scholars who tried to introduce a more scientific approach to the
study of international politics. During the 1980s it gave way to another trend
in international relations theory—neorealism.
Since it is impossible within the scope of
this article to introduce all of the thinkers who contributed to the
development of twentieth-century classical realism, E. H. Carr and Hans
Morgenthau, as perhaps the most influential among them, have been selected for
discussion here.
In his main work on international relations, The Twenty Years' Crisis,
first published in July 1939, Edward Hallett Carr (1892–1982) attacks the
idealist position, which he describes as “utopianism.” He characterizes this
position as encompassing faith in reason, confidence in progress, a sense of
moral rectitude, and a belief in an underlying harmony of interests. According
to the idealists, war is an aberration in the course of normal life and the way
to prevent it is to educate people for peace, and to build systems of
collective security such as the League of Nations or today's United Nations.
Carr challenges idealism by questioning its claim to moral universalism and its
idea of the harmony of interests. He declares that “morality can only be
relative, not universal” (19), and states that the doctrine of the harmony of
interests is invoked by privileged groups “to justify and maintain their
dominant position” (75).
Carr uses the concept of the relativity of
thought, which he traces to Marx and other modern theorists, to show that
standards by which policies are judged are the products of circumstances and
interests. His central idea is that the interests of a given party always
determine what this party regards as moral principles, and hence, these
principles are not universal. Carr observes that politicians, for example,
often use the language of justice to cloak the particular interests of their
own countries, or to create negative images of other people to justify acts of
aggression. The existence of such instances of morally discrediting a potential
enemy or morally justifying one's own position shows, he argues, that moral
ideas are derived from actual policies. Policies are not, as the idealists
would have it, based on some universal norms, independent of interests of the
parties involved.
If specific moral standards are de facto
founded on interests, Carr's argument goes, there are also interests underlying
what are regarded as absolute principles or universal moral values. While the
idealists tend to regard such values, such as peace or justice, as universal
and claim that upholding them is in the interest of all, Carr argues against
this view. According to him, there are neither universal values nor universal
interests. He says those who refer to universal interests are in fact acting in
their own interests (71). They claim that what is best for them is best for
everyone, and identify their own interests with the universal interest of the
world at large.
The idealist concept of the harmony of interests is
based on the notion that human beings can rationally recognize that they have
some interests in common, and that cooperation is therefore possible. Carr
contrasts this idea with the reality of conflict
of interests. According to him, the world is torn apart by the
particular interests of different individuals and groups. In such a conflictual
environment, order is based on power, not on morality. Further, morality itself
is the product of power (61). Like Hobbes, Carr regards morality as constructed
by the particular legal system that is enforced by a coercive power.
International moral norms are imposed on other countries by dominant nations or
groups of nations that present themselves as the international community as a whole.
They are invented to perpetuate those nations' dominance.
Values that idealists view as good for all,
such as peace, social justice, prosperity, and international order, are
regarded by Carr as mere status
quo notions. The powers that are satisfied with the status quo
regard the arrangement in place as just and therefore preach peace. They try to
rally everyone around their idea of what is good. “Just as the ruling class in
a community prays for domestic peace, which guarantees its own security and predominance, … so international peace becomes a special
vested interest of predominant powers” (76). On the other hand, the unsatisfied
powers consider the same arrangement as unjust, and so prepare for war. Hence,
the way to obtain peace, if it cannot be simply enforced, is to satisfy the
unsatisfied powers. “Those who profit most by [international] order can in the
longer run only hope to maintain it by making sufficient concessions to make it
tolerable to those who profit by it least” (152). The logical conclusion to be
drawn by the reader of Carr's book is the policy of appeasement.
Carr was a sophisticated thinker. He
recognized himself that the logic of “pure realism can offer nothing but a
naked struggle for power which makes any kind of international society
impossible” (87). Although he demolishes what he calls “the current utopia” of
idealism, he at the same time attempts to build “a new utopia,” a realist world
order (ibid.). Thus, he acknowledges that human beings need certain
fundamental, universally acknowledged norms and values, and contradicts his own
argument by which he tries to deny universality to any norms or values. To make
further objections, the fact that the language of universal moral values can be
misused in politics for the benefit of one party or another, and that such
values can only be imperfectly implemented in political institutions, does not
mean that such values do not exist. There is a deep yearning in many human
beings, both privileged and unprivileged, for peace, order, prosperity, and
justice. The legitimacy of idealism consists in the constant attempt to reflect
upon and uphold these values. Idealists fail if in their attempt they do not
pay enough attention to the reality of power. On the other hand, in the world
of pure realism, in which all values are made relative to interests, life turns
into nothing more than a power game and is unbearable.
The Twenty Years' Crisis touches on a number
of universal ideas, but it also reflects the spirit of its time. While we can
fault the interwar idealists for their inability to construct international
institutions strong enough to prevent the outbreak of the Second World War,
this book indicates that interwar realists were likewise unprepared to meet the
challenge. Carr frequently refers to Germany under Nazi rule as if it were a
country like any other. He says that should Germany cease to be an unsatisfied
power and “become supreme in Europe,” it would adopt a language of
international solidarity similar to that of other Western powers (79). The
inability of Carr and other realists to recognize the perilous nature of
Nazism, and their belief that Germany could be satisfied by territorial
concessions, helped to foster a political environment in which the latter was
to grow in power, annex Czechoslovakia at will, and be militarily opposed in
September 1939 by Poland alone.
A theory of international relations is not
just an intellectual enterprise; it has practical consequences. It influences
our thinking and political practice. On the practical side, the realists of the
1930s, to whom Carr gave intellectual support, were people opposed to the
system of collective security embodied in the League of Nations. Working within
the foreign policy establishments of the day, they contributed to its weakness.
Once they had weakened the League, they pursued a policy of appeasement and
accommodation with Germany as an alternative to collective security (Ashworth
46). After the annexation of Czechoslovakia, when the failure of the
anti-League realist conservatives gathered around Neville Chamberlain and of
this policy became clear, they tried to rebuild the very security system they
had earlier demolished. Those who supported collective security were labeled
idealists.
Hans J. Morgenthau (1904–1980) developed
realism into a comprehensive international relations theory. Influenced by the
Protestant theologian and political writer Reinhold Niebuhr, as well as by
Hobbes, he places selfishness and power-lust at the center of his picture of
human existence. The insatiable human lust for power, timeless and universal,
which he identifies with animus
dominandi, the desire to dominate, is for him the main cause of
conflict. As he asserts in his main work, Politics
among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,
first published in 1948, “international politics, like all politics, is a
struggle for power” (25).
Morgenthau systematizes realism in
international relations on the basis of six principles that he includes in the
second edition of Politics
among Nations. Although he is a traditionalist and opposes the
so-called scientists (the scholars who, especially in the 1950s, tried to
reduce the discipline of international relations to a branch of behavioral
science), in the first principle he states that realism is based on objective
laws that have their roots in unchanging human nature (4). He wants to develop
realism into both a theory of international politics and a political art, a
useful tool of foreign policy.
The keystone of Morgenthau's realist theory
is the concept of power
or “of interest defined in terms of power,” which informs his second principle:
the assumption that political leaders “think and act in terms of interest
defined as power” (5). This concept defines the autonomy of politics, and
allows for the analysis of foreign policy regardless of the different motives,
preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of individual politicians.
Furthermore, it is the foundation of a rational picture of politics.
Although, as Morgenthau explains in the third
principle, interest defined as power is a universally valid category, and
indeed an essential element of politics, various things can be associated with
interest or power at different times and in different circumstances. Its
content and the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural
environment.
In the fourth principle, Morgenthau considers
the relationship between realism and ethics. He says that while realists are
aware of the moral significance of political action, they are also aware of the
tension between morality and the requirements of successful political action.
“Universal moral principles,” he asserts, “cannot be applied to the actions of
states in their abstract universal formulation, but …they must be filtered
through the concrete circumstances of time and place” (9). These principles
must be accompanied by prudence for as he cautions “there can be no political
morality without prudence; that is, without consideration of the political
consequences of seemingly moral action” (ibid.).
Prudence, and not conviction of one's own
moral or ideological superiority, should guide political action. This is
stressed in the fifth principle, where Morgenthau again emphasizes the idea
that all state actors, including our own, must be looked at solely as political
entities pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power. By
taking this point of view vis-à-vis its counterparts and thus avoiding
ideological confrontation, a state would then be able to pursue policies that
respected the interests of other states, while protecting and promoting its
own.
Insofar as power or interest defined as power
is the concept that defines politics, politics is an autonomous sphere, as
Morgenthau says in his sixth principle of realism. It cannot be subordinated to
ethics. However, ethics does still play a role in politics. “A man who was
nothing but ‘political man’ would be a beast, for he would be completely
lacking in moral restraints. A man who was nothing but ‘moral
man’ would be a fool, for he would be completely lacking in prudence” (12).
Political art requires that these two dimensions of human life, power and
morality, be taken into consideration.
While Morgenthau's six principles of realism
contain repetitions and inconsistencies, we can nonetheless obtain from them
the following picture: Power or interest is the central concept that makes
politics into an autonomous discipline. Rational state actors pursue their
national interests. Therefore, a rational theory of international politics can
be constructed. Such a theory is not concerned with the morality, religious
beliefs, motives or ideological preferences of individual political leaders. It
also indicates that in order to avoid conflicts, states should avoid moral
crusades or ideological confrontations, and look for compromise on the basis of
satisfaction of their mutual interests alone.
Although he defines politics as an autonomous
sphere, Morgenthau does not follow the Machiavellian route of completely
removing ethics from politics. He suggests that, although human beings are
political animals, who pursue their interests, they are moral animals. Deprived
of any morality, they would descend to the level of beasts or sub-humans. Even
if it is not guided by universal moral principles, political action thus has
for Morgenthau a moral significance. Ultimately directed toward the objective
of national survival, it also involves prudence. The effective protection of
citizens' lives from harm is not merely a forceful physical action; it has
prudential and moral dimensions.
Morgenthau regards realism as a way of
thinking about international relations and a useful tool for devising policies.
However, some of the basic conceptions of his theory, and especially the idea
of conflict as stemming from human nature, as well as the concept of power itself, have provoked criticism.
International politics, like all politics, is
for Morgenthau a struggle for power because of the basic human lust for power.
But regarding every individual as being engaged in a perpetual quest for
power—the view that he shares with Hobbes—is a questionable premise. Human
nature is an unobservable. It cannot be proved by any empirical research, but
only imposed on us as a matter of belief and inculcated by education.
Morgenthau himself reinforces this belief by
introducing a normative aspect of his theory, which is rationality. A rational
foreign policy is considered “to be a good foreign policy” (7). But he defines
rationality as a process of calculating the costs and benefits of all
alternative policies in order to determine their relative utility, i.e. their
ability to maximize power. Statesmen “think and act in terms of interest
defined as power” (5). Only intellectual weakness of policy makers can result
in foreign policies that deviate from a rational course aimed at minimizing
risks and maximizing benefits. Rather than presenting an actual portrait of
human affairs, Morgenthau emphasizes the pursuit of power and sets it up as a
norm.
As Raymond Aron and other scholars have
noticed, power, the fundamental concept of Morgenthau's realism, is ambiguous.
It can be either a means or an end in politics. But if power is only a means
for gaining something else, it does not define the nature of international
politics in the way Morgenthau claims. It does not allow us to understand the
actions of states independently from the motives and ideological preferences of
their political leaders. It cannot serve as the basis for defining politics as
an autonomous sphere. Morgenthau's principles of realism are thus open to
doubt. “Is this true,” Aron asks, “that states, whatever their regime, pursue
the same kind of foreign policy” (597) and that the foreign policies of
Napoleon or Stalin are essentially identical to those of Hitler, Louis XVI or
Nicholas II, amounting to no more than the struggle for power? “If one answers yes, then the proposition is incontestable, but not
very instructive” (598). Accordingly, it is useless to define actions of
states by exclusive reference to power, security or national interest.
International politics cannot be studied independently of the wider historical
and cultural context.
Although Carr and Morgenthau concentrate
primarily on international relations, their realism can also be applied to
domestic politics. To be a classical realist is in general to perceive politics
a conflict of interests and a struggle for power, and to seek peace by trying
to recognize common group and individual interests rather than by moralizing.
In spite of its ambiguities and weaknesses,
Morgenthau's Politics among
Nations became a standard textbook and influenced thinking about
international politics for a generation or so. At the same time, as mentioned
above, there was an attempt to develop a more methodologically rigorous
approach to theorizing about international affairs. In the 1950s and 1960s a
large influx of scientists from different fields entered the discipline of
International Relations and attempted to replace the “wisdom literature” of
classical realists with scientific concepts and reasoning (Brown 35). This in
turn provoked a counterattack by Morgenthau and scholars associated with the
so-called English School, especially Hedley Bull, who defended a traditional approach.
Nevertheless, the scientists had established a strong presence in the field,
especially in the area of methodology. By the mid-1960s, the majority of
American students in international relations were trained in quantitative
research, game theory, and other new research techniques of the social
sciences. This, along with the changing international environment, had a
significant effect on the discipline.
The realist assumption was that the state is
the key actor in international politics, and that relations among states are
the core of actual international relations. However, with the receding of the
Cold War during the 1970s, one could witness the growing importance of
international and non-governmental organizations, as well as of multinational
corporations. This development led to a revival of idealist thinking, which
became known as neoliberalism or pluralism. While accepting some basic
assumptions of realism, the leading pluralists, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye,
have proposed the concept of complex
interdependence to describe this more sophisticated picture of
global politics. They would argue that there can be progress in international
relations and that the future does not need to look like the past.
The realist response came most prominently
from Kenneth N. Waltz, who reformulated realism in international relations in a
new and distinctive way. In his book Theory
of International Politics, first published in 1979, he responds to
the liberal challenge and attempts to cure the defects of the classical realism
of Hans Morgenthau with his more scientific approach, which has became known as
structural realism or neorealism. Whereas Morgenthau rooted his theory in the
struggle for power, which he related to human nature, Waltz made an effort to
avoid any philosophical discussion of human nature, and set out instead to
build a theory of international politics analogous to microeconomics. He argues
that states in the international system are like firms in a domestic economy
and have the same fundamental interest: to survive. “Internationally, the
environment of states' actions, or the structure of their system, is set by the
fact that some states prefer survival over other ends obtainable in the short
run and act with relative efficiency to achieve that end” (93).
Waltz maintains that by paying attention to
the individual state, and to ideological, moral and economic issues, both
traditional liberals and classical realists make the same mistake. They fail to
develop a serious account of the international system—one that can be
abstracted from the wider socio-political domain. Waltz acknowledges that such
an abstraction distorts reality and omits many of the factors that were
important for classical realism. It does not allow for the analysis of the
development of specific foreign policies. However, it also has utility.
Notably, it assists in understanding the primary determinants of international
politics. Waltz's neorealist theory cannot be applied to domestic politics. It
cannot serve to develop policies of states concerning their international or
domestic affairs. His theory helps only to explain why states behave in similar
ways despite their different forms of government and diverse political
ideologies, and why, despite of their growing interdependence, the overall
picture of international relations is unlikely to change.
According to Waltz, the uniform behavior of
states over centuries can be explained by the constraints on their behavior
that are imposed by the structure of the international system. A system's
structure is defined first by the principle by which it is organized, then by
the differentiation of its units, and finally by the distribution of
capabilities (power) across units. Anarchy, or the absence of central
authority, is for Waltz the ordering principle of the international system. The
units of the international system are states. Waltz recognizes the existence of
non-state actors, but dismisses them as relatively unimportant. Since all
states want to survive, and anarchy presupposes a self-help system in which
each state has to take care of itself, there is no division of labor or
functional differentiation among them. While functionally similar, they are
nonetheless distinguished by their relative capabilities (the power each of
them represents) to perform the same function.
Consequently, Waltz sees power and state
behavior in a different way from the classical realists. For Morgenthau power
was both a means and an end, and rational state behavior was understood as
simply the course of action that would accumulate the most power. In contrast,
neorealists assume that the fundamental interest of each state is security and
would therefore concentrate on the distribution of power. What also sets
neorealism apart from classical realism is methodological rigor and scientific
self-conception (Guzinni 1998, 127-128). Waltz insists on empirical testability
of knowledge and on falsificationism as a methodological ideal, which, as he
himself admits, can have only a limited application in international relations.
The distribution of capabilities among states
can vary; however, anarchy, the ordering principle of international relations,
remains unchanged. This has a lasting effect on the behavior of states that
become socialized into the logic of self-help. Trying to refute neoliberal
ideas concerning the effects of interdependence, Waltz identifies two reasons
why the anarchic international system limits cooperation: insecurity and
unequal gains. In the context of anarchy, each state is uncertain about the
intentions of others and is afraid that the possible gains resulting from
cooperation may favor other states more than itself, and thus lead it to
dependence on others. “States do not willingly place themselves in situations
of increased dependence. In a self-help system, considerations of security
subordinate economic gain to political interest.” (Waltz
1979, 107).
Because of its theoretical elegance and
methodological rigor, neorealism has become very influential within the
discipline of international relations. However, it has also provoked strong
critiques on a number of fronts.
In 1979 Waltz wrote that in the nuclear age
the international bipolar system, based on two superpowers—the United States
and the Soviet Union—was not only stable but likely to persist (176–7). With
the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent disintegration of the USSR this
prediction was proven wrong. The bipolar world turned out to have been more
precarious than most realist analysts had supposed. Its end opened new
possibilities and challenges related to globalization. This has led many
critics to argue that neorealism, like classical realism, cannot adequately
account for changes in world politics.
The new debate between international (neo)realists and (neo)liberals is no longer concerned with the
questions of morality and human nature, but with the extent to which state
behavior is influenced by anarchic structure rather than by institutions,
learning, and other factors that are conductive to cooperation. In his 1989
book International
Institutions and State Power, Robert Keohane accepts Waltz's
emphasis on system-level theory and his general assumption that states are
self-interested actors that rationally pursue their goals. However, by
employing game theory he shows that states can widen the perception of their
self-interest through economic cooperation and involvement in international
institutions. Patterns of interdependence can thus affect world politics.
Keohane calls for systemic theories that would be able to deal better with
factors affecting state interaction, and with change.
Critical theorists, such as Robert W. Cox,
also focus on the alleged inability of neorealism to deal with change. In their
view, both classical realists and neorealists take a particular, historically
determined state-based structure of international relations and assume it to be
universally valid. In contrast, critical theorists believe that by analyzing
the interplay of ideas, material factors, and social forces, one can understand
how this structure has come about, and how it may eventually change. They
contend that neorealism ignores both the historical process during which
identities and interests are formed, and the diverse methodological
possibilities. It legitimates the existing status quo of strategic relations
among states and considers the scientific method as the only way of obtaining
knowledge. It represents an exclusionary practice, an interest in domination
and control.
While realists are concerned with relations
among states, the focus for critical theorists is social emancipation. Despite
their differences, critical theory, postmodernism and feminism all take issue
with the notion of state sovereignty and envision new political communities
that would be less exclusionary vis-à-vis marginal and disenfranchised groups.
Critical theory argues against state-based exclusion and denies that the
interests of a country's citizens take precedence over those of outsiders. It
insists that politicians should give as much weight to the interests of
foreigners are they give to those of their compatriots and envisions political
structures beyond the “fortress” nation-state. Postmodernism questions the
state's claim to be a legitimate focus of human loyalties and its right to
impose social and political boundaries. It supports cultural diversity and
stresses the interests of minorities. Feminism argues that the realist theory
exhibits a masculine bias and advocates the inclusion of woman and alternative
values into public life.
The critical theory and other alternative
perspectives, sometimes called “reflectivist,” (Weaver 165) represent a radical
departure from the neorealist and neoliberal “rationalist” international
relations theories. Constructivists, such as Alexander Wendt, try to build a
bridge between these two approaches by on the one hand, taking the present
state system and anarchy seriously, and on the other hand, by focusing on the
formation of identities and interests. Countering neorealist ideas Wendt argues
that self-help does not follow logically or casually from the principle of
anarchy. It is socially constructed. Wendt's idea that states' identities and
interests are socially constructed has earned his position the label
“constructivism”. Consequently, in his view, “self-help and power politics are
institutions, and not essential features of anarchy. Anarchy is what states
make of it” (Wendt 1987 395). There is no single logic of anarchy but rather
several, depending on the roles with which states identify themselves and each
other. Power and interests are constituted by ideas and norms. Wendt claims
that neorealism cannot account for change in world politics, but his norm-based
constructivism can.
A similar conclusion, although derived in a
traditional way, comes from the theorists of the English school (International
Society approach) who emphasize both systemic and normative constraints on the
behavior of states. Referring to the classical view of the human being as an
individual that is basically social and rational, capable of cooperating and
learning from past experiences, these theorists emphasize that states, like
individuals, have legitimate interests that others can recognize and respect,
and that they can recognize the general advantages of observing a principle of
reciprocity in their mutual relations (Jackson and Sørensen 167). Therefore,
states can bind themselves to other states by treaties and develop some common
values with other states. Hence, the structure of the international system is
not unchangeable as the neorealists claim. It is not a permanent Hobbesian
anarchy, permeated by the danger of war. An anarchic international system based
on pure power relations among actors can evolve into a more cooperative and
peaceful international society, in which state behavior is shaped by commonly
shared values and norms. A practical expression of
international society are international organizations that uphold the
rule of law in international relations, especially the UN.
An unintended and unfortunate consequence of
the debate about neorealism is that neorealism and a large part of its critique
(a notable exception is the English School), expressed in abstract scientific
and philosophical terms, have made the theory of international politics almost
inaccessible to a layperson and have divided the discipline of international
relations into incompatible parts. Whereas classical realism was a theory aimed
at supporting diplomatic practice and provided a guide to be followed by those
seeking to understand and deal with potential threats, today's theories,
concerned with various grand pictures and projects, are ill-suited to perform
this task.
Nevertheless, whatever its weakness may
be—including those that have been indicated throughout the text—the realist
tradition in international relations continues to perform a useful role.
Realism warns us against progressivism, moralism, legalism, and other orientations
that lose touch with the reality of self-interest and power. The neorealist
revival of the 1970s can also be interpreted as a necessary corrective to an
overoptimistic liberal belief in international cooperation and change resulting
from interdependence. However, as Donnelly rightly notices, once that
correction has been made, the time of realism “as a fruitful dominant mode of
thinking has passed” (2000, 194). By denying any progress in interstate
relations, realism turns into an ideology. Its emphasis on power politics and
national interest can be misused to justify aggression. It has to be supplanted
by theories that take better account of the cooperation and changing picture of
global politics. To its merely negative, cautionary function, positive norms
must be added. These norms extend from the rationality and prudence stressed by
classical realists, through the vision of multilateralism, international law,
and an international society emphasized by liberals and members of the English
School, to the cosmopolitanism and global solidarity advocated by many of
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First
published Sat May 31, 2003; substantive revision Tue Jun 8, 2010
Sovereignty, though its meanings have varied
across history, also has a core meaning, supreme
authority within a territory. It is a modern notion of political
authority. Historical variants can be understood along three dimensions — the
holder of sovereignty, the absoluteness of sovereignty, and the internal and
external dimensions of sovereignty. The state is the political institution in which
sovereignty is embodied. An assemblage of states forms a sovereign states
system.
The history of sovereignty can be understood
through two broad movements, manifested in both practical institutions and
political thought. The first is the development of a system of sovereign
states, culminating at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Contemporaneously,
sovereignty became prominent in political thought through the writings of
Machiavelli, Luther, Bodin, and Hobbes. The second movement is the
circumscription of the sovereign state, which began in practice after World War
II and has since continued through European integration and the growth and
strengthening of laws and practices to protect human rights. The most prominent
corresponding political thought occurs in the writings of critics of
sovereignty like Bertrand de Jouvenel and Jacques Maritain.
In his classic, The King's Two Bodies (1957), medievalist
Ernst Kantorowicz describes a profound transformation in the concept of
political authority over the course of the Middle
Ages. The change began when the concept of the body of Christ evolved into a
notion of two bodies — one, the corpus
naturale, the consecrated host on the altar, the other, the corpus mysticum, the
social body of the church with its attendant administrative structure. This
latter notion — of a collective social organization having an enduring,
mystical essence — would come to be transferred to political entities, the body
politic. Kantorowicz then describes the emergence, in the late Middle Ages, of
the concept of the king's two bodies, vivified in Shakespeare's Richard II and
applicable to the early modern body politic. Whereas the king's natural, mortal
body would pass away with his death, he was also thought to have an enduring,
supernatural one that could not be destroyed, even by assassination, for it
represented the mystical dignity and justice of the body politic. The modern
polity that emerged dominant in early modern Europe manifested the qualities of
the collectivity that Kantorowicz described — a single, unified one, confined
within territorial borders, possessing a single set of interests, ruled by an
authority that was bundled into a single entity and held supremacy in advancing
the interests of the polity. Though in early modern times, kings would hold
this authority, later practitioners of it would
include the people ruling through a constitution, nations, the Communist Party,
dictators, juntas, and theocracies. The modern polity is known as the state,
and the fundamental characteristic of authority within it, sovereignty.
The evolution that Kantorowicz described is
formative, for sovereignty is a signature feature of modern politics. Some
scholars have doubted whether a stable, essential notion of sovereignty exists.
But there is in fact a definition that captures what sovereignty came to mean
in early modern Europe and of which most subsequent definitions are a variant: supreme authority within a territory.
This is the quality that early modern states possessed, but which popes,
emperors, kings, bishops, and most nobles and vassals during the Middle Ages
lacked.
Each component of this definition highlights
an important aspect of the concept. First, a holder of sovereignty possesses
authority. That is to say, the person or entity does not merely wield coercive
power, defined as A's ability to cause B to do what he would otherwise not do.
Authority is rather what philosopher R.P. Wolff proposed: “the right to command
and correlatively the right to be obeyed” (Wolff, 1990, 20). What is most
important here is the term “right,” connoting legitimacy. A holder of
sovereignty derives authority from some mutually acknowledged source of
legitimacy — natural law, a divine mandate, hereditary law, a constitution,
even international law. In the contemporary era, some body of law is
ubiquitously the source of sovereignty.
But if sovereignty is a matter of authority,
it is not a matter of mere authority, but of supreme authority. Supremacy is
what makes the constitution of the United States superior to the government of Pennsylvania, or any holder of sovereignty different from a
police chief or corporate executive. The holder of sovereignty is superior to
all authorities under its purview. Supremacy, too, is endemic to modernity.
During the Middle Ages, manifold authorities held some sort of legal warrant
for their authority, whether feudal, canonical, or otherwise, but very rarely
did such warrant confer supremacy.
A final ingredient of sovereignty is
territoriality, also a feature of political authority in modernity.
Territoriality is a principle by which members of a community are to be
defined. It specifies that their membership derives from their residence within
borders. It is a powerful principle, for it defines membership in a way that
may not correspond with identity. The borders of a sovereign state may not at
all circumscribe a “people” or a “nation,” and may in fact encompass several of
these identities, as national self-determination and irredentist movements make
evident. It is rather by simple virtue of their location within geographic borders
that people belong to a state and fall under the authority of its ruler. It is
within a geographic territory that modern sovereigns are supremely
authoritative.
Territoriality is now deeply taken for
granted. It is a feature of authority all across the globe. Even supranational
and international institutions like the European Union and the United Nations
are composed of states whose membership is in turn defined territorially. This
universality of form is distinctive of modernity and underlines sovereignty's
connection with modernity. Though territoriality has existed in different eras
and locales, other principles of membership like family kinship, religion,
tribe, and feudal ties have also held great prestige. Most vividly contrasting
with territoriality is a wandering tribe, whose authority structure is
completely disassociated with a particular piece of land. Territoriality
specifies by what quality citizens are subject to authority — their geographic
location within a set of boundaries. International relations theorists have
indeed pointed out the similarity between sovereignty and another institution
in which lines demarcate land — private property. Indeed, the two prominently
rose together in the thought of Thomas Hobbes.
Supreme authority within a territory — this
is the general definition of sovereignty. Historical manifestations of
sovereignty are almost always specific instances of this general definition. It
is in fact the instances of which philosophers and the politically motivated
have spoken most often, making their claim for the sovereignty of this person
or that body of law. Understanding sovereignty, then, involves understanding
claims to it, or at least some of the most important of these claims.
Over the past half millennium, these claims
have taken extraordinarily diverse forms — nations asserting independence from
mother states, communists seeking freedom from colonialists, the vox populi contending with
ancien regimes,
theocracies who reject the authority of secular states, and sundry others. It
is indeed a mark of the resilience and flexibility of the sovereign state that
it has accommodated such diverse sorts of authority. Though a catalog of these
authorities is not possible here, three dimensions along which they may be
understood will help to categorize them: the holders of sovereignty, the
absolute or non-absolute nature of sovereignty, and the relationship between
the internal and external dimensions of sovereignty.
As suggested, diverse authorities have held
sovereignty — kings, dictators, peoples ruling through constitutions, and the
like. The character of the holder of supreme authority within a territory is
probably the most important dimension of sovereignty. In early modern times,
French theorist Jean Bodin thought that sovereignty must reside in a single
individual. Both he and English philosopher Thomas Hobbes conceived the
sovereign as being above the law. Later thinkers differed, coming to envision
new loci for sovereignty, but remaining committed to the principle.
Sovereignty can also be absolute or
non-absolute. How is it possible that sovereignty might be non-absolute if it
is also supreme? After all, scholars like Alan James argue that sovereignty can
only be either present or absent, and cannot exist partially (James 1999,
462–4). But here, absoluteness refers not to the extent or character of
sovereignty, which must always be supreme, but rather to the scope of matters
over which a holder of authority is sovereign. Bodin and Hobbes envisioned
sovereignty as absolute, extending to all matters within the territory,
unconditionally. It is possible for an authority to be sovereign over some
matters within a territory, but not all. Today, many European Union (EU) member
states exhibit non-absoluteness. They are sovereign in governing defense, but
not in governing their currencies, trade policies, and many social welfare
policies, which they administer in cooperation with EU authorities as set forth
in EU law. Absolute sovereignty is quintessential modern sovereignty. But in recent
decades, it has begun to be circumscribed by institutions like the EU, the UN's
practices of sanctioning intervention, and the international criminal court.
A final pair of adjectives that define
sovereignty is “internal” and “external.” In this case, the words do not
describe exclusive sorts of sovereignty, but different aspects of sovereignty
that are coexistent and omnipresent. Sovereign authority is exercised within
borders, but also, by definition, with respect to outsiders, who may not
interfere with the sovereign's governance. The state has been the chief holder
of external sovereignty since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, after which
interference in other states’ governing prerogatives became illegitimate. The
concept of sovereignty in international law most often connotes external
sovereignty. Alan James similarly conceives of external sovereignty as
constitutional independence — a state's freedom from outside influence upon its
basic prerogatives (James 1999, 460–462). Significantly, external sovereignty
depends on recognition by outsiders. To states, this recognition is what a
no-trespassing law is to private property — a set of mutual understandings that
give property, or the state, immunity from outside interference. It is also
external sovereignty that establishes the basic condition of international
relations — anarchy, meaning the lack of a higher authority that makes claims
on lower authorities. An assemblage of states, both internally and externally
sovereign, makes up an international system, where sovereign entities ally, trade, make war, and make peace.
Supreme authority with a territory — within
this definition, sovereignty can then be understood
more precisely only through its history. This history can be told as one of two
broad movements — the first, a centuries long evolution towards a European
continent, then a globe, of sovereign states, the second, a circumscription of
absolute sovereign prerogatives in the second half of the twentieth century.
It was at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648
that Europe consolidated its long transition from the Middle Ages to a world of
sovereign states. According to historian J.R. Strayer, Britain and France
looked a lot like sovereign states by around 1300, their kings possessing
supremacy within bounded territories. But as late as the beginning of the
Reformation in 1517, Europe remained distant from Westphalia. It was just
around then that a great reversal in historical momentum occurred when Charles
V of Spain ascended to the throne, uniting Castile, Aragon and the Netherlands,
at the same time becoming Holy Roman Emperor, gaining prerogatives over lands
in Central Europe, while taking on the role of enforcer of the Catholic
Church's still significant temporal prerogatives inside the Empire, especially
its enforcement of ecclesiastical orthodoxy. But within the Empire, Charles V
was not sovereign, either, for princes and nobles there retained prerogatives
over which he exercised no control. In 1555, a system of sovereign states
gained important ground in the Peace of Augsburg, whose formula cuius regio, eius religio,
allowed German princes to enforce their own faith within their territory. But
Augsburg was unstable. Manifold contests over the settlement's provisions
resulted in constant wars, culminating finally in the Thirty Years War, which
did not end until 1648, at the Peace of Westphalia.
What features of Westphalia make it the
origin of the sovereign states system? In fact, not all scholars agree that it
deserves this status (see Krasner 1999). Nowhere in the settlement's treaties
is a sovereign states system or even the state as the reigning legitimate unit,
prescribed. Certainly, Westphalia did not create a sovereign states system ex nihilo, for components
of the system had been accumulating for centuries up to the settlement;
afterwards, some medieval anomalies persisted. In two broad respects, though,
in both legal prerogatives and practical powers, the system of sovereign states
triumphed. First, states emerged as virtually the sole form of substantive
constitutional authority in Europe, their authority no longer seriously
challenged by the Holy Roman Empire. The Netherlands and Switzerland gained
uncontested sovereignty, the German states of the Holy
Roman Empire accrued the right to ally outside the empire, while both the
diplomatic communications and foreign policy designs of contemporary great
powers revealed a common understanding of a system of sovereign states. The
temporal powers of the Church were also curtailed to the point that they no
longer challenged any state's sovereignty. In reaction, Pope Innocent X
condemned the treaties of the peace as “null, void, invalid, iniquitous,
unjust, damnable, reprobate, inane, empty of meaning
and effect for all time” (quoted in Maland 1966, 16).
Second, Westphalia brought an end to
intervention in matters of religion, up to then the most commonly practiced
abridgement of sovereign prerogatives. After decades of armed contestation, the
design of the Peace of Augsburg was finally consolidated, not in the exact form
of 1555, but effectively establishing the authority of princes and kings over
religion. In ensuing decades, no European state would fight to affect the
religious governance of another state, this in stark contrast to the previous
130 years, when wars of religion sundered Europe. As the sovereign states
system became more generalized in ensuing decades, this proscription of
intervention would become more generalized, too, evolving into a foundational
norm of the international system.
The sovereign states system that came to
dominate Europe at Westphalia spread worldwide over the next three centuries,
culminating in the decline of the European colonial empires in the mid-20th
century, when the state became the only form of polity ever to cover the entire
land surface of the globe. Today, norms of sovereignty are enshrined in the
Charter of the United Nations, whose article 2(4) prohibits attacks on
“political independence and territorial integrity,” and whose Article 2(7)
sharply restricts intervention.
As the sovereign state was occupying the
European continent, piece by piece, in early modern times, eventually forming
the system that came to occupy the globe, contemporary political philosophers
embraced this form of polity and described what made it legitimate. They were
not originators of the concept, for even during medieval times, philosophers
like Dante and Marsilius of Padua advocated a separation of temporal and
religious powers that would be achieved through a transfer of prerogatives into
temporal ruler's hands. Then, in early modern times, there were two roughly
contemporary philosophers who did not write explicitly or consciously of
sovereignty, yet whose ideas amounted in substance to important developments of
the concept. Machiavelli observed the politics of city states in his
Renaissance Italy and described what a prince had to do to promote a
flourishing republic in terms that conferred on him supreme authority within
his territory. Manifestly, he was not to be bound by natural law, canon law,
Gospel precepts, or any of the norms or authorities that obligated members of
Christendom. Rather, he would have to be prepared “not to be good,” and to be
ready to perform evil, not because evil was no longer evil, but because it was
sometimes necessary to further an end that was central for Machiavelli, an end
that amounts to the unifying idea of his thought: the strength and
well-ordering of the state. The obligation of the prince was raison d’état. He was
supreme within the state's territory and responsible for the well being of this
singular, unitary body.
Purveying sovereignty from quite a different
perspective was Martin Luther. His theology of the
Reformation advocated stripping the Catholic Church of its many powers, not
only its ecclesiastical powers, but powers that are, by any modern definition,
temporal. Luther held that the Church should no longer be thought of as a
visible, hierarchical institution, but was rather the invisibly united
aggregate of local churches that adhered to right doctrine. Thus, the Catholic
Church no longer legitimately held vast tracts of land that it taxed and
defended, and whose justice it administered; it was no longer legitimate for
its bishops to hold temporal offices under princes and kings; nor would the
Pope be able to depose secular rulers through his power of excommunication;
most importantly, the Holy Roman Emperor would no longer legitimately enforce
Catholic uniformity. No longer would the Church and those who acted in its name
exercise political or economic authority. Who, then, would take up such
relinquished powers? Territorial princes. “By the
destruction of the independence of the Church and its hold on an
extra-territorial public opinion, the last obstacle to unity within the State
was removed,” writes political philosopher J.N. Figgis (72). It was this vision
that triumphed at Westphalia.
Luther's political theology explained all of
this. He taught that under God's authority, two orders with two forms of
government existed. “The realm of the spirit” was the order in which Christ was
related to the soul of the believer. The realm of the world was the order of
secular society, where civil authorities ran governmental institutions through
law and coercion. Both realms furthered the good of believers, but in different
senses; they were to be separately organized. Leaders of the church would
perform spiritual duties; princes, kings and magistrates would perform temporal
ones. Freed from the power of the pope and the Catholic Church, having
appropriated temporal powers within their realm, princes were now effectively
sovereign. In that era, princes even exercised considerable control over
Protestant churches, often appointing their regional leaders, as described by
the doctrine of “Erastianism.” Though neither Luther nor other Protestant
reformers discussed the doctrine of sovereignty in any detail, they prescribed
for princes all of its substance. Again, Figgis:
The
unity and universality and essential rightness of the sovereign territorial
State, and the denial of every extra-territorial or independent communal form
of life, are Luther's lasting contribution to politics. (91)
Other early modern philosophers, of course,
espoused the doctrine of sovereignty explicitly, and are thus more familiarly
associated with it. French philosopher Jean Bodin was the first European
philosopher to treat the concept extensively. His concept of souveraineté featured as a
central concept in his work, De
la république, which he wrote in 1576, during a time when France
was sundered by civil war between Calvinist Huguenots and the Catholic
monarchy. He viewed the problem of order as central and did not think that it
could be solved through outdated medieval notions of a segmented society, but
only through a concept in which rulers and ruled were integrated into a single,
unitary body politic that was above any other human law, and was in fact the
source of human law. This concept was sovereignty. Only a supreme authority
within a territory could strengthen a fractured community.
To be sure, Bodin thought that the body that
exercised sovereignty was bound by natural and divine law, though no human law
could judge or appeal to it. More curiously, he also thought that sovereignty
rightly exercised would respect customary and property rights. It is not clear
how such a restraint was to be reconciled with the supreme status of sovereign
authority. Possibly, Bodin thought that such rights were to be features of a
legal regime which was itself sovereign with respect
to other authorities. Indeed, he also thought the form of government that
exercised sovereign powers could legitimately vary among monarchy, aristocracy
and democracy, though he preferred monarchy. Whatever the sovereign body looked
like, though, it was not subject to any external human law or authority within
its territory. F.H. Hinsley writes:
At a time when it had become imperative that
the conflict between rulers and ruled should be terminated, [Bodin] realized —
and it was an impressive intellectual feat — that the conflict would be solved
only if it was possible both to establish the existence of a necessarily
unrestricted ruling power and to distinguish this power from an absolutism that
was free to disregard all laws and regulations. He did this by founding both
the legality of this power and the wisdom of observing the limitations which
hedged its proper use upon the nature of the body politic as a political
society comprising both ruler and ruled — and his statement of sovereignty was
the necessary, only possible, result (124–125).
Bodin's “statement of sovereignty” is the
first systematic one in modern European philosophy, and thus deserves a
landmark status.
The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes also
wrote during a time of civil war and also arrived at the notion of sovereignty
as a solution. For Hobbes, the people established sovereign authority through a
contract in which they transferred all of their rights to the Leviathan, which
represented the abstract notion of the state. The will of the Leviathan reigned
supreme and represented the will of all those who had alienated their rights to
it. Like Bodin's sovereign, Hobbes’ Leviathan was above the law, a mortal god
unbound by any constitution or contractual obligations with any external party.
Like Bodin, Hobbes also thought the sovereign to be accountable to God and most
likely to the natural law in some form. Otherwise, though, law was the command
of the sovereign ruler, emanating from his will, and the obligation to obey it
absolute.
Both Bodin and Hobbes argued for sovereignty
as supreme authority. The concept continues to prevail as the presumption of
political rule in states throughout the globe today, including ones where the
sovereign body of law institutes limited government and civil rights for
individuals. Over the centuries, new notions of the holders of sovereignty have
evolved. Rousseau, far different from Bodin or Hobbes, saw the collective
people within a state as the sovereign, ruling through their general will. In
constitutional government, it is the people ruling through a body of law that
is sovereign. That is the version that commands legitimacy most commonly in the
world today.
Yet versions of sovereignty evocative of
Hobbes' and Bodin's have carried forth into the twentieth century. Explicitly
invoking both of these philosophers was the early twentieth century German
philosopher and jurist Carl Schmitt, for instance. His Political Theology,
originally published in 1922, opens with the line, “sovereign is he who decides
on the exceptions.” Schmitt thought that the sovereign was above any
constitutional law and ought to be able to “make a decision” on behalf of the
good of the state during a time of emergency. He had little respect for liberal
constitutionalism, which he thought wholly inadequate to contain the power
struggle that politics involves. By and large, there is little indicating that,
at least in this work, Schmitt thought the sovereign to be bound by divine law
or natural law. The liberal constitutionalism of Weimar Germany was his chief
piece of evidence for this conviction; during the 1930s he fervently supported
the National Socialist regime, one whose emergency powers were just those that
he thought necessary.
The rise and global expansion of sovereignty,
described and even lauded by political philosophers, amounts to one of the most
formidable and successful political trends in modern times. But from its
earliest days, sovereignty has also met with both doubters and qualified
supporters, many of whom have regarded any body of law's claim to sovereign
status as a form of idolatry, sometimes as a carapace behind which rulers carry
out cruelties and injustices free from legitimate outside scrutiny. It was
indeed after the Holocaust that meaningful legal and institutional
circumscriptions of sovereignty in fact arose, many of which have come to
abridge the rights of sovereign states quite significantly. The two most prominent
curtailments are conventions on human rights and European integration.
It was in 1948 that the vast majority of
states signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, committing themselves to respect over 30 separate rights for
individuals. As it was not a legally binding declaration and contained no
enforcement provisions, the declaration left states’ sovereignty intact, but it
was a first step towards tethering them to international, universal obligations
regarding their internal affairs. Over decades, these human rights would come
to enjoy ever stronger legal status. One of the most robust human rights
conventions, one that indeed curtails sovereignty, even if mildly, through its
arbitration mechanisms, is the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, formed in 1950. Roughly contemporaneous,
signed on December 9, 1948, was the Genocide Convention, committing signing
states to refrain from and punish genocide. Then, in the mid-1960's, two
covenants — the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights — legally bound most of the world's states
to respecting the human rights of their people. Again, the signatories’
constitutional authority remained largely intact, since they would not allow
any of these commitments to infringe upon their sovereignty. Subsequent human
rights covenants, also signed by the vast majority of the world's states,
contained similar reservations.
Only a practice of human rights backed up by military
enforcement or robust judicial procedures would circumscribe sovereignty in a
serious way. Progress in this direction began to occur after the Cold War
through a historic revision of the Peace of Westphalia, one that curtails a
norm strongly advanced by its treaties — non-intervention. In a series of
several episodes beginning in 1990, the United Nations or another international
organization has endorsed a political action, usually involving military force, that the broad consensus of states would have
previously regarded as illegitimate interference in internal affairs. The
episodes have involved the approval of military operations to remedy an
injustice within the boundaries of a state or the outside administration of
domestic matters like police operations. Unlike peacekeeping operations during
the Cold War, the operations have usually lacked the consent of the government
of the target state. They have occurred in Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia,
Kosovo, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Cambodia, Liberia, and elsewhere. Although the
legitimacy and wisdom of individual interventions is often contested among
states — the U.S. bombing of Iraq in December 1999 and NATO's intervention in
Kosovo, for instance, failed to elicit U.N. Security Council endorsement, as
did the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 — the broad practice of intervention is
likely to continue to enjoy broad endorsement within the U.N. Security Council
and other international organizations.
An explicit call to revise the concept of
sovereignty so as to allow for internationally sanctioned intervention arose
with The Responsibility to Protect, a document written and produced in 2001 by
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, a
commission that the Government of Canada convened at the behest of U.N.
Secretary General Kofi Annan. The document proposes a strong revision of the
classical conception by which sovereignty involves a “responsibility to
protect” on the part of a state towards its own citizens, a responsibility that
outsiders may assume when a state perpetrates massive injustice or cannot
protect its own citizens. Responsibility to Protect has garnered wide
international attention and serves as a manifesto for a concept of sovereignty
that is non-absolute and conditional upon outside obligations.
The other way in which sovereignty is being
circumscribed is through European integration. This idea also arose in reaction
to the Holocaust, a calamity that many European leaders attributed at least in
part to the sovereign state's lack of accountability. Historically, the most
enthusiastic supporters of European integration have indeed come from Catholic
Christian Democratic parties, whose ideals are rooted in medieval Christendom,
where at least in theory, no leader was sovereign and all leaders were
accountable to a universal set of values. In the modern language of human
rights and democracy, they echo Pope Innocent X's excoriation of the Peace of
Westphalia.
European integration began in 1950, when six
states formed the European Coal and Steel Community in the Treaty of Paris. The
community established joint international authority over the coal and steel
industries of these six countries, entailing executive control through a
permanent bureaucracy and a decision-making Council of Ministers composed of
foreign ministers of each state. This same model was expanded to a general
economic zone in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. It was enhanced by a judicial
body, the European Court of Justice, and a legislature, the European Parliament,
a directly elected Europe-wide body. Over time, European integration has
widened, as the institution now consists of twenty-seven members, and deepened,
as it did in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, which expanded the institution's
powers and reconfigured it as the European Union. Far from a replacement for
states, the European Union rather “pools” important aspects of their
sovereignty into a “supranational” institution in which their freedom of action
is constrained (Keohane & Hoffman 1991). They are no longer absolutely
sovereign. Today, European integration proceeds apace. On December 1, 2009, the
Treaty of Lisbon came into full force, pooling sovereignty further by
strengthening the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, creating a
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to
represent a unified European Union position, and making the European Union's
Charter of Fundamental Human Rights legally binding.
This circumscription of the sovereign state,
through international norms and supranational institutions, finds a parallel in
contemporary philosophers who attack the notion of absolute sovereignty. Their
thought is not entirely new, for even in early modern times, philosophers like
Hugo Grotius, Alberico Gentili, and Francisco Suarez, though they accepted the
state as a legitimate institution, thought that its authority ought to be
limited, not absolute. The cruel prince, for instance, could be subject to a
disciplining action from neighboring princes that is much like contemporary
notions of humanitarian intervention.
Perhaps the two most prominent attacks on
sovereignty from political philosophers since World War II come from Bertrand
de Jouvenel and Jacques Maritain. In his prominent work of 1957, Sovereignty: An
Inquiry Into the Political Good, Jouvenel acknowledges that
sovereignty is an important attribute of modern political authority, needed to
quell disputes within the state and to muster cooperation in defense against
outsiders. But he roundly decries the modern concept of sovereignty, which
creates a power who is above the rules, a power whose decrees are to be
considered legitimate simply because they emanate from his will. To Jouvenel,
sovereignty reached its peak in Hobbes, in whose “horrific conception
everything comes back to means of constraint, which enable the sovereign to
issue rights and dictate laws in any way he pleases. But these means of
constraint are themselves but a fraction of the social forces concentrated in
the hand of the sovereign” (197). Despite their differences over the locus and
form of sovereignty, subsequent thinkers like Locke, Pufendorf, and Rousseau
“were to feel the lure of this mechanically perfect construction” (198). This
was “the hour of sovereignty
in itself,” writes Jouvenel, the existence
of which “hardly anyone would thenceforward have the hardihood to deny” (198).
As his description of Hobbes intimates,
Jouvenel views early modern absolute sovereignty with great alarm. “[I]t is the
idea itself which is dangerous,” he writes (198). But rather than calling for
the concept to be abrogated, he holds that sovereignty must be channeled so
that sovereign authority wills nothing but what is legitimate. Far from being
defined by the sovereign, morality has an independent validity. Appealing to
the perspective of “Christian thinkers,” he argues that “there are . . . wills
which are just and wills which are unjust” (201). “Authority,”
then, “carries with it the obligation to command the thing that should be
commanded” (201). This was the understanding of authority held by the
ancien regime, where effective advisers to the monarch could channel his
efforts towards the common good. What can channel the sovereign will today?
Jouvenel seems to doubt that judicial or constitutional design is alone enough.
Rather, he places his hope in the shared moral concepts of the citizenry, which
act as a constraint upon the choices of the sovereign.
In Chapter Two of his enduring work of 1951, Man and the State, Jacques
Maritain shows little sympathy for sovereignty at all, not even the qualified
sympathy of Jouvenel:
It is my contention that political philosophy
must get rid of the word, as well as the concept, of Sovereignty:-not because
it is an antiquated concept, or by virtue of a sociological-juridical theory of
“objective law”; and not only because the concept of Sovereignty creates
insuperable difficulties and theoretical entanglements in the field of
international law; but because, considered in its genuine meaning, and in the
perspective of the proper scientific realm to which it belongs — political
philosophy — this concept is intrinsically wrong and bound to mislead us if we
keep on using it — assuming that it has been too long and too largely accepted
to be permissibly rejected, and unaware of the false connotations that are
inherent in it (29–30).
Bodin's and Hobbes’ mistake was in conceiving
of sovereignty as authority that the people permanently transferred and
alienated to an external entity, here the monarch. Rather than representing the
people and being accountable to it, the sovereign became a transcendent entity,
holding the supreme and inalienable right to rule over the people,
independently of them, rather than representing the people, accountable to
them. Like Jouvenel, Maritain rues the exaltation of the sovereign's will such
that what is just is what serves his interest. This is idolatry. Any transfer
of the authority of the body politic either to some part of itself or to some
outside entity — the apparatus of the state, a monarch, or even the people — is
illegitimate, for the validity of a government is rooted in its relationship to
natural law. Sovereignty gives rise to three dysfunctionalities. First, its
external dimension renders inconceivable international law and a world state,
to both of which Maritain is highly sympathetic. Second, the internal dimension
of sovereignty, the absolute power of the state over the body politic, results
in centralism, not pluralism. Third, the supreme power of the sovereign state
is contrary to the democratic notion of accountability.
As a Catholic philosopher, Maritain's
arguments run similar to Christian philosophers of early modern Europe who
criticized absolute sovereignty. Witnessing the rise of the formidable entity
of the state, they sought to place limits on its power and authority. They are
the ancestors of those who now demand limits on the state's authority in the
name of human rights, of the right to quell genocide and disaster and deliver
relief from the outside, of an international criminal court, and of a
supranational entity that assumes power of governance over economic, and now,
maybe, military affairs.
·
Bartelson,
J., 1995. A Genealogy of
Sovereignty, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
·
Bodin,
J., 1992. On Sovereignty:
Four Chapters From Six Books of the Commonwealth,
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·
Popular
Sovereignty,
by John F. Knutsen
First
published Tue Feb 12, 2002; substantive revision Sat Aug 23, 2008
The 17th Century English
philosopher Thomas Hobbes is now widely regarded as one of a handful of truly
great political philosophers, whose masterwork Leviathan rivals in significance the
political writings of Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls. Hobbes
is famous for his early and elaborate development of what has come to be known
as “social contract theory”,
the method of justifying political principles or arrangements by appeal to the
agreement that would be made among suitably situated rational, free, and equal
persons. He is infamous for having used the social contract method to arrive at
the astonishing conclusion that we ought to submit to the authority of an
absolute—undivided and unlimited—sovereign power. While his methodological
innovation had a profound constructive impact on subsequent work in political
philosophy, his substantive conclusions have served mostly as a foil for the
development of more palatable philosophical positions. Hobbes's moral
philosophy has been less influential than his political philosophy, in part
because that theory is too ambiguous to have garnered any general consensus as
to its content. Most scholars have taken Hobbes to have affirmed some sort of
personal relativism or subjectivism; but views that Hobbes espoused divine
command theory, virtue ethics, rule egoism, or a form of projectivism also find
support in Hobbes's texts and among scholars. Because Hobbes held that “the
true doctrine of the Lawes of Nature is the true Morall philosophie”,
differences in interpretation of Hobbes's moral philosophy can be traced to
differing understandings of the status and operation of Hobbes's “laws of
nature”, which laws will be discussed below. The formerly dominant view that
Hobbes espoused psychological egoism as the foundation of his moral theory is
currently widely rejected, and there has been to date no fully systematic study
of Hobbes's moral psychology.
Hobbes wrote several
versions of his political philosophy, including The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic
(also under the titles Human
Nature and De
Corpore Politico) published in 1650, De Cive (1642) published in English as Philosophical Rudiments Concerning
Government and Society in 1651, the English Leviathan published in
1651, and its Latin revision in 1668. Others of his works are also important in
understanding his political philosophy, especially his history of the English
Civil War, Behemoth
(published 1679), De Corpore
(1655), De Homine
(1658), Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of
England (1681), and The
Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance (1656). All of
Hobbes's major writings are collected in The
English Works of Thomas Hobbes, edited by Sir William Molesworth
(11 volumes, London 1839-45), and Thomae
Hobbes Opera Philosophica Quae Latina Scripsit Omnia, also edited
by Molesworth (5 volumes; London, 1839-45). Oxford University Press has
undertaken a projected 26 volume collection of the Clarendon Edition of the Works of Thomas Hobbes.
So far 3 volumes are available: De
Cive (edited by Howard Warrender), The Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes (edited
by Noel Malcolm), and Writings
on Common Law and Hereditary Right (edited by Alan Cromartie and
Quentin Skinner). Readers new to Hobbes should begin with Leviathan, being sure to
read Parts Three and Four, as well as the more familiar and often excerpted
Parts One and Two. There are many fine overviews of Hobbes's normative
philosophy, some of which are listed in the following selected bibliography of
secondary works.
Hobbes sought to discover
rational principles for the construction of a civil polity that would not be
subject to destruction from within. Having lived through the period of
political disintegration culminating in the English Civil War, he came to the
view that the burdens of even the most oppressive government are “scarce
sensible, in respect of the miseries, and horrible calamities,
that accompany a Civill Warre”. Because virtually any government would
be better than a civil war, and, according to Hobbes's analysis, all but
absolute governments are systematically prone to dissolution into civil war,
people ought to submit themselves to an absolute political authority. Continued
stability will require that they also refrain from the sorts of actions that
might undermine such a regime. For example, subjects should not dispute the
sovereign power and under no circumstances should they rebel. In general,
Hobbes aimed to demonstrate the reciprocal relationship between political
obedience and peace.
To establish these conclusions, Hobbes invites
us to consider what life would be like in a state of nature, that is, a
condition without government. Perhaps we would imagine that people might fare
best in such a state, where each decides for herself how to act, and is judge,
jury and executioner in her own case whenever disputes arise—and that at any
rate, this state is the appropriate baseline against which to judge the
justifiability of political arrangements. Hobbes terms this situation “the
condition of mere nature”, a state of perfectly private judgment, in which
there is no agency with recognized authority to arbitrate disputes and
effective power to enforce its decisions.
Hobbes's near descendant, John Locke,
insisted in his Second
Treatise of Government that the state of nature was indeed to be
preferred to subjection to the arbitrary power of an absolute sovereign. But
Hobbes famously argued that such a “dissolute condition of masterlesse men,
without subjection to Lawes, and a coercive Power to tye their hands from
rapine, and revenge” would make impossible all of the basic security upon which
comfortable, sociable, civilized life depends. There would be “no place for
industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no culture
of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by
Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving and removing such things
as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of
Time; no Arts; no Letters; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and
danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish,
and short.” If this is the state of nature, people have strong reasons to avoid
it, which can be done only by submitting to some mutually recognized public
authority, for “so long a man is in the condition of mere nature, (which is a
condition of war,) as private appetite is the measure of good and evill.”
Although many readers have criticized
Hobbes's state of nature as unduly pessimistic, he constructs it from a number
of individually plausible empirical and normative assumptions. He assumes that people are sufficiently similar in their mental and physical
attributes that no one is invulnerable nor can expect to be able to dominate the
others. Hobbes assumes that people generally “shun death”, and that the desire
to preserve their own lives is very strong in most people. While people have
local affections, their benevolence is limited, and they have a tendency to
partiality. Concerned that others should agree with their own high opinions of
themselves, people are sensitive to slights. They make evaluative judgments,
but often use seemingly impersonal terms like ‘good’ and ‘bad’ to stand for
their own personal preferences. They are curious about the causes of events,
and anxious about their futures; according to Hobbes, these characteristics
incline people to adopt religious beliefs, although the content of those
beliefs will differ depending upon the sort of religious education one has
happened to receive.
With respect to normative assumptions, Hobbes
ascribes to each person in the state of nature a liberty right to preserve
herself, which he terms “the right of nature”. This is the right to do whatever
one sincerely judges needful for one's preservation; yet because it is at least
possible that virtually anything might be judged necessary for one's
preservation, this theoretically limited right of nature becomes in practice an
unlimited right to potentially anything, or, as Hobbes puts it, a right “to all
things”. Hobbes further assumes as a principle of practical rationality, that
people should adopt what they see to be the necessary means to their most
important ends.
Taken together, these plausible descriptive
and normative assumptions yield a state of nature potentially fraught with
divisive struggle. The right of each to all things invites serious conflict,
especially if there is competition for resources, as there will surely be over
at least scarce goods such as the most desirable lands, spouses, etc. People
will quite naturally fear that others may (citing the right of nature) invade
them, and may rationally plan to strike first as an anticipatory defense.
Moreover, that minority of prideful or “vain-glorious” persons who take
pleasure in exercising power over others will naturally elicit preemptive
defensive responses from others. Conflict will be further fueled by
disagreement in religious views, in moral judgments, and over matters as mundane
as what goods one actually needs, and what respect one properly merits. Hobbes
imagines a state of nature in which each person is free to decide for herself
what she needs, what she's owed, what's respectful, right, pious, prudent, and
also free to decide all of these questions for the behavior of everyone else as
well, and to act on her judgments as she thinks best, enforcing her views where
she can. In this situation where there is no common authority to resolve these
many and serious disputes, we can easily imagine with Hobbes that the state of
nature would become a “state of war”, even worse, a war of “all against all”.
In response to the natural question whether
humanity ever was generally in any such state of nature, Hobbes gives three
examples of putative states of nature. First, he notes that all sovereigns are
in this state with respect to one another. This claim has made Hobbes the
representative example of a “realist” in international relations. Second, he
opined that many now civilized peoples were formerly in that state, and some
few peoples—“the savage people in many places of America” (Leviathan, XIII), for
instance—were still to his day in the state of nature. Third and most
significantly, Hobbes asserts that the state of nature will be easily
recognized by those whose formerly peaceful states have collapsed into civil
war. While the state of nature's condition of perfectly private judgment is an
abstraction, something resembling it too closely for comfort remains a
perpetually present possibility, to be feared, and avoided.
Do the other assumptions of Hobbes's
philosophy license the existence of this imagined state of isolated individuals
pursuing their private judgments? Probably not, since, as feminist critics
among others have noted, children are by Hobbes's theory assumed to have
undertaken an obligation of obedience to their parents in exchange for
nurturing, and so the primitive units in the state of nature will include
families ordered by internal obligations, as well as individuals. The bonds of
affection, sexual affinity, and friendship—as well as of clan membership and
shared religious belief—may further decrease the accuracy of any purely
individualistic model of the state of nature. This concession need not impugn
Hobbes's analysis of conflict in the state of nature, since it may turn out
that competition, diffidence and glory-seeking are disastrous sources of
conflicts among small groups just as much as they are among individuals. Still,
commentators seeking to answer the question how precisely we should understand
Hobbes's state of nature are investigating the degree to which Hobbes imagines
that to be a condition of interaction among isolated individuals.
Another important open question is that of
what, exactly, it is about human beings that makes it the case (supposing
Hobbes is right) that our communal life is prone to disaster when we are left
to interact according only to our own individual judgments. Perhaps, while
people do wish to act for their own best long-term interest, they are
shortsighted, and so indulge their current interests without properly
considering the effects of their current behavior on their long-term interest.
This would be a type of failure of rationality. Alternative, it may be that
people in the state of nature are fully rational, but are trapped in a
situation that makes it individually rational for each to act in a way that is
sub-optimal for all, perhaps finding themselves in the familiar ‘prisoner's
dilemma’ of game theory. Or again, it may be that Hobbes's state of nature
would be peaceful but for the presence of persons (just a few, or perhaps all,
to some degree) whose passions overrule their calmer judgments; who are
prideful, spiteful, partial, envious, jealous, and in other ways prone to
behave in ways that lead to war. Such an account would understand irrational
human passions to be the source of conflict. Which, if any,
of these accounts adequately answers to Hobbes's text is a matter of continuing
debate among Hobbes scholars. Game theorists have been particularly
active in these debates, experimenting with different models for the state of
nature and the conflict it engenders.
Hobbes argues that the state
of nature is a miserable state of war in which none of our important human ends
are reliably realizable. Happily, human nature also provides resources to
escape this miserable condition. Hobbes argues that each of us, as a rational
being, can see that a war of all against all is inimical to the satisfaction of
her interests, and so can agree that “peace is good, and therefore also the way
or means of peace are good”. Humans will recognize as imperatives the
injunction to seek peace, and to do those things necessary to secure it, when
they can do so safely. Hobbes calls these practical imperatives “Lawes of
Nature”, the sum of which is not to treat others in ways we would not have them
treat us. These “precepts”, “conclusions” or “theorems” of reason are “eternal
and immutable”, always commanding our assent even when they may not safely be
acted upon. They forbid many familiar vices such as iniquity, cruelty, and
ingratitude. Although commentators do not agree on whether these laws should be
regarded as mere precepts of prudence, or rather as divine commands, or moral
imperatives of some other sort, all agree that Hobbes understands them to
direct people to submit to political authority. They tell us to seek peace with
willing others by laying down part of our “right to all things”, by mutually
covenanting to submit to the authority of a sovereign, and further direct us to
keep that covenant establishing sovereignty.
When people mutually covenant each to the
others to obey a common authority, they have established what Hobbes calls
“sovereignty by institution”. When, threatened by a conqueror, they covenant
for protection by promising obedience, they have established “sovereignty by
acquisition”. These are equally legitimate ways of establishing sovereignty,
according to Hobbes, and their underlying motivation is the same—namely
fear—whether of one's fellows or of a conqueror. The social covenant involves
both the renunciation or transfer of right and the authorization of the
sovereign power. Political legitimacy depends not on how a
government came to power, but only on whether it can effectively protect
those who have consented to obey it; political obligation ends when protection
ceases.
Although Hobbes offered some mild pragmatic
grounds for preferring monarchy to other forms of government, his main concern
was to argue that effective government—whatever its form—must have absolute
authority. Its powers must be neither divided nor limited. The powers of
legislation, adjudication, enforcement, taxation, war-making (and the less
familiar right of control of normative doctrine) are connected in such a way
that a loss of one may thwart effective exercise of the rest; for example,
legislation without interpretation and enforcement will not serve to regulate
conduct. Only a government that possesses all of what Hobbes terms the
“essential rights of sovereignty” can be reliably effective, since where
partial sets of these rights are held by different bodies that disagree in
their judgments as to what is to be done, paralysis of effective government, or
degeneration into a civil war to settle their dispute, may occur.
Similarly, to impose limitation on the
authority of the government is to invite irresoluble disputes over whether it
has overstepped those limits. If each person is to decide for herself whether
the government should be obeyed, factional disagreement—and war to settle the
issue, or at least paralysis of effective government—are quite possible. To
refer resolution of the question to some further authority, itself also limited
and so open to challenge for overstepping its bounds, would be to initiate an
infinite regress of non-authoritative ‘authorities’ (where the buck never
stops). To refer it to a further authority itself unlimited, would be just to
relocate the seat of absolute sovereignty, a position entirely consistent with
Hobbes's insistence on absolutism. To avoid the horrible prospect of
governmental collapse and return to the state of nature, people should treat
their sovereign as having absolute authority.
While Hobbes insists that we should regard
our governments as having absolute authority, he reserves to subjects the
liberty of disobeying some of their government's commands. He argues that
subjects retain a right of self-defense against the sovereign power, giving
them the right to disobey or resist when their lives are in danger. He also
gives them seemingly broad resistance rights in cases in which their families
or even their honor are at stake. These exceptions have understandably
intrigued those who study Hobbes. His ascription of apparently inalienable
rights—what he calls the “true liberties of subjects”—seems incompatible with
his defense of absolute sovereignty. Moreover, if the sovereign's failure to
provide adequate protection to subjects extinguishes their obligation to obey,
and if it is left to each subject to judge for herself the adequacy of that
protection, it seems that people have never really exited the fearsome state of
nature. This aspect of Hobbes's political philosophy has been hotly debated
ever since Hobbes's time. Bishop Bramhall, one of Hobbes's contemporaries,
famously accused Leviathan
of being a “Rebell's Catechism.” More recently, some commentators have argued
that Hobbes's discussion of the limits of political obligation is the Achilles'
heel of his theory. It is not clear whether or not this charge can stand up to
scrutiny, but it will surely be the subject of much continued discussion.
The last crucial aspect of Hobbes's political
philosophy is his treatment of religion. Hobbes progressively expands his
discussion of Christian religion in each revision of his political philosophy,
until it comes in Leviathan
to comprise roughly half the book. There is no settled consensus on how Hobbes
understands the significance of religion within his political theory. Some
commentators have argued that Hobbes is trying to demonstrate to his readers
the compatibility of his political theory with core Christian commitments,
since it may seem that Christians' religious duties forbid their affording the
sort of absolute obedience to their governors which Hobbes's theory requires of
them. Others have doubted the sincerity of his professed Christianity, arguing
that by the use of irony or other subtle rhetorical devices, Hobbes sought to
undermine his readers' religious beliefs. Howsoever his intentions are properly
understood, Hobbes's obvious concern with the power of religious belief is a fact
that interpreters of his political philosophy must seek to explain.
The secondary literature on Hobbes's moral
and political philosophy (not to speak of his entire body of work) is vast,
appearing across many disciplines and in many languages. The following is a
narrow selection of fairly recent works by philosophers, political theorists,
and intellectual historians, available in English, on main areas of inquiry in
Hobbes's moral and political thought. Very helpful for further reference is the
critical bibliography of Hobbes scholarship to 1990 contained in Zagorin, P.,
1990, “Hobbes on Our Mind”, Journal
of the History of Ideas, 51(2).
·
Hobbes Studies is an annually published journal devoted to
scholarly research on all aspects of Hobbes's work.
·
Brown,
K.C., (ed.), 1965, Hobbes
Studies, Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, contains important papers by A.E. Taylor, J.W. N. Watkins, Howard
Warrender, and John Plamenatz, among others.
·
Caws,
P., (ed.), 1989, The Causes of Quarrell: Essays on Peace,
War, and Thomas Hobbes, Boston: Beacon Press.
·
Dietz,
M., (ed.), 1990, Thomas
Hobbes and Political Theory, Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.
·
Finkelstein,
C., (ed.), 2005, Hobbes on
Law, Aldershot: Ashgate.
·
Foisneau,
L. and T. Sorell, (eds.), 2004, Leviathan
after 350 years, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
·
Lloyd,
S.A., (ed.), 2001, “Special Issue on Recent Work on the Moral and Political
Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes”, Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly, 82 (3&4).
·
Rogers,
G.A.J. and A. Ryan, (eds.), 1988, Perspectives
on Thomas Hobbes, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
·
Rogers,
G.A.J., (ed.), 1995, Leviathan:
Contemporary Responses to the Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes,
Bristol: Thoemmes Press.
·
Shaver,
R., (ed.), 1999, Hobbes,
Hanover: Dartmouth Press.
·
Sorell,
T. (ed.), 1996, The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
·
Sorrell,
T. and G.A.J. Rogers, (eds.), 2000, Hobbes
and History, London: Routledge.
·
Springboard,
P., (ed.), 2007, The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes's
Leviathan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
·
Armitage,
D., 2007, “Hobbes and the foundations of modern international thought”, in Rethinking the Foundations of Modern
Political Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
·
Ashcraft,
R., 1971, “Hobbes's Natural Man: A Study in Ideology Formation”, Journal of Politics, 33:
1076-1117.
·
Baumgold,
D., 1988, Hobbes's Political
Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
·
Boonin-Vail,
D., 1994, Thomas Hobbes and
the Science of Moral Virtue, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
·
Collins,
J., 2005, The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
·
Curley,
E., 1988, “I durst not write so boldly: or how to read Hobbes'
theological-political treatise”, E. Giancotti (ed.), Proceedings of the Conference on
Hobbes and Spinoza, Urbino.
·
–––,
1994, “Introduction to Hobbes's Leviathan”,
Leviathan with
selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668, E. Curley (ed.),
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
·
Curran,
E., 2006, “Can Rights Curb the Hobbesian Sovereign? The Full Right to
Self-preservation, Duties of Sovereignty and the Limitations of Hohfeld”, Law and Philosophy, 25:
243-265.
·
–––,
2007, Reclaiming the Rights
of Hobbesian Subjects, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
·
Darwall,
S., 1995. The British
Moralists and the Internal 'Ought', 1640-1740, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press
·
–––
2000, “Normativity and Projection in Hobbes's Leviathan”, The Philosophical Review, 109
(3): 313-347.
·
Ewin,
R.E., 1991, Virtues and Rights:
The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Boulder: Westview Press.
·
Gauthier,
D., 1969, The Logic of
'Leviathan': the Moral and political Theory of Thomas Hobbes,
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
·
Gert,
B., 1967, “Hobbes and psychological egoism”, Journal
of the History of Ideas, 28: 503-520.
·
–––
1978, “Introduction to Man and Citizen”, Man
and Citizen, B. Gert, (ed.), New York: Humanities Press.
·
–––
1988, “The law of nature and the moral law”, Hobbes
Studies, 1: 26-44.
·
Goldsmith,
M. M., 1966, Hobbes's
Science of Politics, New York: Columbia University Press
·
Hampton,
J., 1986, Hobbes and the
Social Contract Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
·
Hoekstra,
K., 1999, “Nothing to Declare: Hobbes and the Advocate of Injustice”, Political Theory, 27 (2): 230-235.
·
–––,
2003, “Hobbes on Law, Nature and Reason”, Journal
of the History of Philosophy, 41 (1): 111-120.
·
–––,
2007, “A lion in the house: Hobbes and democracy” in Rethinking the Foundations of Modern
Political Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
·
Hood,
E.C., 1964. The Divine
Politics of Thomas Hobbes, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
·
Johnston,
D., 1986, The Rhetoric
of'Leviathan': Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural Transformation,
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
·
Kavka,
G., 1986, Hobbesian Moral
and Political Theory, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
·
LeBuffe,
M., 2003, “Hobbes on the Origin of Obligation”, British Journal for the History of Philosophy,
11(1): 15-39.
·
Lloyd,
S.A., 1992, Ideals as
Interests in Hobbes's 'Leviathan': the Power of Mind over Matter,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
·
–––,
1998, “Contemporary Uses of Hobbes's political philosophy”, in Rational Commitment and Social
Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka, J. Coleman and C. Morris (eds.),
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
·
Macpherson,
C.B., 1962, The Political Theory of Possessive
Individualism: Hobbes to Locke, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
·
–––,
1968, “Introduction”, Leviathan,
C.B. Macpherson, (ed.), London: Penguine.
·
Malcolm,
N., 2002, Aspects of Hobbes,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
·
Martinich,
A.P., 1992, The Two Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes
on Religion and Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
·
–––,
1995, A Hobbes Dictionary,
Oxford: Blackwell.
·
–––,
1999, Hobbes: A Biography,
Cambridge: Cambridg University Press.
·
–––,
2005, Hobbes,
New York: Routledge.
·
Murphy,
M. 2000, “Hobbes on the Evil of Death”, Archiv
für Geschichte der Philosophie, 82: 36-61.
·
Nagel,
T., 1959, “Hobbes's Concept of Obligation”, Philosophical
Review, 68: 68-83.
·
Oakeshott,
M., 1975. Hobbes on Civil
Association, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
·
Raphael,
D. D., 1977, Hobbes: Morals
and Politics, London: Routledge Press.
·
Ryan,
A., 1986, “A More Tolerant Hobbes?”, S. Mendus, (ed.),
Justifying Toleration,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
·
Schneewind,
J.B., 1997, The Invention of Autonomy: History of
Modern Moral Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
·
Schwitzgebel,
E., 2007, “Human Nature and Moral Education in Mencius, Xunzi, Hobbes, and
Rousseau”, History of
Philosophy Quarterly, 24 (2): 147-168.
·
Skinner,
Q., 1996, Reason and
Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
·
–––,
2002, Visions of Politics
Volume 3: Hobbes and Civil Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
·
Sommerville,
J., 1992, Thomas Hobbes:
Political Ideas in Historical Context, London: Macmillan.
·
Sorell,
T., 1986, Hobbes,
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
·
Strauss,
L., 1936, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: its
Basis and Genesis, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
·
Tuck,
R., 1979, Natural Rights
Theories: Their Origin and Development, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
·
–––,
1989, Hobbes,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
·
–––,
1991, “Introduction”, Leviathan,
R. Tuck, (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
·
–––,
1993, Philosophy and
Government 1572-1651, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
·
Warrender,
H., 1957, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: his
Theory of Obligation, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
·
Watkins,
J.W.N., 1965, Hobbes's
System of Ideas, London: Hutchison and Co.
·
Entry
on Thomas Hobbes, by Garrath Williams,
Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy.
·
A
blog discussing Hobbes's relevance to
contemporary issues.
Why
does America insist on going to war with Iraq while France opposes it? Indeed,
the military solution to disarm Saddam Hussein’s regime of its weapons of mass
destruction is opposed by the whole world. Though the UN will not authorize the
use of force, America is going ahead. Why have France, Germany and other
countries in the European Union, formerly America’s allies and heirs of the renaissance
who adore the values of liberty, individual autonomy and democracy, been so
against the war?
The
conflict between America and Continental Europe over Iraq is more than a
dissagreement over the choice between war and peace. Robert Kagan, an expert on
American international relationships, has discussed this in his book Of
Paradise and Power (2003) wherein he defends American interests.
According to Kagan, currently there is a sharp divergence between America and
Europe over national priorities concerning the Iraqi threat as well as in
defining common defense and foreign policy affairs. In Kagan’s idiom, Europe is
living in a “Kantian worldly heaven”, while America is living in a “Hobbesian
authorized universe.”
The
heavenly Kantian world refers to the concept of a perpetual peace as described
by Immanuel Kant, the German 18th century philosopher. This concept
highlights the idea that to reach eternal peace on an international scale, a foedus
pacificum should be formed. This is a peace federation which is approved of
by countries that accept the Republican arrangement which honors moral
autonomy, individualism and social order.
The
Hobbesian universe refers to Thomas Hobbes’s dark view of society. This British
philosopher from the 17th century regarded the natural human state
to be one of anarchy, a constant war of all against all. Hobbes saw life as
solitary, brutish, poor, nasty, and short. In these circumstances, a Leviathan
power is needed which has absolute authority and the power to control anarchistic
and brutal tendencies.
Continental
Europe prefers the idea of a Kantian heaven world because they are wary of a
world based on pure power politics, a world that they have endured for
centuries and which involved dictatorships, narrow nationalisms and finally two
ruinous world wars.
Today
Europe is enjoying the foedus pacificum heaven. They are no longer
interested in enlarging their defense and military budgets. Instead they prefer
to rely on international constitutions, negotiation, diplomacy, and
transnational teamwork for solving world problems. That’s why in the Iraqi case
they call for a peaceful and multilateral resolution for the crisis.
America,
as the leading hegemonic state since the second world war
and the only hyper- power since the Soviet collapse, views the world as
the battlefield between good and the evil in a Hobbesian way. As the idiom
says, “If you have a hammer, everything appears as nails.” For America, with
its unassailable powers, it is the hammer which views the world as nails. In a
Hobbesian world view, America is the Leviathan that controls anarchy through
force and power.
In
Kagan’s point of view, America’s position is natural because basically the
choice is between peace and war, Kantian or Hobbesian. During the 19th
century, while American military power was deteriorating, it tended towards
Kantianism, while Europe tended to Hobbesianism. Now as America turns into a
militaristic state and Europe’s power wanes, their positions shift
correspondingly.
I
feel disturbed by this kind of thesis not because it is a weak argument, but
because of its worrying implications, particularly in the geopolitical context
of the WTC tragedy in which global terrorism is haunting everyone. Kagan
concludes that peaceful and multilateral approaches are merely signs of
weakness. In short, if you are powerful, why behave in a multilateral way? This
thinking characterizes the Bush government’s foreign policy.
America
is the only invincible hyper power at the moment. Its defense budget is
much larger than all the defense budgets of the European Union put together.
According to the latest Newsweek, next years American defense budget
will be greater than the defense budget of all the 191 countries in the world.
Its economic power eclipses that of Japan, Germany, and Britain combined. A
country that is populated by five percent of the total world’s population
possesses 43 percent of the world’s economic industry and is responsible for 50
percent of high end technological production.
Due
to its hyper power, America can do anything it wants in a unilateral
fashion, finding it unnecessary to have other’s authorization or to listen to
other’s suggestions. This is really ironic because when the September 11th
tragedy occurred, the majority of the world’s people, except Osama Bin Laden
and the fundamentalists, affirmed their sympathy and solidarity for America.
For example, Le Monde, a French magazine, proclaimed that “We are all
American now” and NATO expressed total support for America. America’
s call for “War against global terrorism” was welcomed virtually
everywhere.
In
the war against the terrorism, you cannot neglect the weak party, even though
you are a superpower. Not because you could not do it alone, but because when
you are very powerful, you will always be the target of terrorism. Therefore
you should build and expand the networks of trust in both strong and weak
circles to isolate the terrorists.
Unfortunately
Bush is not doing this. Instead of isolating the terrorists, he is isolating
America through unilateral action and thus wasting the international sympathy
for the WTC tragedy. He appears to feel capable of ordering the world’s anarchy
alone. It is as if America is proclaiming through its unilateral actions—“I am
a Leviathan, therefore I am.”
It is
even more worrying that the basis for the attack of Iraq is the belief that it
involves liberation rather than conquest. According to Bush, “Liberty for the
Iraqi people is the magnificent moral motive.” Overthrowing Saddam is merely
the beginning of a campaign for spreading democracy across the globe.
In
the American context, actually it is not Bush alone who possesses this
belief. American history is full of similar examples. Since the
beginning, the self-image built by America is that it is a concrete
manifestation of the universal liberty’s idea, which becomes the human
liberty’s realization model in the future.
Abraham
Lincoln said in America’s declaration if Independance,
“Liberty, is not only for the people of this country, but also the hope
for the world in the future.” In order to manifest this, Lincoln was not
reluctant to execute war. In his famous speech at Gettysburg during the civil
war, Lincoln called for the war against the South because their refusal to
abolish slavery. Lincoln’s two objectives were to liberate slaves and to assure
that the government is from the people, by the people and for the people.
At
that time America had not yet become a hegemonic state. After the second world war,
when America became a superpower, its role as a liberator was accepted by the
world because the American president at that time, Franklin D. Roosevelt and
Harry Truman, prefered to uphold international co-operation not imperialism.
Then, as a superpower, America took the multilateral initiative.
At
present, Bush combines the American belief as the liberator and a hyper power
which does not trust others. Thus moral absolutism emerges. This happens when
the Leviathan thinks it deserves to judge between good and evil, to provide
“liberty from God” and to decide which countries are in the axis of evil.
Shakespeare
said in Julius Caesar: “The abuse of greatness is when it
disjoins remorse from power.” A Leviathan which only believes in its
own power because it feels unbeatable is an example of power disjoined from
remorse. While the US Leviathan boasts about delivereing liberty through
attacking Iraq, the world’s people do not see this as the libertion of the
Iraqi people. Instead, they percieve an arrogant Leviathan
that agonizes the world. American unilateralism is a form of ignorance
which has no trust in the world’s voice. Consequently, the world does not trust
the US either.
Bush’s
main mistake is that he violated Thomas Jefferson’s original message that
America should always harbour “a decent respect to the opinions of
humankind”.
Is the
realist paradigm the best approach for national security considerations?
What are the main flaws and greatest strengths of realism as an approach?
Cite examples to illustrate your points.
“Realism and the realist paradigm have been
central to the operation of the international system and American attitudes
toward the world (Snow 21)”. Realism has been the central foundation for state
policies throughout the centuries. This realist paradigm builds upon the
concept of state sovereignty. It also asserts that this anarchic international
community is a result of these actors having certain interests that are so
important that compromise is unacceptable and force is justifiable as a means
to protect these interests. Because states zealously pursue these interests and
scarcity is often the case in international relations, political processes have
developed as a means of resolution. When these processes fail, force is the instrument
of choice. In order to use force successfully, a state must possess the
political, diplomatic, economic, and military power to succeed in achieving
their goals.
Sovereignty is at the heart of the realist
paradigm. Sovereignty means that a nation will not be imposed standards
from the outside. Some argue that the birth of realism occurred with
Thucydides' "History of the Peloponesian Wars," written in the 5th
century B.C. Machiavelli's "The Prince," written in the sixteenth
century, is also a major contributor to realism. Six propositions
compose the realist paradigm. One, the international system is composed
of sovereign states. Two, these sovereign states possess vital interests.
Three, vital interests become matters of international concern when
scarcity exists. Four, power must be used to rectify number three.
Five, power is the political means of conflict resolution. Six, one
political instrument of power is military force.
Realism can be beneficial because states exist in an
international arena of anarchy. Although not discussed by Snow, anarchy
is paramount to the realist paradigm. Because of this anarchy, states are
the strongest players. The states that exude the most power will be the
most successful because all states are in competition with one another.
For example, the Bush administration invaded Iraq without much
international support because they felt it was in their nation's best interest.
Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941 because they felt that they needed to
limit US influence in the Pacific. The realist paradigm at present is probably
the best approach to national security policy due to its acceptance as the
standard of conduct of states’ interaction with one another. I view realism as the lowest common
denominator (LCM) in which to base state action. Snow (2011, p 28) does a pretty good
job in determining where the LCM is placed based on national
interests. Most states resort to the realist paradigm when interest vital
to national security is involved. For
example, China’s military buildup along the Strait of Formosa is in direct
response to the threat China feels from the US-Japan Bilateral security
alliance. The US and Japan have both stated a threat to Taiwan from the
China mainland represents a threat to regional stability. When China conducted a show of force
exercise, which “bracketed” the Taiwanese ports of Keelung and Kaosuing with
cruise missiles, the US issued a statement warning “grave consequences” should
China actually attack Taiwan. In
this specific case, the realist paradigm is clearly evident as the US and Japan
is balanced against China. China
is, in turn, building up its military capabilities to counter the perceived
threat of the opposing alliance. Both
actions indicate ongoing power politics between the three states.
The realist paradigm is not without its
faults. One of the main
detractors to following realist policy is realism’s focus on “conflict rather
than cooperation (Snow, 2011, p 35).” Using
the example of the security dilemma between the US, Japan, and mainland China,
many courses of action resulting in peaceful resolution of the issue of
Taiwan’s reunification versus independence, are due solely to the practice of
realist policies by all sides. The
US-Japan alliance and China are untrusting of the opposite party solely based
upon each other’s apparent intentions of resorting to conflict to resolve said
issue. Another fault of realism is the exogenous assumption of the state being
the only actor in international relations. This notion has been challenged by
constructivists and is most evident in the conflict formerly known as the
Global War on Terror (GWOT). Al-Qaeda
is an international terrorist organization that does not have its location in
one state. In the case of
Operation Enduring Freedom, it was easy to target Afghanistan as the source of
al-Qaeda support and therefore restore some familiarity to the realist
paradigm, but beyond that specific scenario, realist power politics toward
al-Qaeda have been more ambiguous. This
ambiguity may have contributed to the George W. Bush era neoconservative
perception of the use of force for US policies involving major issues of
security.
Critics of realism argue that
the international arena is guaranteed to be full of conflict rather than cooperation.
Although realism still dominates most nations, it's
critiques are increasing. The first Gulf War in 1990/1991 is proof that
the international arena will not stand pat while one nation (Iraq) invades
another (Kuwait). Critics argue that realists legitimize the use of force
as a means of achieving states' interests. There are several critical stances
that have been taken regarding this realist paradigm upon which many states
build their security policies. The world’s events are fluid. Critics claim that
realism cannot explain all the world’s happenings, and the realist paradigm,
they argue, is not entirely accurate. The
concept of state sovereignty tends to receive most negative attention. Those
not in favor of a realist approach to national security
argue that state sovereignty creates a world of conflict rather than peaceful
interactions between nations as states pursue their own interests. However,
sovereign states are hardly unaffected by the interactions of others.
International interference is seen throughout the world. Economic globalization
and increased and improved communications have made states around the world
more connected and reliant on one another. Because of this interconnectivity
instruments such as sanctions have become effective. The international
community recently threatened such sanctions on Iran in hopes of stalling their
nuclear program.
Excellent
analysis on the realist paradigm and national security considerations.
Nation's acting in their own interest is a good
observation of reality. The
problem is that a nation's interest is not so easily defined.
National interests are formed through identity creation (a constructivist
perspective). What one nation's decision maker may think is in his or her
nation's best interest is not the same as other nation's decision makers.
Understanding the almost limitless number of variables that influence the
creation of interests and identities truly is mind bending. While realism
points out the importance of nation's acting in their own interests,
constructivism points out the importance of how those interests are
formed. For example, Switzerland's idealistic foreign policy and
neutrality during WWII can be viewed as in its best interest because of numerous
factors that influenced its outcome. Various identity factors coupled
with its lack of ability to stop a German invasion resulted in an outcome of
neutrality and the eventual construction of the idealistic foreign
policy of today. Thanks again for your discussion. -Stephen
As states become more intertwined and
sovereignty slips away, the framework that the realist paradigm lays out for
national security also decays. The use of force to achieve state goals is
nowhere near as acceptable today as it has been in the past. The Cold War was a
prime example of a time when the realist paradigm was optimal. National
security and survival, states number one goal, were at stake. The Soviet
Union’s possession and possible intent of using a nuclear arsenal against the United
states provided “clear guidance for the development,
deployment, and potential employment of force” (Snow 36). The United States’
response to the attack on September 11th was also justified under the realist
paradigm. Another critique
of a realist approach is that it emphasizes military force as a means to the
ends. International cooperation is increasing, however, raising doubts as to
the effectiveness of this paradigm. Realism certainly worked as the building
blocks in national security in the past, however, as the world is changing, so
too, must national security policies.
Realism, however, is an effective policy to
use between states of relative equal power. The past has shown states will
refrain from conflict if said conflicts will seriously the vital interest of
state survival. The Cold
War is the best example of how well realism can function. The US and USSR, in conjunction
with a myriad allied states competed for forty years, and yet major conflict
never occurred. Both sides,
unsure of their survival should a major war commence, remained largely
nonviolent towards one another until the USSR disintegrated in 1990.
I'm stuck in the
middle on this one. Newer theories such as constructivism make sense to
me, but I also steadfastly believe that nations act in their own interests.
I think if a nation wants to be idealistic, that is fine, but that nation
may be left behind in the dust. For example, Switzerland, with its
idealistic foreign policy, would not exist today if it weren't for the millions
of soldiers who sacrificed their lives in WW2. Switzerland chose to
remain neutral in the war, but had Germany won, they surely would have
eventually invaded them. As long as nations exist that are not
democratic, the world will continue to be a violent place, so realism may still
be the best approach to foreign policy. –Chuck
Despite its limitations and mounting
criticism of it, realism remains the dominant granizational device by which the
governments of sovereign states organize their approach to dealing with the
world. The criticisms are, without doubt, growing.
First published Thu Nov 28, 1996; substantive revision Thu Sep 16, 2010
As soon as one examines it, ‘liberalism’ fractures into a variety of types and competing visions. In this entry we focus on debates within the liberal tradition. We begin by (1) examining different interpretations of liberalism's core commitment — liberty. We then consider (2) the longstanding debate between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ liberalism. In section (3) we turn to the more recent controversy about whether liberalism is a ‘comprehensive’ or a ‘political’ doctrine. We close in (4) by considering disagreements as to ‘the reach’ of liberalism — does it apply to all humankind, and must all political communities be liberal?
‘By
definition’, Maurice Cranston rightly points out, ‘a liberal is a man who
believes in liberty’ (1967: 459). In two different ways, liberals accord
liberty primacy as a political value. (i) Liberals have typically maintained
that humans are naturally in ‘a State of perfect Freedom to order
their Actions…as they think fit…without asking leave, or depending on the Will
of any other Man’ (Locke, 1960 [1689]: 287). Mill too argued that ‘the burden
of proof is supposed to be with those who are against liberty; who contend for
any restriction or prohibition…. The a priori assumption is in favour
of freedom…’ (1963, vol. 21: 262). Recent liberal thinkers such as as Joel
Feinberg (1984: 9), Stanley Benn (1988: 87) and John Rawls (2001: 44, 112)
agree. This might be called the Fundamental Liberal Principle (Gaus,
1996: 162-166): freedom is normatively basic, and so the onus of justification
is on those who would limit freedom, especially through coercive means. It
follows from this that political authority and law must be justified, as they limit
the liberty of citizens. Consequently, a central question of liberal political
theory is whether political authority can be justified, and if so, how. It is
for this reason that social contract theory, as developed by Thomas Hobbes
(1948 [1651]), John Locke (1960 [1689]), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1973 [1762])
and Immanuel Kant (1965 [1797]), is usually viewed as liberal even though the
actual political prescriptions of, say, Hobbes and Rousseau, have distinctly
illiberal features. Insofar as they take as their starting point a state of
nature in which humans are free and equal, and so argue that any limitation of
this freedom and equality stands in need of justification (i.e., by the social
contract), the contractual tradition expresses the Fundamental Liberal
Principle.
(ii)
The Fundamental Liberal Principle holds that restrictions on liberty must be
justified, and because he accepts this, we can understand Hobbes as espousing a
liberal political theory. But Hobbes is at best a qualified liberal, for he also
argues that drastic limitations on liberty can be justified.
Paradigmatic liberals such as Locke not only advocate the Fundamental Liberal
Principle, but also maintain that justified limitations on liberty are fairly
modest. Only a limited government can be justified; indeed, the basic task of
government is to protect the equal liberty of citizens. Thus John Rawls's first
principle of justice: ‘Each person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive system of equal basic liberty compatible with a similar system for
all’ (Rawls, 1999b: 220).
Liberals
disagree, however, about the concept of liberty, and as a result the liberal
ideal of protecting individual liberty can lead to very different conceptions
of the task of government. As is well-known, Isaiah Berlin advocated a negative
conception of liberty:
I am normally said to be free
to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my activity.
Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can act
unobstructed by others. If I am prevented by others from doing what I could
otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree; and if this area is contracted by
other men beyond a certain minimum, I can be described as being coerced, or, it
may be, enslaved. Coercion is not, however, a term that covers every form of
inability. If I say that I am unable to jump more than ten feet in the air, or
cannot read because I am blind…it would be eccentric to say that I am to that
degree enslaved or coerced. Coercion implies the deliberate interference of
other human beings within the area in which I could otherwise act. You lack
political liberty or freedom only if you are prevented from attaining a goal by
other human beings (Berlin, 1969: 122).
For
Berlin and those who follow him, then, the heart of liberty is the absence of
coercion by others; consequently, the liberal state's commitment to protecting
liberty is, essentially, the job of ensuring that citizens do not coerce each
other without compelling justification. So understood,
negative liberty is an opportunity-concept. Being free is
merely a matter of what we can do, what options are open to us, regardless of
whether or not we exercise such options (Taylor, 1979).
Many
liberals have been attracted to more ‘positive’ conceptions of liberty.
Although Rousseau (1973 [1762]) seemed to advocate a positive conception of
liberty, according to which one was free when one acted according to one's true
will (the general will), the positive conception was best developed by the
British neo-Hegelians of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
such as Thomas Hill Green and Bernard Bosanquet (2001 [1923]). Green
acknowledged that ‘…it must be of course admitted that every usage of the term
[i.e., ‘freedom’] to express anything but a social and political relation of
one man to other involves a metaphor…It always implies…some exemption from
compulsion by another…’(1986 [1895]: 229). Nevertheless, Green went on to claim
that a person can be unfree if he is subject to an impulse or craving that
cannot be controlled. Such a person, Green argued, is ‘…in the condition of a
bondsman who is carrying out the will of another, not his own’ (1986 [1895]:
228). Just as a slave is not doing what he really wants to do, one who
is, say, an alcoholic, is being led by a craving to look for satisfaction where
it cannot, ultimately, be found.
For
Green, a person is free only if she is self-directed or autonomous. Running
throughout liberal political theory is an ideal of a free person as one whose
actions are in some sense her own.In this sense, positive liberty is
an exercise-concept. One is free merely to the degree that one has
effectively determined oneself and the shape of one's life (Taylor, 1979). Such
a person is not subject to compulsions, critically reflects on her ideals and
so does not unreflectively follow custom, and does not ignore her long-term
interests for short-term pleasures. This ideal of freedom as autonomy has its
roots not only in Rousseau's and Kant's political theory, but also in John
Stuart Mill's On Liberty. And today it is a dominant strain in
liberalism, as witnessed by the work of S.I. Benn (1988), Gerald Dworkin
(1988), and Joseph Raz (1986); see also the essays in Christman and Anderson
(2005).
This
Greenian, autonomy-based, conception of positive freedom is often run together
with a very different notion of ‘positive’ freedom: freedom as effective power
to act or to pursue one's ends. In the words of the British socialist R. H.
Tawney, freedom thus understood is ‘the ability act’ (1931: 221; see also Gaus,
2000; ch. 5.) On this view of positive freedom, a person who is not prohibited
from being a member of a Country Club but who is too poor to afford membership
is not free to be a member: she does not have an effective power to act.
Although the Greenian autonomy-based conception of positive freedom certainly
had implications for the distribution of resources (education, for example,
should be easily available so that all can develop their capacities), positive
freedom qua effective power to act closely ties freedom to material
resources. It was this conception of positive liberty that Hayek had in mind
when he insisted that although ‘freedom and wealth are both good things…they
still remain different’ (1960: 17-18).
An
older notion of liberty that has recently undergone resurgence is the
republican, or neo-Roman, conception of liberty which has its roots in the
writings of Cicero and Niccolo Machiavelli (1950 [1513]). According to Philip
Pettit, ‘The contrary of the liber, or free, person in Roman,
republican usage was the servus, or slave, and up to at least the
beginning of the last century, the dominant connotation of freedom, emphasized
in the long republican tradition, was not having to live in servitude to
another: not being subject to the arbitrary power of another’ (Pettit, 1996:
576). On this view, the opposite of freedom is domination. An agent is said to
be unfree if she is ‘subject to the potentially capricious will or the
potentially idiosyncratic judgement of another’ (Pettit, 1997: 5). The ideal
liberty-protecting government, then, ensures that no agent, including itself, has arbitrary power over any citizen. The key method
by which this is accomplished is through an equal disbursement of power. Each
person has power that offsets the power of another to arbitrarily interfere
with her activities (Pettit, 1997: 67).
The
republican conception of liberty is certainly distinct from both Greenian
positive and negative conceptions. Unlike Greenian positive liberty, republican
liberty is not primarily concerned with rational autonomy, realizing one's true
nature, or becoming one's higher self. When all dominating power has been
dispersed, republican theorists are generally silent about these goals (Larmore
2001). Unlike negative liberty, republican liberty is primarily focused upon
‘defenseless susceptibility to interference, rather than actual interference’
(Pettit, 1996: 577). Thus, in contrast to the ordinary negative conception, on
the republican conception the mere possibility of arbitrary
interference appears to constitute a limitation of liberty. Republican liberty
thus seems to involve a modal claim about the possibility of interference, and
this is often cashed out in terms of complex counterfactual claims. It is not
clear whether these claims can be adequately explicated (Gaus, 2003; cf.
Larmore, 2004).
Some republican theorists, such as Quentin Skinner
(1998: 113), Maurizio Viroli (2002: 6) and Pettit (1997: 8-11), view
republicanism as an alternative to liberalism. Insofar as republican liberty is seen as a basis for
criticizing market liberty and market society, this is plausible (Gaus, 2003b).
However, when liberalism is understood more expansively, and not so closely
tied to either negative liberty or market society, republicanism becomes
indistinguishable from liberalism (Ghosh, 2008; Rogers, 2008; Larmore, 2001;
Dagger, 1997).
Liberal
political theory, then, fractures over the conception of liberty. But a more
important division concerns the place of private property and the market order.
For classical liberals — sometimes called the ‘old’ liberalism — liberty and
private property are intimately related. From the eighteenth century right up
to today, classical liberals have insisted that an economic system based on
private property is uniquely consistent with individual liberty, allowing each
to live her life —including employing her labor and her capital — as she sees
fit. Indeed, classical liberals and libertarians have often asserted that in
some way liberty and property are really the same
thing; it has been argued, for example, that all rights, including liberty
rights, are forms of property; others have maintained that property is itself a
form of freedom (Gaus, 1994; Steiner, 1994). A market order based on private
property is thus seen as an embodiment of freedom (Robbins, 1961:
104). Unless people are free to make contracts and to sell their labour, or
unless they are free to save their incomes and then invest them as they see
fit, or unless they are free to run enterprises when they have obtained the
capital, they are not really free.
Classical
liberals employ a second argument connecting liberty and private property.
Rather than insisting that the freedom to obtain and employ private property is
simply one aspect of people's liberty, this second argument insists that
private property is the only effective means for the protection of liberty.
Here the idea is that the dispersion of power that results from a free market
economy based on private property protects the liberty of subjects against
encroachments by the state. As F.A. Hayek argues, ‘There can be no freedom of
press if the instruments of printing are under government control, no freedom
of assembly if the needed rooms are so controlled, no freedom of movement if
the means of transport are a government monopoly’ (1978: 149).
Although
classical liberals agree on the fundamental importance of private property to a
free society, the classical liberal tradition itself refracts into a spectrum
of views, from near-anarchist to those that attribute a significant role to the
state in economic and social policy (on this spectrum, see Mack and Gaus,
2004). Towards the most extreme ‘libertarian’ end of the classical liberal
spectrum are views of justified states as legitimate monopolies that may with
justice charge for their necessary rights-protection services: taxation is
legitimate so long as it is necessary to protect liberty and property rights.
As we go further ‘leftward’ we encounter classical liberal views that allow
taxation for (other) public goods and social infrastructure and, moving yet
further ‘left’, some classical liberal views allow for a modest social
minimum.(e.g., Hayek, 1976: 87). Most nineteenth century classical liberal
economists endorsed a variety of state policies, encompassing not only the
criminal law and enforcement of contracts, but the licensing of professionals,
health, safety and fire regulations, banking regulations, commercial
infrastructure (roads, harbors and canals) and often encouraged unionization
(Gaus, 1983b). Although today classical liberalism is often associated with
extreme forms of libertarianism, the classical liberal tradition was centrally
concerned with bettering the lot of the working class. The aim, as Bentham put
it, was to make the poor richer, not the rich poorer (Bentham, 1952 [1795]: vol.
1, 226n). Consequently, classical liberals reject the redistribution of wealth
as a legitimate aim of government.
What
has come to be known as ‘new’, ‘revisionist’, ‘welfare state’, or perhaps best,
‘social justice’, liberalism challenges this intimate connection between
personal liberty and a private property based market order (Freeden, 1978;
Gaus, 1983b; Paul, Miller and Paul, 2007). Three factors help explain the rise
of this revisionist theory. First, the new liberalism arose in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a period in which the ability of a
free market to sustain what Lord Beveridge (1944: 96) called a ‘prosperous
equilibrium’ was being questioned. Believing that a private property based
market tended to be unstable, or could, as Keynes argued (1973 [1936]), get
stuck in an equilibrium with high unemployment, new liberals came to doubt that
it was an adequate foundation for a stable, free society. Here the second
factor comes into play: just as the new liberals were losing faith in the
market, their faith in government as a means of supervising economic life was
increasing. This was partly due to the experiences of the First World War, in
which government attempts at economic planning seemed to succeed (Dewey, 1929:
551-60); more importantly, this reevaluation of the state was spurred by the
democratization of western states, and the conviction that, for the first time,
elected officials could truly be, in J.A. Hobson's phrase ‘representatives of
the community’ (1922: 49). As D.G. Ritchie proclaimed:
be it observed that arguments
used against ‘government’ action, where the government is entirely or mainly in
the hands of a ruling class or caste, exercising wisely or unwisely a paternal
or grandmotherly authority — such arguments lose their force just in proportion
as the government becomes more and more genuinely the government of the people
by the people themselves (1896: 64).
The
third factor underlying the development of the new liberalism was probably the
most fundamental: a growing conviction that, so far from being ‘the guardian of
every other right’ (Ely, 1992: 26), property rights generated an unjust
inequality of power that led to a less-than-equal liberty (typically, ‘positive
liberty’) for the working class. This theme is central to what is usually
called ‘liberalism’ in American politics, combining a strong endorsement of
civil and personal liberties with, at best, an indifference, and often enough
an antipathy, to private ownership. The seeds of this newer liberalism can be
found in Mill's On Liberty. Although Mill insisted that the ‘so-called
doctrine of Free Trade’ rested on ‘equally solid’ grounds as did the ‘principle
of individual liberty’ (1963, vol. 18: 293), he nevertheless insisted that the
justifications of personal and economic liberty were distinct. And in his Principles
of Political Economy Mill consistently emphasized that it is an open
question whether personal liberty can flourish without private property (1963,
vol. 2; 203-210), a view that Rawls was to reassert over a century later (2001:
Part IV).
One
of the many consequences of Rawls's great work, A Theory of Justice
(1999 [first published in 1971]) is that the ‘new liberalism’ has become focused
on developing a theory of social justice. For over thirty-five years liberal
political philosophers have analyzed, and disputed, his famous ‘difference
principle’ according to which a just basic structure of society arranges social
and economic inequalities such that they are to the greatest advantage of the
least well off representative group (1999b: 266). For Rawls, the default is an
equal distribution of (basically) income and wealth; only inequalities that
best enhance the long-term prospects of the least advantaged are just. As Rawls
sees it, the difference principle constitutes a public recognition of the
principle of reciprocity: the basic structure is to be arranged such that no
social group advances at the cost of another (2001: 122-24). Many followers of
Rawls have focused less on the ideal of reciprocity than the commitment to
equality (Dworkin, 2000). Indeed, what was previously called ‘welfare state’
liberalism is now often described as ‘egalitarian’ liberalism. And in one way
that is especially appropriate: in his later work Rawls insists that
welfare-state capitalism does not constitute a just basic structure (2001:
137-38). If some version of capitalism is to be just it must be a ‘property
owning democracy’ with a wide diffusion of ownership; a market socialist
regime, in Rawls's view, is more just than welfare-state capitalism (2001:
135-38). Not too surprisingly, classical liberals such as Hayek (1976) insist
that the contemporary liberal fixation on ‘the mirage of social justice’ leads them
to ignore the way that freedom depends on a decentralized market based on
private property, the overall results of which are unpredictable. In a similar
vein, Robert Nozick (1974: 160ff) famously argued that any attempt to ensure
that market transactions conform to any specific pattern of holdings will
involve constant interferences with individual freedom.
As
his work evolved, Rawls (1996: 5ff) insisted that his liberalism was not a
‘comprehensive’ doctrine, that is, one which includes an overall theory of
value, an ethical theory, an epistemology, or a controversial metaphysics of
the person and society. Our modern societies, characterized by a ‘reasonable
pluralism’, are already filled with such doctrines. The aim of ‘political
liberalism’ is not to add yet another sectarian doctrine, but to provide a
political framework that is neutral between such controversial comprehensive
doctrines (Larmore, 1996: 121ff). If it is to serve as the basis for public
reasoning in our diverse western societies, liberalism must be restricted to a
core set of political principles that are, or can be, the subject of consensus
among all reasonable citizens. Rawls's notion of a purely political conception
of liberalism seems more austere than the traditional liberal political
theories discussed above, being largely restricted to constitutional principles
upholding basic civil liberties and the democratic process.
As
Gaus (2004) has argued, the distinction between
‘political’ and ‘comprehensive’ liberalism misses a great deal. Liberal
theories form a broad continuum, from those that constitute full-blown
philosophical systems, to those that rely on a full theory of value and the
good, to those that rely on a theory of the right (but not the good), all the
way to those that seek to be purely political doctrines. Nevertheless, it is
important to appreciate that, though liberalism is primarily a political
theory, it has been associated with broader theories of ethics, value and
society. Indeed, many believe that liberalism cannot rid itself of all
controversial metaphysical (Hampton, 1989) or epistemological (Raz, 1990)
commitments.
Following
Wilhelm von Humboldt (1993 [1854]), in On Liberty Mill argues that one
basis for endorsing freedom (Mill believes that there are many), is the
goodness of developing individuality and cultivating capacities:
Individuality is the same
thing with development, and…it is only the cultivation of individuality which
produces, or can produce, well-developed human beings…what more can be said of
any condition of human affairs, than that it brings human beings themselves
nearer to the best thing they can be? or what worse
can be said of any obstruction to good, than that it prevents this? (Mill,
1963, vol. 18: 267)
This
is not just a theory about politics: it is a substantive, perfectionist, moral
theory about the good. And, on this view, the right thing to do is to promote
development or perfection, and only a regime securing extensive liberty for
each person can accomplish this (Wall, 1998). This moral ideal of human
perfection and development dominated liberal thinking in the latter part of the
nineteenth, and for most of the twentieth, century: not only Mill, but T.H.
Green, L.T. Hobhouse, Bernard Bosanquet, John Dewey and even Rawls show
allegiance to variants of this perfectionist ethic and the claim that it
provides a foundation for endorsing a regime of liberal rights (Gaus, 1983a).
And it is fundamental to the proponents of liberal autonomy discussed above, as
well as ‘liberal virtue’ theorists such as William Galston (1980). That the
good life is necessarily a freely chosen one in which a person develops his
unique capacities as part of a plan of life is probably the dominant liberal
ethic of the past century.
The
main challenge to Millian perfectionism as the distinctly liberal ethic comes
from moral contractualism, which can be divided into what might very roughly be
labeled ‘Kantian’ and ‘Hobbesian’ versions. According to Kantian
contractualism, ‘society, being composed of a plurality of persons, each with
his own aims, interests, and conceptions of the good, is best arranged when it
is governed by principles that do not themselves presuppose any particular
conception of the good…’(Sandel, 1982: 1). On this view, respect for the person
of others demands that we refrain from imposing our view of the good life on
them. Only principles that can be justified to all respect
the personhood of each. We thus witness the tendency of recent liberal
theory (Reiman, 1990; Scanlon, 1998) to transform the social contract from an
account of the state to an overall justification of morality, or at least a
social morality. Basic to such ‘Kantian contractualism’ is the idea that
suitably idealized individuals are motivated not by
the pursuit of gain, but by a commitment or desire to publicly justify
the claims they make on others (Reiman, 1990; Scanlon, 1982). A moral code that
could be the object of agreement among such individuals is thus a publicly
justified morality.
In
contrast, the Hobbesian version of contractualism supposes only that
individuals are self-interested, and correctly perceive that each person's
ability to effectively pursue her interests is enhanced by a framework of norms
that structure social life and divide the fruits of social cooperation
(Gauither, 1986; Hampton, 1986; Kavka, 1986). Morality, then, is a common
framework that advances the self-interest of each. The claim of Hobbesian
contractualism to be a distinctly liberal conception of morality stems from the
importance of individual freedom and property in such a common framework: only
systems of norms that allow each person great freedom to pursue her interests
as she sees fit could, it is argued, be the object of consensus among
self-interested agents (Courtland, 2008; Gaus 2003a: chap. 3; Ridge, 1998;
Gauthier, 1995). The continuing problem for Hobbesian contractualism is the
apparent rationality of free-riding: if everyone (or enough) complies with the
terms of the contract, and so social order is achieved, it would seem rational
to defect, and act immorally when one can gain by doing so. This is essentially
the argument of Hobbes's ‘Foole’, and from Hobbes (1948 [1651]: 94ff) to
Gauthier (1986: 160ff), Hobbesians have tried to reply to it.
Turning
from rightness to goodness, we can identify three main candidates for a liberal
theory of value. We have already encountered the first: perfectionism. Insofar
as perfectionism is a theory of right action, it can be understood as an
account of morality. Obviously, however, it is an account of rightness that
presupposes a theory of value or the good: the ultimate human value is
developed personality or an autonomous life. Competing with this objectivist
theory of value are two other liberal accounts: pluralism and subjectivism.
In
his famous defence of negative liberty, Berlin insisted that values or ends are
plural, and no interpersonally justifiable ranking among these many ends is to
be had. More than that, Berlin maintained that the pursuit of one end
necessarily implies that other ends will not be achieved. In this sense ends
collide or, in the more prosaic terms of economics, the pursuit of one end
necessarily entails opportunity costs in relation to others which cannot be
impersonally shown to be less worthy. So there is no interpersonally
justifiable way to rank the ends, and there is no way to achieve them all. The
upshot is that each person must devote herself to some ends at the cost of
ignoring others. For the pluralist, then, autonomy, perfection or development
are not necessarily ranked higher than hedonistic pleasures, environmental
preservation or economic equality. All compete for our allegiance, but because
they are incommensurable, no choice can be interpersonally justified as
correct.
The
pluralist is not a subjectivist: that values are many,
competing and incommensurable does not imply that they are somehow dependent on
subjective experiences. But the claim that what a person values rests on
experiences that vary from person to person has long been a part of the liberal
tradition. To Hobbes, what one values depends on what
one desires (1948 [1651]: 48). Locke advances a ‘taste theory of value’:
The Mind has a different
relish, as well as the Palate; and you will as fruitlessly endeavour to delight
all Man with Riches or Glory, (which yet some Men place their Happiness in,) as
you would satisfy all men's Hunger with Cheese or Lobsters; which, though very
agreeable and delicious fare to some, are to others extremely nauseous and
offensive: And many People would with reason preferr [sic] the griping of an
hungry Belly, to those Dishes, which are a Feast to others. Hence it was, I
think, that the Philosophers of old did in vain enquire, whether the Summum
bonum consisted in Riches, or bodily Delights, or Virtue, or
Contemplation: And they might have as reasonably disputed, whether the best
Relish were to be found in Apples, Plumbs or Nuts; and have divided themselves
into Sects upon it. For…pleasant Tastes depend not on the things themselves,
but their agreeableness to this or that particulare Palate, wherein there is
great variety…(1975 [1706]: 269).
The
perfectionist, the pluralist and the subjectivist concur on the crucial point:
the nature of value is such that reasonable people pursue different ways of
living. To the perfectionist, this is because each person has unique
capacities, the development of which confers value on her life; to the
pluralist, it is because values are many and conflicting, and no one life can
include them all, or make the interpersonally correct choice among them; and to
the subjectivist, it is because our ideas about what is valuable stem from our
desires or tastes, and these differ from one individual to another. All three
views, then, defend the basic liberal idea that people rationally follow very
different ways of living. But in themselves, such notions of the good do not
constitute a full-fledged liberal ethic, for an additional argument is required
linking liberal value with norms of equal liberty. To be sure, Berlin seems to
believe this is a very quick argument: the inherent plurality of ends points to
the political preeminence of liberty. Guaranteeing each a measure of
negative liberty is, Berlin argues, the most humane ideal, as it recognises
that ‘human goals are many’, and no one can make a choice that is right for all
people (1969: 171). But the move from diversity to equal liberty and individual
rights seems a complicated one; it is here that both subjectivists and
pluralists often rely on versions of moral contractualism. Those who insist
that liberalism is ultimately a nihilistic theory can be interpreted as arguing
that this transition cannot be made successfully: liberals, on their view, are
stuck with a subjectivistic or pluralistic theory of value, and no account of
the right emerges from it.
Throughout
the last century, liberalism has been beset by controversies between, on the
one hand, those broadly identified as ‘individualists’ and, on the other,
‘collectivists’, ‘communitarians’ or ‘organicists’ (for skepticism about this,
though, see Bird, 1999). These vague and sweeping designations have been
applied to a wide array of disputes; we focus here on controversies concerning
(i) the nature of society; (ii) the nature of the self.
Liberalism
is, of course, usually associated with individualist analyses of society.
‘Human beings in society’, Mill claimed, ‘have no properties but those which
are derived from, and which may be resolved into, the laws of the nature of
individual men’ (1963, Vol. 8: 879; see also Bentham: 1970 [1823]: chap. I, sec. 4). Herbert Spencer agreed: ‘the properties of the
mass are dependent upon the attributes of its component parts’ (1995 [1851]:
1). In the last years of the nineteenth century this individualist view was
increasingly subject to attack, especially by those who were influenced by
idealist philosophy. D. G. Ritche, criticizing Spencer's individualist
liberalism, explicitly rejected the idea that society is simply a ‘heap’ of
individuals, insisting that it is more akin to an organism, with a complex
internal life (1896: 13). Liberals such as L. T. Hobhouse and Dewey refused to
adopt radically collectivist views such as those advocated by Bernard Bosanquet
(2001), but they too rejected the radical individualism of Bentham, Mill and
Spencer. Throughout most of the first half of the twentieth century such
‘organic’ analyses of society held sway in liberal theory, even in economics
(see A.F Mummery and J. A. Hobson, 1956: 106; J.M. Keynes, 1972: 275).
During
and after the Second World War the idea that liberalism was based on inherently
individualist analysis of humans-in-society arose again. Karl Popper's The
Open Society and its Enemies (1945) presented a sustained critique of
Hegelian and Marxist theory and its collectivist and historicist, and to
Popper, inherently illiberal, understanding of society. The reemergence of
economic analysis in liberal theory brought to the fore a thoroughgoing
methodological individualism. Writing in the early 1960s, James Buchanan and
Gordon Tullock adamantly defended the ‘individualistic postulate’ against all
forms of ‘organicism’: ‘This [organicist] approach or theory of the
collectivity….is essentially opposed to the Western philosophical tradition in
which the human individual is the primary philosophical entity’ (1965: 11-12).
Human beings, insisted Buchanan and Tullock, are the only real choosers and
decision-makers, and their preferences determine both public and private
actions. The renascent individualism of late-twentieth century liberalism was
closely bound up with the induction of Hobbes as a member of the liberal
pantheon. Hobbes's relentlessly individualistic account of society, and the
manner in which his analysis of the state of nature lent itself to game-theoretical
modeling, yielded a highly individualist, formal analysis of the liberal state
and liberal morality.
Of
course, as is widely known, the last twenty-five years have witnessed a renewed
interest in collectivist analyses of liberal society —though the term
‘collectivist’ is abjured in favor of ‘communitarian’. Writing in 1985, Amy
Gutmann observed that ‘we are witnessing a revival of communitarian criticisms
of liberal political theory. Like the critics of the 1960s, those of the 1980s
fault liberalism for being mistakenly and irreparably individualistic’ (1985:
308). Starting with Michael Sandel's (1982) famous criticism of Rawls, a number
of critics charged that liberalism was necessarily premised on an abstract
conception of individual selves as pure choosers, whose commitments, values and
concerns are possessions of the self, but never constitute the self. Although
the now famous, not to say infamous, ‘liberal-communitarian’ debate ultimately
involved wide-ranging moral, political and sociological disputes about the
nature of communities, and the rights and responsibilities of their members,
the heart of the debate was about the nature of liberal selves. For Sandel the
flaw at the heart of Rawls's liberalism was its implausibly abstract theory of
the self, the pure autonomous chooser. Rawls, he charges, ultimately assumes
that it makes sense to identify us with a pure capacity for choice, and that
such pure choosers might reject any or all of their attachments and values and
yet retain their identity.
From
the mid-1980s onwards various liberals sought to show how liberalism may
consistently advocate a theory of the self which finds room for cultural
membership and other non-chosen attachments and commitments which at least
partially constitute the self (Kymlicka, 1989). Much of liberal theory has
became focused on the issue as to how we can be social creatures, members of
cultures and raised in various traditions, while also being autonomous choosers
who employ our liberty to construct lives of our own.
In On
Liberty Mill argued that ‘Liberty, as a principle, has no application to
any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of
being improved by free and equal discussion’ (1963, vol. 18: 224). Thus
‘Despotism is a legitimate form of government in dealing with barbarians,
provided the end be their improvement…. ’(1963, vol. 18: 224). This passage — infused with the
spirit of nineteenth century imperialism — is often ignored by defenders of
Mill as an embarrassment. Nevertheless, it raises a question that still divides
liberals: are liberal political principles justified for all political
communities? In The Law of Peoples Rawls argues that they are not.
According to Rawls there can be a ‘decent hierarchical society’ which is not
based on the liberal conception of all persons as free and equal, but instead
views persons as ‘responsible and cooperating members of their respective
groups’ but not inherently equal (1999a: 66). Given this, the full liberal
conception of justice cannot be constructed out of shared ideas of this
‘people’, though basic human rights, implicit in the very idea of a social
cooperative structure, apply to all peoples. David Miller (2002) develops a
different defense of this anti-universalistic position, while those such as
Thomas Pogge (2002: ch. 4) and Martha Nussbaum (2002) reject Rawls's position,
instead advocating versions of moral universalism: they claim that liberal
moral principles apply to all states.
The
debate about whether liberal principles apply to all political communities
should not be confused with the debate as to whether liberalism is a
state-centered theory, or whether, at least ideally, it is a cosmopolitan
political theory for the community of all humankind. Immanuel Kant — a moral
universalist if ever there was one — argued that all states should respect the
dignity of their citizens as free and equal persons, yet denied that humanity
forms one political community. Thus he rejected the ideal of a universal
cosmopolitan liberal political community in favor of a world of states, all
with internally just constitutions, and united in a confederation to assure
peace (1970 [1795]).
On a
classical liberal theory, the difference between a world of liberal communities
and a world liberal community is not of fundamental importance. Since the aim
of government in a community is to assure the basic liberty and property rights
of its citizens, borders are not of great moral significance in classical
liberalism (Lomasky, 2007; but cf. Pogge, 2002: ch. 2). In contrast under the
‘new’ liberalism, which stresses redistributive programs to achieve social
justice, it matters a great deal who is included
within the political or moral community. If liberal principles require
significant redistribution, then it is crucially important whether these
principles apply only within particular communities, or whether their reach is
global. Thus a fundamental debate between Rawls and many of his followers is
whether the difference principle should only be applied within a liberal state
such as the United States (where the least well off are the least well off Americans),
or whether it should be applied globally (where the least well off are the
least well off in the world) (Rawls, 1999a: 113ff; Beitz, 1973: 143ff; Pogge,
1989: Part Three).
Liberal
political theory also fractures concerning the appropriate response to groups
(cultural, religious, etc.) which endorse illiberal policies and values. These
groups may deny education to some of their members, advocate female genital
mutilation, restrict religious freedom, maintain an
inequitable caste system, and so on. When, if ever, is it reasonable for a
liberal group to interfere with the internal governance of an illiberal group?
Suppose
first that the illiberal group is another political community or state. Can
liberals intervene in the affairs of non-liberal states? Mill provides a
complicated answer in his 1859 essay ‘A Few Words on Non-Intervention’.
Reiterating his claim from On Liberty that civilized and non-civilized
countries are to be treated differently, he insists that ‘barbarians have no
rights as a nation, except a right to such treatment as may, at the
earliest possible period, fit them for becoming one. The only moral laws for
the relation between a civilized and a barbarous government, are the universal
rules of morality between man and man’ (1963, vol. 21: 119). Although this
strikes us today as simply a case for an objectionable paternalistic
imperialism (and it certainly was such a case), Mill's argument for the
conclusion is more complex, including a claim that, since international
morality depends on reciprocity, ‘barbarous’ governments that cannot be counted
on to engage in reciprocal behavior have no rights qua governments. In
any event, when Mill turns to interventions among ‘civilized’ peoples he
develops an altogether more sophisticated account as to when one state can
intervene in the affairs of another to protect liberal principles. Here Mill is
generally against intervention. ‘The reason is, that there can seldom be
anything approaching to assurance that intervention, even if successful, would
be for the good of the people themselves. The only test possessing any real
value, of a people's having become fit for popular institutions, is that they,
or a sufficient proportion of them to prevail in the contest, are willing to
brave labour and danger for their liberation’ (1963, vol. 21: 122).
In
addition to questions of efficacy, to the extent that peoples or groups have
rights to collective self-determination, intervention by a liberal group to
induce a non-liberal community to adopt liberal principles will be morally
objectionable. As with individuals, liberals may think that peoples or groups
have freedom to make mistakes in managing their collective affairs. If people's
self-conceptions are based on their participation in such groups, even those
whose liberties are denied may object to, and perhaps in some way harmed by,
the imposition of liberal principles (Margalit and Raz, 1990; Tamir, 1993).
Thus rather than proposing a doctrine of intervention many liberals
propose various principles of toleration which specify to what extent
liberals must tolerate non-liberal peoples and cultures. As is usual, Rawls's
discussion is subtle and enlightening. In his account of the foreign affairs of
liberal peoples, Rawls argues that liberal peoples must distinguish ‘decent’
non-liberal societies from ‘outlaw’ and other states; the former have a claim
on liberal peoples to tolerance while the latter do not (1999a: 59-61). Decent
peoples, argues Rawls, ‘simply do not tolerate’ outlaw states which ignore
human rights: such states may be subject to ‘forceful sanctions and even to
intervention’ (1999a: 81). In contrast, Rawls insists that ‘liberal peoples
must try to encourage [non-liberal] decent peoples and not frustrate their
vitality by coercively insisting that all societies be liberal’ (1999a: 62).
Chandran Kukathas (2003) — whose liberalism derives from the classical
tradition — is inclined to almost complete toleration of non-liberal peoples,
with the proviso that there must be exit rights.
The
status of non-liberal groups within liberal societies has increasingly become a
subject of debate, especially with respect to some citizens of faith. We should
distinguish two questions: (i) to what extent should non-liberal cultural and
religious communities be exempt from the requirements of the liberal state? and, (ii) to what extent can they be allowed to participate
in decision-making in the liberal state?
Turning
to (i), liberalism has a long history of seeking to accommodate religious
groups that have deep objections to certain public policies, such as the
Quakers, Mennonites or Sikhs. The most difficult issues in this regard arise in
relation to children and education (see Galston, 2003) Mill, for example,
writes:
Consider … the case of
education. Is it not almost a self-evident axiom, that the State should require
and compel the education, up to a certain standard, of every human being who is
born its citizen? Yet who is there that is not afraid to recognize and assert
this truth? Hardly any one indeed will deny that it is one of the most sacred
duties of the parents (or, as law and usage now stand, the father), after
summoning a human being into the world, to give to that being an education
fitting him to perform his part well in life towards others and towards himself
… . that to bring a child into existence without a fair prospect of being able,
not only to provide food for its body, but instruction and training for its
mind, is a moral crime, both against the unfortunate offspring and against
society … . (1963, vol. 18)
Over
the last thirty years, there has been a particular case that is at the core of
this debate — Wisconsin vs. Yoder: [406 U.S. 205 (1972)]. In this
case, the United States Supreme Court upheld the right of Amish parents to
avoid compulsory schooling laws and remove their children from school at the
age of 14 — thus, according to the Amish, avoiding secular influences that might
undermine the traditional Amish way of life. Because cultural and religious
communities raise and educate children, they cannot be seen as purely voluntary
opt-outs from the liberal state: they exercise coercive power over children,
and so basic liberal principles about protecting the innocent from unjustified
coercion come into play. Some have maintained that liberal principles require
that the state should intervene (against groups like the Amish) in order to [1]
provide the children with an effective right of exit that would otherwise be
denied via a lack of education (Okin, 2002), [2] to protect the children's
right to an autonomous and ‘open future’ (Feinberg, 1980) and/or [3] to insure
that children will have the cognitive tools to prepare them for their future
role as citizens (Galston, 1995: p. 529; Macedo, 1995: pp. 285-6). Other
liberal theorists, on the other hand, have argued that the state should not
intervene because it might undermine the inculcation of certain values that are
necessary for the continued existence of certain comprehensive doctrines
(Galston, 1995: p. 533; Stolzenberg, 1993: pp. 582-3). Moreover, some such as
Harry Brighouse (1998) have argued that the inculcation of liberal values
through compulsory education might undermine the legitimacy of liberal states
because children would not (due to possible indoctrination) be free to consent
to such institutions.
Question
(ii) — the extent to which non-liberal beliefs and values may be employed in
liberal political discussion— has become the subject of sustained debate in the
years following Rawls's Political Liberalism. According to Rawls's
liberalism — and what we might call ‘public reason liberalism’ more generally —
because our societies are characterized by ‘reasonable pluralism’, coercion
cannot be justified on the basis of comprehensive moral or religious systems of
belief. But many friends of religion (e.g., Eberle, 2002; Perry, 1993) argue
that this is objectionably ‘exclusionary’: conscientious believers are barred
from voting on their deepest convictions. Again liberals diverge in their
responses. Some such as Stephen Macedo take a pretty hard-nosed attitude: ‘if
some people…feel “silenced” or “marginalized” by the fact that some of us
believe that it is wrong to shape basic liberties on the basis of religious or
metaphysical claims, I can only say “grow up!”’ (2000: 35). Rawls, in contrast,
seeks to be more accommodating, allowing that arguments based on religious
comprehensive doctrines may enter into liberal politics on issues of basic
justice ‘provided that, in due course, we give properly public reasons to
support the principles and policies that our comprehensive doctrine is said to
support’ (1999a: 144). Thus Rawls allows the legitimacy of religious-based
arguments against slavery and in favor of the United States civil rights
movement, because ultimately such arguments were supported by public reasons.
Others (e.g., Greenawalt, 1995) hold that even this is too restrictive: it is
difficult for liberals to justify a moral prohibition on a religious citizen
from voicing her view in liberal political debate.
Given
that liberalism fractures on so many issues — the nature of liberty, the place
of property and democracy in a just society, the comprehensiveness and the
reach of the liberal ideal — one might wonder whether there is any point in
talking of ‘liberalism’ at all. It is not, though, an unimportant or trivial
thing that all these theories take liberty to be the grounding political value.
Radical democrats assert the overriding value of equality, communitarians
maintain that the demands of belongingness trump freedom, and conservatives
complain that the liberal devotion to freedom undermines traditional values and
virtues and so social order itself. Intramural disputes aside, liberals join in
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|
Balance
of Power Theory |
|
As
a theory, balance of power predicts that rapid changes in international power
and status—especially attempts by one state to conquer a region—will provoke
counterbalancing actions. For this reason, the balancing process helps to
maintain the stability of relations between states. A balance of power system
functions most effectively when alliances are fluid, when they are easily
formed or broken on the basis of expediency, regardless of values, religion,
history, or form of government. Occasionally a single state plays a balancer
role, shifting its support to oppose whatever state or alliance is strongest.
A weakness of the balance of power concept is the difficulty of measuring
power. (Extract from 'Balance of Power,' Microsoft® Encarta® Online
Encyclopedia 2000 http://encarta.msn.com © 1997-2000 Microsoft Corporation.
All rights reserved.) |
|
Balance
of Threat Theory |
|
Behavioralism |
|
An
approach to the study of politics or other social phenomena that focuses on
the actions and interactions among units by using scientific methods of
observation to include quantification of variables whenever possible. A
practitioner of behavioralism is often referred to as a behavioralist.
Behaviorism refers to the ideas held by those behavioral scientists who
consider only observed behavior as relevant to the scientific enterprise and
who reject what they consider to be metaphysical notions of "mind"
or "consciousness" (Viotti, P. and M. Kauppi, (eds.). 1987. International
Relations Theory. Macmillan Publishing Company, New York). |
|
Chaos
Theory |
|
In
mathematics and physics, chaos theory describes the behavior of certain
nonlinear dynamical systems that may exhibit dynamics that are highly
sensitive to initial conditions (popularly referred to as the butterfly
effect). As a result of this sensitivity, which manifests itself as an
exponential growth of perturbations in the initial conditions, the behavior of
chaotic systems appears to be random. This happens even though these systems
are deterministic, meaning that their future dynamics are fully defined by
their initial conditions, with no random elements involved. This behavior is
known as deterministic chaos, or simply chaos. Since the International System
can be considered a nonlinear dynamic system, it is reasonable to take this
theory into account for the study of the International Order. (Mostly from
Wikipedia.) |
|
Classical
Realism |
|
Also
called human realism and associated with Morgenthau's exposition of realism
in which the power pursuit propensity of states is derived from the basic
nature of human beings as power maximisers. This perspective holds that
ideological, as well as material, factors may constitute 'power' (e.g. power
over public opinion) and hence has some social underpinning. |
|
Collective
Defense |
|
Though
the term existed before 1949, a common understanding of collective defense
with regards to NATO can be found in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty:
'The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them... shall
be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that,
if such an armed attack occurs, each of them in exercise of the right of
individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter
of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking
forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as
it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain
the security of the North Atlantic area' (NATO Handbook: 232). In the context
of NATO, then, collective defense is based on countering traditional
challenges as understood by the realist/neorealist paradigm, specifically to
territory, and finds its focus on an identifiable external threat or
adversary. |
|
Collective
Security |
|
Employed
during the construction of the League of Nations, the concept of collective
security goes beyond the pure idea of defence to include, according to Inis
Claude, 'arrangements for facilitating peaceful settlement of disputes,'
assuming that the mechanisms of preventing war and defending states under
armed attack will 'supplement and reinforce each other' (1984:245). Writing during
the Cold War, Claude identifies the concept as the post-WWI name given by the
international community to the 'system for maintenance of international
peace... intended as a replacement for the system commonly known as the
balance-of-power' (1984:247). Most applicable to widely inclusive
international organizations such as the League and the United Nations,
ideally, the arrangement would transcend the reliance on deterrence of
competing alliances through a network or scheme of 'national commitments and international
mechanisms.' As in collective defence, collective security is based on the
risk of retribution, but it can also involve economic and diplomatic
responses, in addition to military retribution. From this, it is theorized
that perfected collective security would discourage potential aggressors from
angering a collectivity of states. Like balance-of-power, collective security
works on the assumption that any potential aggressor would be deterred by the
prospect of joint retaliation, but it goes beyond the military realm to
include a wider array of security problems. It assumes that states will
relinquish sovereignty and freedom of action or inaction to increasing
interdependence and the premise of the indivisibility of peace. The security
that can be derived from this is part of the foundation of the neoliberal
institutionalist argument. |
|
Communitarianism |
|
Comparative
Advantage |
|
Principle
was derived by David Ricard in his 1817 book, Principles of Political Economy
and Taxation. Having
a comparative advantage means that one state can produce a good or service at
a lower cost than other states can. “The theory of comparative advantage
holds that nations should produce and export those goods and services in
which they hold a comparative advantage, and import those items that other
nations can produce at a lower cost. Through comparative advantage, global
resources and welfare can be maximized. In
economics, the theory of
comparative advantage refers to the ability of a person or a country to
produce a particular good or service at a lower marginal and opportunity
cost. Even if one country is more efficient in the production of all goods (absolute
advantage)
than the other, both countries will still gain by trading with each other, as
long as they have different relative efficiencies. |
|
Complex
Interdependence Theory |
|
The
term 'complex interdependence' was developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye
and refers to the various, complex transnational connections
(interdependencies) between states and societies. Interdependence theorists
noted that such relations, particularly economic ones, were increasing; while
the use of military force and power balancing were decreasing (but remained
important). Reflecting on these developments, they argued that the decline of
military force as a policy tool and the increase in economic and other forms
of interdependence should increase the probability of cooperation among
states. The complex interdependence framework can be seen as an attempt to
synthesise elements of realist and liberal thought. Finally, anticipating
problems of cheating and relative gains raised by realists, interdependence
theorists introduced the concept of 'regimes' to mitigate anarchy and
facilitate cooperation. Here, we can see an obvious connection to neo-liberal
institutionalism. See Keohane, R. and J. Nye. 1977. Power and
Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Little-Brown, Boston. (2nd
edition,1989). |
|
Complexity
Theory |
|
Complexity
theory offers a rich array of concepts that can help us ask deeper questions.
Taken together, these concepts argue for viewing world politics increasingly
as a group of tightly bound actors evolving together, characterized more by
context than their innate nature, vulnerable to surprise from new groups
whose members decide independently to organize themselves in new ways and for
new purposes. These concepts argue further for assuming that substantive
consequences can arise, sometimes rapidly, from initially minor conditions
and that organizations and countries will have a dangerous tendency to push
themselves to limits beyond which catastrophe is almost unavoidable. The
resultant picture of the 21st century world of high technology, instant communication,
tight international connectivity at all levels of
society, and universal education is one of a political world not only
constantly evolving but evolving more rapidly, where actors can change course
abruptly, policies that worked can suddenly fail, and success will go to the
nimble. (William deB. Mills, Analyzing the Future Web site) (http://futuremethods.wordpress.com/complexity/) |
|
Constitutional
Order Theory |
|
Philip
Bobbitt’s central thesis (in his book The Shield of Achilles, 2002)
that the interplay between strategic and constitutional innovation changes
the constitutional order of the state. In putting his thesis, Bobbitt also
contends that: epochal wars have brought a particular constitutional order to
primacy; a constitutional order achieves dominance by best exploiting the
strategic and constitutional innovations of its era; the peace treaties that
end epochal wars ratify a particular constitutional order for the society of
states; and each constitutional order asserts a unique basis for legitimacy.
In terms of the current international system, Bobbitt argues that it is
transitioning from an order of nation-states to market-states. The value of
Bobbitt’s thesis is that it better explains relations between states, as well
as changes within states and in the international system, than the
(previously) dominant theory of neo-realism, which assumes that all states
are the same and seek only to survive in an anarchical and competitive system
through on-going power balancing. |
|
Constitutive
Theory |
|
Constitutive
theory is directly concerned with the importance of human reflection on the
nature and character of world politics and the approach to its study.
Reflections on the process of theorizing, including epistemological and
ontological issues and questions, are typical. Constitutive theory is
distinguished from explanatory or empirical theory (see below) and may be
described as the philosophy of world politics or international
relations. |
|
Constructivism |
|
Constructivist
theory rejects the basic assumption of neo-realist theory that the state of
anarchy (lack of a higher authority or government) is a structural condition
inherent in the system of states. Rather, it argues, in Alexander Wendt's
words, that 'Anarchy is what states make of it'. That is, anarchy is a
condition of the system of states because states in some sense 'choose' to
make it so. Anarchy is the result of a process that constructs the rules or
norms that govern the interaction of states. The condition of the system of
states today as self-helpers in the midst of anarchy is a result of the
process by which states and the system of states was constructed. It is not
an inherent fact of state-to-state relations. Thus, constructivist theory
holds that it is possible to change the anarchic nature of the system of
states. (See Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of It', International
Organization, 46, 2, Spring 1992.) |
|
Corporatism |
|
Cosmopolitanism |
|
The
word ‘cosmopolitan’, which derives from the Greek word kosmopolitês (‘citizen
of the world’), has been used to describe a wide variety of important views
in moral and socio-political philosophy. The nebulous core shared by all
cosmopolitan views is the idea that all human beings, regardless of their
political affiliation, do (or at least can) belong to a single community, and
that this community should be cultivated. Different versions of
cosmopolitanism envision this community in different ways, some focusing on
political institutions, others on moral norms or relationships, and still
others focusing on shared markets or forms of cultural expression. The
philosophical interest in cosmopolitanism lies in its challenge to commonly
recognized attachments to fellow-citizens, the local state, parochially
shared cultures, and the like. (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmopolitanism/) |
|
Critical
Social Theory |
|
Not
really a theory, but an approach or methodology which seeks to take a
critical stance towards itself by recognising its own presuppositions and
role in the world; and secondly, towards the social reality that it
investigates by providing grounds for the justification and criticism of the
institutions, practices and mentalities that make up that reality. Critical
social theory therefore attempts to bridge the divides in social thought
between explanation and justification, philosophical and substantive
concerns, pure and applied theory, and contemporary and earlier thinking. |
|
Cultural
Internationalism |
|
Decision
Making Analysis |
|
Defensive
Realism |
|
Defensive
realism is an umbrella term for several theories of international politics
and foreign policy that build upon Robert Jervis's writings on the security
dilemma and to a lesser extent upon Kenneth Waltz's balance-of-power theory
(neorealism). Defensive realism holds that the international system provides
incentives for expansion only under certain conditions. Anarchy (the absence
of a universal sovereign or worldwide government) creates situations where by
the tools that one state uses to increase it security decreases the security
of other states. This security dilemma causes states to worry about one
another's future intentions and relative power. Pairs of states may pursue
purely security seeking strategies, but inadvertently generate spirals of
mutual hostility or conflict. States often, although not always, pursue
expansionist policies because their leaders mistakenly believe that
aggression is the only way to make their state secure. Defensive realism
predicts great variation in internationally driven expansion and suggests
that states ought to generally pursue moderate strategies as the best route
to security. Under most circumstances, the stronger states in the
international system should pursue military, diplomatic, and foreign economic
policies that communicate restraint. Examples of defensive realism include:
offense-defense theory (Jervis, Stephen Van Evera, Sean Lynn-Jones, and
Charles Glaser), balance-of-power theory (Barry Posen, Michael Mastanduno),
balance-of-threat theory (Stephen Walt), domestic mobilization theories (Jack
Snyder, Thomas Christensen, and Aron Friedberg), and security dilemma theory
(Thomas Christensen, Robert Ross, and William Rose). (Sources: Jeffrey W.
Taliaferro, 'Security-Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Reconsidered,'
International Security, 25, 3, Winter 2000/2001: 152-86; and John J.
Mearsheimer, (2002), Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W.W. Norton, New
York). |
|
Democratic
Peace |
|
All
democratic peace theories seek to explain the disputed empirical fact that
two constitutional democracies have never gone to war with each other in
recent history (1816 onwards). As such, they rest on a similar hypothesis:
that relations between pairings of democratic states are inherently more
peaceful than relations between other regime-type pairings (i.e. democratic
versus non-democratic or non-democratic versus non-democratic). To prove the
reality of the democratic peace, theorists such as Michael Doyle have sought
to show a causal relationship between the independent variable - 'democratic
political structures at the unit level' - and the dependant variable - 'the
asserted absence of war between democratic states'. Critics, such as Ido
Oren, dispute the claims of democratic peace theorists by insisting that
there is a liberal bias in the interpretation of 'democracy' which weakens
the evidence. |
|
Dependency
Theory |
|
Dependency
theorists assert that so-called 'third-world' countries were not always 'poor',
but became impoverished through colonial domination and forced incorporation
into the world economy by expansionist 'first-world' powers. Thus,
'third-world' economies became geared more toward the needs of their
'first-world' colonial masters than the domestic needs of their own
societies. Proponents of dependency theory contend that relationships of
dependency have continued long after formal colonization ended. Thus, the
primary obstacles to autonomous development are seen as external rather than internal, and so 'third-world' countries face a global
economy dominated by rich industrial countries. Because 'first-world'
countries never had to contend with colonialism or a world full of richer,
more powerful competitors, dependency theorists argue that it is unfair to
compare contemporary 'third-world' societies with those of the 'first-world'
in the early stages of development. |
|
Deterrence
Theory |
|
Deterrence
is commonly thought about in terms of convincing opponents that a particular
action would elicit a response resulting in unacceptable damage that would
outweigh any likely benefit. Rather than a simple cost/benefits calculation,
however, deterrence is more usefully thought of in terms of a dynamic process
with provisions for continuous feedback. The process initially involves
determining who shall attempt to deter whom from doing what, and by what
means. Several important assumptions underlie most thinking about deterrence.
Practitioners tend to assume, for example, that states are unitary actors,
and logical according to Western concepts of rationality. Deterrence also
assumes that we can adequately understand the calculations of an opponent. One
of the most important assumptions during the Cold War was that nuclear
weapons were the most effective deterrent to war between the states of the
East and the West. This assumption, carried into the post-Cold War era,
however, may promote nuclear proliferation. Indeed, some authors suggest that
the spread of nuclear weapons would deter more states from going to war
against one another. The weapons would, it is argued, provide weaker states
with more security against attacks by stronger neighbors. Of course, this
view is also predicated on the assumption that every state actor's
rationality will work against the use of such weapons, and that nuclear arms
races will therefore not end in nuclear warfare. (Edited extract from Post-Cold
War Conflict Deterrence, Naval Studies Board, National Research Council,
National Acadamy of Sciences, 1997.) |
|
Dialectical
Functionalism |
|
Domino
Theory |
|
This
theory was pronounced in the early 1950s by the US government fearing the
spread of communism in Asia, in the early phase of the Cold War. In essence,
the domino theory argues that if one South East Asian state becomes Marxist
then this will trigger neighbouring states into becoming Marxist and so on.
Internal crises in Asian states coupled with their interdependence means that
Marxist revolutions or insurgencies will occur and spread. This is akin to
toppling a row of dominoes. The Chinese revolution of 1949 followed by the
Korean war of 1950-53 seemed to suggest that this domino effect was
occurring. Though this theory is somewhat simplistic and based more on
observation than scientific reasoning, the logic of the domino theory was
perhaps one reason why the US became involved in the Vietnam War to stop this
domino effect. |
|
Dynamic
Interaction Theory |
|
Emancipatory
International Relations |
|
Emancipatory
international relations is characterized by a number of schools of thought
most broadly falling under the umbrella of Wesern or Hegelian Marxism, such
as neo-Gramscian theory and approaches to IR based on the Frankfurt School
philosophy. These approaches to emancipatory IR can be shown to be reformist
rather than revolutionary, in the sense that visions of an alternative world
order fail to transcend the state. Thus, some would suggest that approaches
to IR that are derived from an anarchist political philosophy, for example,
are more appropriate for an emancipatory conception of IR which is
revolutionary rather than reformist. |
|
Empirical
Theory |
|
An
empirical theory in the social or natural sciences relates to facts and
provides an explanation or prediction for observed phenomena. Hypotheses
associated with empirical theories are subject to test against real-world
data or facts. The theorist need not have any purpose in developing such
empirical theories other than satisfying his or her intellectual curiosity,
although many will seek to make their work "policy relevant"
(Viotti, P. and M. Kauppi, (eds.). 1987. International Relations Theory.
Macmillan Publishing Company, New York). |
|
Ethnic
Conflict Theory |
|
Ethnic
conflicts are old. It is violence for state recognition, autonomy or to join
a neighboring state. Such conflicts received serious attention by scholars in
the aftermath of the Cold War and with the demise of the former Yugoslavia
and USSR into several independent states. Ethnic conflict studies can be a
source for understanding international relations bearing in mind that no
single book, concept or theory can expect to capture such a complex phenomena
in its entirety. Political scientists use concepts and theories of
sociologists such as Evans (1993), Giddens (1993), Smith (1986), Rex (1986),
Hurd (1986) and Laitin (1986) to explain endemic ethnic conflicts caused by
alienation and deprivation of ethnic minority groups bonded by history,
descent, language, religion and culture living in a defined territory. This
group perceives itself as 'me-you,' 'we-they,' 'insiders-outsiders,' and
'minority-majority.' Three contending ethnic conflict theories: a)
Primordialists stress the importance of instinctive behavior of belonging; b)
Instrumentalist or Circumstantialists cite compelling
socio-economic-political factors; and c) Constructivists point to the social
nature of ethnic groups. For ethnic conflict management models of political
'accommodation' or 'arrangements' see Walker, C. 1994, Ethnocentrism: The
Quest for Understanding (Chapters 6 & 8), Princeton University Press;
McGarry, J. and O'Leary, B. (eds), 1993, The Politics of Ethnic Conflict
Resolution: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts (Chapter 1),
Routledge; and Lijphart, A. 1997, Democracy in Plural Societies
(Chapters 1 & 2), Yale University Press. For further perspectives, see
Toft, M. 2003, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and
the Indivisibilty of Territory, Princeton University Press; Anderson, B.
1991, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism, Verso; and Huntington, P. 1996, The Clash of
Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster. |
|
Evolutionary
World Politics |
|
A
sub-field of the study of International Relations that poses the question:
what explains structural change in world politics, in the past millennium in
particular? It rests on two core premises: that political change at the
global level is the product of evolutionary processes, and that such
processes might be best understood through the application of evolutionary
concepts such as selection or learning, without yet embracing biological
determinism. Focussing on longer-term, institutional, change it contrasts
with, and complements, rational choice approaches that illuminate
shorter-term, ends-means decision-making. Components of it might be
recognized both in the realist, and the liberal schools of international
relations. Structural change may be studied at three levels: at the actor
level, by looking at long cycles of global politics; at the level of global
political formation, by inquiring into world empire, the nation-state system
with global leadership, and global organization, as alternative forms of
coping with global problems; and at the of human species evolution, by asking
about the emergence of basic world institutions. Global political change
co-evolves with cognate processes in the world economy, and is nested in the
longer-term developments in democratization, and changes in world opinion.
For recent research, reports and bibliography see The Evolutionary World
Politics Home Page.
(http://faculty.washington.edu/modelski/) |
|
Expected
Utility Theory |
|
Feminism |
|
A
branch of Critical Social Theory (see above) that seeks to explore how we
think, or do not think, or avoid thinking about gender in international
relations (IR). Feminists argue that traditional IR thinking has avoided
thinking of men and women in the capacity of embodied and
socially constituted subject categories by subsuming them in other categories
(e.g. statesmen, soldiers, refugees), too readily accepting that women are
located inside the typically separate sphere of domestic life, and retreating
to abstractions (i.e. the state) that mask a masculine identity.
Gender-minded analysts therefore seek to move from suspicion of officially
ungendered IR texts to their subversion and to replacement theories. Some
recent gender-attentive research streams include: critique and reappropriation
of stories told about the proper scope of the field of IR; revisions of war
and peace narratives; reevaluations of women and development in the
international system and its parts; feminist interpretations of human rights;
and feminist understandings of international political economy and
globalisation. (These notes are an adaptation of a piece by Christine
Sylvester: 'Feminist Theory and Gender Studies in International Relations'.) |
|
Fourth
World Theory |
|
A
theoretical framework, based on the distinction between nations and states,
examining how colonial empires and modern states invaded and now encapsulate
most of the world's enduring peoples. The term Fourth World refers to
nations forcefully incorporated into states which maintain a distinct
political culture but are internationally unrecognized (Griggs, R. 1992. 'The
Meaning of 'Nation' and 'State' in the Fourth World', Center for World
Indigenous Studies). Fourth World analyses, writings and maps aim to rectify
the distorting and obscuring of indigenous nations' identities, geographies
and histories and expose the usually hidden 'other side' of invasions and
occupations that generate most of the world's wars, refugees, genocide, human
rights violations and environmental destruction. The distinction between
political terms such as nation, state, nation-state, a people and ethnic
group - which are commonly used interchangeably in both popular and academic
literature despite the fact that each has a unique connotation - provides a
geopolitical perspective from which one can paint a 'ground-up' portrait of
the significance and centrality of people in most world issues, problems and
solutions. Fourth World Theory was fashioned by a diverse assortment of people,
including activists, human rights lawyers, academics and leaders of
indigenous nations. Similar to World Systems Analysis (see below) scholars,
proponents of Fourth World Theory seek to change the world, not just describe
or explain it. |
|
Frustration-Aggression
Theory |
|
A
theory that argues that collective behavior is an aggressive response to
feelings of frustration. |
|
Functionalism |
|
A
focus on purposes or tasks, particularly those performed by organisations.
Some theorists have explained the growth of organisations, particularly
international organisations, as a response to an increase in the number of
purposes or tasks demanding attention. Neofunctionalism as a theory of
regional integration emphasizes the political calculation and pay-off to
elites who agree to collaborate in the performance of certain tasks (Viotti,
P. and M. Kauppi, (eds.). 1987. International Relations Theory.
Macmillan Publishing Company, New York). |
|
Game
Theory |
|
A
decision-making approach based on the assumption of actor rationality in a
situation of competition. Each actor tries to maximize gains or minimize
losses under conditions of uncertainty and incomplete information, which
requires each actor to rank order preferences, estimate probabilities, and
try to discern what the other actor is going to do. In a two-person zero-sum
game, what one actor wins the other loses; if A wins, 5, B
loses 5, and the sum is zero. In a two-person non-zero or variable
sum game, gains and losses are not necessarily equal; it is possible that
both sides may gain. This is sometimes referred to as a positive-sum
game. In some games, both parties can lose, and by different amounts or to a
different degree. So-called n-person games include more than two
actors or sides. Game theory has contributed to the development of models of
deterrence and arms race spirals, but it is also the basis for work
concerning the question of how collaboration among competitive states in an
anarchic world can be achieved: The central problem is that the rational
decision for an individual actor such as a state may be to "defect"
and go it alone as opposed to taking a chance on collaboration with another
state actor. Dealing with this problem is a central concern of much of the
literature on international regimes, regional integration, and conflict
resolution (Viotti, P. and M. Kauppi, (eds.). 1987. International
Relations Theory. Macmillan Publishing Company, New York). |
|
Globalizations |
|
Globalization,
as a theory, argues that states and societies are increasingly being
'disciplined' to behave as if they were private markets operating in a global
territory. 'Disciplinary' forces affecting states and societies are
attributed to the global capital market, transnational corporations (TNCs),
and structural adjustment policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and World Bank, which are all driven by neo-liberal economic ideology. Some
scholars, such as Stephen Gill, see these agents as representing an emerging system
of global economic governance ('disciplinary neo-liberalism') based on a
quasiconstitutional framework for the reconstitution of the legal rights,
prerogatives, and freedom of movement for capital on a world scale ('new
constitutionalism'). See Gill, S. 'New Constitutionalism, Democratisation and
Global Political Economy', in Pacifica Review 10, 1, 1998. |
|
Globalism |
|
An
image of politics different from realism and pluralism.
Globalism focuses on the importance of economy, especially capitalist
relations of dominance or exploitation, to understanding world politics. The
globalist image is influenced by Marxist analyses of exploitative relations,
although not all globalists are Marxists. Dependency theory, whether
understood in Marxist or non-Marxist terms, is categorised here as part of
the globalist image. Also included is the view that international relations
are best understood if one sees them as occurring within a world-capitalist
system (Viotti, P. and M. Kauppi, (eds.). 1987. International Relations
Theory. Macmillan Publishing Company, New York). |
|
Golden
Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention |
|
Thomas
Friedman's theory that no two countries that both had McDonald's had fought a
war against each other since each got its McDonald's. More specifically,
Friedman articulates it thus: 'when a country reached the level of economic
development where it had a middle class big enough to support a McDonald's
network, it became a McDonald's country. And people in McDonald's countries
didn't like to fight wars anymore, they preferred to
wait in line for burgers'. (See Chapter 12 in Thomas L. Friedman, (2000), The
Lexus and The Olive Tree, Harper Collins Publishers, London.) |
|
Gramscianism |
|
Grand
Strategy |
|
Hegemonic
Stability Theory |
|
The
central idea of this theory is that the stability of the international system
requires a single dominant state to articulate and enforce the rules of
interaction among the most important members of the system. For a state to be
a hegemon, it must have three attributes: the capability to enforce the rules
of the system, the will to do so, and a commitment to a system which is
perceived as mutually beneficial to the major states. A hegemon's capability
rests upon the likes of a large, growing economy, dominance in a leading
technological or economic sector, and political power backed up by projective
military power. An unstable system will result if economic, technological,
and other changes erode the international hierarchy and undermine the
position of the dominant state. Pretenders to hegemonic control will emerge
if the benefits of the system are viewed as unacceptably unfair. (Extract
from lecture notes on the theory of hegemonic stability by Vincent Ferraro,
Ruth C. Lawson Professor of International Politics at Mount Holyoke College,
Massachusetts.) |
|
Historical
Internationalism |
|
Historical
Materialism |
|
Historical
materialism is articulated in the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin. The basic
assumption of the theory is that the historical process is determined by the
type of economic relations prevalent during a specific time period. That is,
the economy, or mode of life, determines the political, cultural, religious,
legal and other dimensions of society. |
|
Historical
Sociology |
|
Idealism |
|
Idealism
is so widely defined that only certain basic tenets can be described.
Idealists believe strongly in the affective power of ideas, in that it is
possible to base a political system primarily on morality, and that the baser
and more selfish impulses of humans can be muted in order to build national
and international norms of behavior that foment peace, prosperity,
cooperation, and justice. Idealism then is not only heavily reformist, but
the tradition has often attracted those who feel that idealistic principles
are the "next-step" in the evolution of the human character. One of
the first and foremost pieces of the "old world" and "old
thinking" to be tossed on the trash heap of history by idealism is that
destructive human institution of war. War, in the idealistic view, is now no
longer considered by either elites or the populace of the
great powers as being a plausible way of achieving goals, as the costs of
war, even for the victor, exceed the benefits. As John Mueller says in
his book Quiet Cataclysm, war is passing into that consciousness stage
where slavery and dueling reside - it can fade away without any adverse
effect, and with no need for replacement. |
|
Imperialism |
|
Hans
J. Morgenthau defines imperialism as a national foreign policy aimed at acquiring
more power than the state actually has, through a reversal of existing power
relations, in other words, a favorable change in power status. Imperialism as
a national foreign policy is in contrast to 'status quo' foreign policy and a
foreign policy of 'prestige.' The policy of imperialism assumes the classical
realist theory perspective of analysis at the unit level in international
relations. Furthermore, imperialism is based on a 'balance-of-power'
construct in international relations. The three types of imperialism as
outlined by Morgenthau are: Marxist theory of imperialism which rests on the
foundation that all political phenomena are the reflection of economic
forces; the Liberal theory of imperialism which results because of
maladjustments in the global capitalist system (e.g., surplus of goods and
capital which seek outlets in foreign markets); and finally, the 'devil'
theory of imperialism which posits that manufacturers and bankers plan wars
in order to enrich themselves. From Morgenthau, Hans J. 1948. Politics
Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. McGraw-Hill, Boston.
(Chapter 5, The Struggle for Power: Imperialism). |
|
Incrementalism |
|
Integration
Theory |
|
Intergovernmentalism |
|
In
its most basic form, intergovernmentalism explains interstate cooperation and
especially regional integration (e.g. EU) as a function of the alignment of
state interests and preferences coupled with power. That is, contrary to the
expectations of functionalism and neofunctionalism, integration and
cooperation are actually caused by rational self-interested states bargaining
with one another. Moreover, as would be expected, those states with more
‘power’ likely will have more of their interests fulfilled. For example, with
regard to the EU, it is not surprising, according to proponents of this
theory, that many of the agreed-upon institutional arrangements are in line
with the preferences of France and Germany, the so-called ‘Franco-German
core.’ Andrew Moravcsik is probably the most well-known proponent of
intergovernmentalism right now. (See for example: Andrew Moravcsik,
‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal
Intergovernmentalist Approach,’ Journal of Common Market Studies,
December, 1993.) |
|
Internationalism |
|
Internationalism
is a political movement that advocates greater economic and political
cooperation among participating actors for the benefit of all. It is by
nature opposed to ultranationalism, jingoism and national chauvinism and
presupposes the recognition of other nations as equal, in spite of all their
differences. Indeed, it is most commonly expressed as an appreciation for the
diverse cultures in the world and as a desire for world peace. It also
encompasses an obligation to assist the world through leadership and cooperation,
advocating robust global governance and the presence of international
organizations, such as the United Nations. |
|
International
Order Theory |
|
International
Political Economy |
|
A
method of analysis concerning the social, political and economic arrangements
affecting the global systems of production, exchange and distribution, and
the mix of values reflected therein (Strange, S. 1988. States and Markets.
Pinter Publishers, London. p18). As an analytical method, political economy
is based on the assumption that what occurs in the economy reflects, and
affects, social power relations. |
|
International
Regime Theory |
|
A
perspective that focuses on cooperation among actors in a given area of
international relations. An international regime is viewed as a set of
implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules, and procedures around which
actors' expectations converge in a particular issue-area. An issue-area
comprises interactions in such diverse areas as nuclear nonproliferation,
telecommunications, human rights, or environmental problems. A basic idea
behind international regimes is that they provide for transparent state
behaviour and a degree of stability under conditions of anarchy in the
international system. International regime analysis has been offering a
meeting ground for debate between the various schools of thought in IR
theory. See Krasner, S. 1983. International Regimes. Cornell
University Press, Ithaca. |
|
Just
War Theory |
|
Normative
theory referring to conditions under which (1) states rightfully go to war (jus
ad bellum) with just cause, as in self-defense in response to aggression,
when the decision to go to war is made by legitimate authority in the state,
as a last resort after exhausting peaceful remedies, and with some
reasonable hope of achieving legitimate objectives; (2) states exercise right
conduct in war (jus in bello) when the means employed are proportional
to the ends sought, when noncombatants are spared, when weapons or other
means that are immoral in themselves are not used (typically those that are
indiscriminate or cause needless suffering), and when actions are
taken with a right intention to accomplish legitimate military
objectives and to minimize collateral death and destruction. Many of these
principles of just war are part of the body of international law and thus are
legally binding on states and their agents (Viotti, P. and M. Kauppi, (eds.).
1987. International Relations Theory. Macmillan Publishing Company,
New York). |
|
Legal
Positivism |
|
A
legal theory that identifies international law with positive acts of state
consent. Herein, states are the only official 'subjects' or 'persons' of
international law because they have the capacity to enter into legal
relations and to have legal rights and duties. Indeed, they are the only
entities with full, original and universal legal personality; the only proper
actors bound by international law. As far as non-state entities (such as
individuals, corporations, and international organisations) are concerned,
their ability to assert legal personality is only derivative of and
conditional upon state personality and state consent. This predominant
ideology originated in the nineteenth century when legal positivism took the
eighteenth century law of nations, a law common to individuals and states,
and transformed it into public and private international law, with the former
being deemed to apply to states and the latter to individuals. Thus, only
states enjoy full international legal personality, which can be defined as
the capacity to bring claims arising from the violation of international law,
to conclude valid international agreements, and to enjoy priveleges and
immunities from national jurisdiction. (Edited text taken from Cutler, C.
2000. 'Globalization, Law and Transnational Corporations: a Deepening of
Market Discipline', in Cohn, T., S. McBride and J. Wiseman (eds.). Power
in the Global Era. Macmillan Press Ltd.). |
|
Liberalism
(Liberal Internationalism) |
|
A
political theory founded on the natural goodness of humans and the autonomy
of the individual. It favours civil and political liberties, government by
law with the consent of the governed, and protection from arbitrary
authority. In IR liberalism covers a fairly broad perspective ranging from
Wilsonian Idealism through to contemporary neo-liberal theories and the
democratic peace thesis. Here states are but one actor in world politics, and
even states can cooperate together through institutional mechanisms and
bargaining that undermine the propensity to base interests simply in military
terms. States are interdependent and other actors such as Transnational
Corporations, the IMF and the United Nations play a role. |
|
Marxism |
|
A
body of thought inspired by Karl Marx. It emphasizes the dialectical
unfolding of historical stages, the importance of economic and material
forces and class analysis. It predicts that contradictions inherent in each
historical epoch eventually lead to the rise of a new dominant class. The era
of capitalism, according to Marx, is dominated by the bourgeoisie and will
give way to a proletarian, or working class, revolution and an era of
socialism in which workers own the means of production and move toward a
classless, communist society in which the state, historically a tool of the
dominant class, will wither away. A number of contemporary theorists have
drawn on Marxian insights and categories of analysis - an influence most
evident in work on dependency and the world capitalist system (Viotti, P. and
M. Kauppi, (eds.). 1987. International Relations Theory. Macmillan
Publishing Company, New York). |
|
Materialism |
|
Modernisation
Theory |
|
A
theory presuming that all countries had similiar starting points and follow
similar paths to 'development' along the lines of contemporary 'first-world'
societies. |
|
Mutually
Assured Destruction Theory |
|
This
theory is based on the same initial input as for security dilemma theory, but
differs in terms of the outcome. According to mutually assured destruction
theory, when two or more states all acquire a nuclear potential sufficient to
destroy any other one, then nuclear conflict is impossible because a first
strike will inevitably lead to a response and the subsequent mutual
destruction of the actors involved. In other words, a nuclear arsenal is a
good deterrent because it does not allow anyone to become a winner in a
conflict. |
|
Neoclassical
Realism |
|
Neoconservatism |
|
Neoliberal
Institutionalism |
|
Encompasses
those theories which argue that international institutions play an important
role in coordinating international cooperation. Proponents begin with the
same assumptions used by realists, except for the following: where realists
assume that states focus on relative gains and the potential for conflict,
neoliberal institutionalists assume that states concentrate on absolute gains
and the prospects for cooperation. Neoliberal institutionalists believe that
the potential for conflict is overstated by realists and suggest that there
are countervailing forces, such as repeated interactions, that propel states
toward cooperation. They regard cheating as the greatest threat to
cooperation and anarchy as the lack of organization to enforce rules against cheating.
Institutions are described by neoliberals as 'persistent and connected sets
of rules (formal or informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain
activity, and shape expectations' (Keohane, R. 'International Institutions:
Two Approaches', in International Studies Quarterly 32, 1988). Robert
Keohane is the scholar most closely identified with neoliberal
institutionalism. |
|
Neoliberalism |
|
Neomarxism |
|
Neorealism |
|
A
theory developed by Kenneth Waltz in which states seek to survive within an
anarchical system. Although states may seek survival through power balancing,
balancing is not the aim of that behaviour. Balancing is a product of the aim
to survive. And because the international system is regarded as anarchic and
based on self-help, the most powerful units set the scene of action for
others as well as themselves. These major powers are referred to as poles;
hence the international system (or a regional subsystem), at a particular
point in time, may be characterised as unipolar, bipolar or multipolar. |
|
Neotraditionalism |
|
New
War Theory |
|
Mary
Kaldor’s new war theory argues that contemporary types of warfare are
distinct from the classic modern forms of warfare based on nation-states. New
wars are part of a globalised war economy underpinned by transnational
ethnicities, globalised arms markets and internationalised Western-global
interventions. The new type of warfare is a predatory social condition which
damages the economies of neighbouring regions as well as the zone of conflict
itself, spreading refugees, identity-based politics and illegal trade. It is
also characterised by new forms of violence (the systematic murder of
‘others’, forced population expulsion and rendering areas uninhabitable)
carried out by new militaries (the decaying remnants of state armies,
paramilitary groups, self-defence units, mercenaries and international
troops) funded by remittances, diaspora fund-raising, external government
assistance and the diversion of international humanitarian aid. Whereas 80
per cent of war victims early last century were military personnel, it is estimated
that 80 per cent of victims in contemporary wars are civilians. According to
Kaldor, this new form of warfare is a political rather than a military
challenge, involving the breakdown of legitimacy and the need for a new
cosmopolitan politics to reconstruct affected communities and societies. See
Kaldor, Mary. 1999. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era.
Polity, Cambridge. |
|
Normative
Theory |
|
Normative
theory deals precisely with values and value preferences. Unlike empirical
theory, however, propositions in normative theory are not subject to
empirical test as a means of establishing their truth or falsehood. Normative
theory deals not with what is, the domain of
empirical theory. Rather, normative theory deals explicitly with what ought
to be - the way the world should be ordered and the value choices decision
makers should make (Viotti, P. and M. Kauppi, (eds.). 1987. International
Relations Theory. Macmillan Publishing Company, New York). |
|
Nuclear
Utilisation Theory |
|
Offensive
Realism |
|
Offensive
realism is a covering term for several theories of international politics and
foreign policy that give analytical primacy to the hostile and unforgiving
nature of the international system as the cause of conflict. Like defensive
realism, some variants of offensive realism build upon and depart from
Waltz's neorealism. Offensive realism holds that anarchy (the absence of a
worldwide government or universal sovereign) provides strong incentives for
expansion. All states strive to maximize their relative power because only
the strongest states can guarantee their survival. They pursue expansionist
policies when and where the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. States
face the ever-present threat that other states will use force to harm or
conquer them. This compels them to improve their relative power positions
through arms build-ups, unilateral diplomacy, mercantile (or even autarkic)
foreign economic policies, and opportunistic expansion. Ultimately every
state in the international system strives to become a regional hegemon - a
state that enjoys a preponderance of military, economic, and potential power
in its part of the globe. Offensive realists however, disagree over the
historical prevalence of hegemonic regional systems and the likely responses
of weaker states to would-be regional hegemons (e.g., balancing,
buck-passing, or bandwagoning). In particular, there is a sharp disagreement
between proponents of the balance-of-power tradition (John Mearsheimer, Eric
Labs, Fareed Zakaria, Kier Lieber, and Christopher Layne) and proponents of
the security variant of hegemonic stability theory (Robert Gilpin, William
Wohlforth, and Stephen Brooks). (Sources: Jeffrey W. Taliaferro,
'Security-Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Reconsidered,' International
Security, 25, 3, Winter 2000/2001: 152-86; and John J. Mearsheimer,
(2002), Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W.W. Norton, New York). |
|
Parallelism
Theory |
|
Based
on a fusion of Weberian and Freudian concepts, Parallelism argues that, at
the macro level, states fall into two general categories, paternal and
fraternal, and that the struggle between the two types characterizes
international relations. In the ancient world, paternal systems were
predominant because they were militarily superior, but since the rise of the
nation-state, fraternal states have become predominant. The engine of
historical change is the revolution-hegemonic war cycle, which brings
paternal and fraternal systems into conflict with one another. There are at
least four examples of this type of hegemonic conflict occurring in
documented history: 1) the rise of Macedonia and Alexander the Great's war
with Persia; 2) the rise of Mongolia and Gheghis Khan's war of expansion; 3)
the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars; and 4) Weimar Germany and
World War II. There are other types of hegemonic conflicts (e.g., WW I, Seven
Years War), but these four represent parallel events. Victory in
revolutionary and hegemonic conflict has determined the direction of the
world system, towards paternalism or fraternalism. For more information,
refer to the Center for the Study of Political Parallelism. (http://www.parallelism.org/) |
|
Peripheral
Realism |
|
A
foreign policy theory arising from the special perspective of (Latin
American) peripheral states and represented by the work of Carlos Escude, for
example. This view of international relations regards the international
system as having an incipient hierarchical structure based on perceived
differences between states: those that give orders, those that obey, and
those that rebel. The peripheral approach introduces a different way of
understanding the internatonal system: that is, from the unique viewpoint of
states that do not impose 'rules of the game' and which suffer high costs
when they confront them. Thus, the foreign policies of peripheral states are
typically framed and implemented in such a way that the national interest is
defined in terms of development, confrontation with great powers is avoided,
and autonomy is not understood as freedom of action but rather in terms of
the costs of using that freedom. |
|
Phantom
State |
|
A
state that is not widely recognised internationally or which has a unique set
of sovereignty issues that provide only partial legitimacy and partial
recognition of sovereignty among established nation-states. Examples are:
Taiwan - successful phantom state using its ambiguity and US support to
maintain partial independence; Palestine - less successful, especially at
internal governance issues, but better at establishing legitimacy
internationally as a cause rather than a state. |
|
Pluralism |
|
A
tradition in international relations that argued that politics, and hence
policy, was the product of a myriad of competing interests, hence depriving
the state of any independent status. Pluralism can be seen to derive
principally from a liberal tradition, rooted in Locke's 'Second Treatise of
Government', and to pose an anti-realist vision of the centrality of the
state in world politics. Pluralists make four key assumptions about
international relations. Primarily, non-state actors are important entities
in world politics. Secondly, the State is not looked upon as a unified actor,
rather, competition, coalition building, and compromise between various
interest groups including multinational enterprises will eventually culminate
into a 'decision' announced in the name of the state. Thirdly, pluralists challenge
the realist assumption of the state as a rational actor, and this derives
from the second assumption where the clash of competing interests may not
always provide for a rational decision making process. Finally, the fourth
assumption revolves around the nature of the international agenda, where it
is deemed extensive by the pluralists and includes issues of national
security as well as economic, social and environmental issues. Hence,
pluralists reject the 'high politics' 'low politics' divide characteristic of
realism. They also contend with the predominance of a physical conception of
power inherent in realism. |
|
Policy-Relevant
Theory |
|
Policy-relevant
theories may have explicit purposes that stem from the value preferences of
the theorist, such as reducing the likelihood of war or curbing the arms
race. Acting on such theories, of course, is the domain of the policy maker,
a task separate from that of the empirical theorist. Theorists who become
policy makers may well make choices informed by what theories say will be the
likely outcomes of implementing one or another alternative. Their choices may
be informed by empirical theory or understanding of world events, but the
decisions they make are still based on value preferences (Viotti, P. and M.
Kauppi, (eds.). 1987. International Relations Theory. Macmillan
Publishing Company, New York). |
|
Poliheuristic
Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making |
|
Poliheuristic
theory suggests that leaders simplify their choice problems according to a
two-stage decision process. During the first stage, the set of possible
options and outcomes is reduced by application of a 'noncompensatory
principle' to eliminate any alternative with an unacceptable return on a
critical, typically political, decision dimension (Mintz 1993). Once the
choice set has been reduced to alternatives that are acceptable to the
decision maker, the process moves to a second stage 'during which the decision
maker can either use a more analytic, expected utility-like strategy or
switch to a lexicographic decision strategy.' (Mintz 1997; Mintz et al. 1997;
Mintz and Geva 1997; Mintz and Astorino-Courtois 2001). In setting out a
pivotal preliminary stage to expected utility decision making, the
poliheuristic theory bridges the gap between research in cognitive psychology
(Taber and Steenbergen 1995) and the considerable insights provided by
rational analyses of decision making (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Bueno de
Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Morrow 1997). From Mintz, A. 2003. Integrating
Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making.
Palgrave Macmillan, New York. |
|
Positivism |
|
Postbehaviouralism |
|
Postinternationalism |
|
Unlike
many other theories, postinternational theory is organized around the premise
that our time is marked by profound and continuous transformations and
turbulence. It seeks to account for the dynamics of change and anticipate
where they might be leading the world. Its prime focus is on the
transformation of three basic parameters: one at the micro level of
individuals, another at the micro-macro level where individuals and their
collectivities interact, and the third is at the macro level of collectivities
and their global structures. The central concept at the micro level involves
a skill revolution, whereas at the micro-macro level it involves the
pervasiveness of authority crises experienced by all kinds of collectivities;
and at the macro level it posits a bifurcation of global structures into the
state-centric world of sovereignty-bound actors and the multi-centric world
of sovereignty-free actors. This formulation is theoretical in the sense that
it anticipates the conditions under which continual turbulence and
transformation are likely to sustain world affairs. Examples of
transformations at each level include the increasingly manifest readiness of
individuals to engage in collective action (micro level), the 'battle of
Seattle' (micro-macro level), and the pattern - indeed, institutionalization
- whereby the NGO and state-centric worlds converge around common interests
(macro level). See James Rosenau's (1990) Turbulence in World Politics
and Heidi Hobbs' (ed.) (2000) Pondering Postinternationalism. |
|
Postmodernism |
|
A
more extreme branch of Critical Social Theory (see above) that can be
identified in terms of its critical stance toward (western) modernity and the
unambiguous narratives of reason, truth and progress. Whereas the dominant
narrative of modernity upholds reason as the foundation of objective truth
and the source of progress, postmodernism emphasises the interplay of a
plurality of discursive practices, ways of knowing, social identities and
possible worlds. |
|
Postpositvism |
|
Poststructuralism |
|
Power
Transition Theory |
|
Created
by A.F.K. Organski and originally published in his textbook, World
Politics (1958), power transition theory today describes international
politics as a hierarchy with (1) a "dominant" state, the one with the
largest proportion of power resources (population, productivity, and
political capacity meaning coherence and stability); (2) "great
powers," a collection of potential rivals to the dominant state and who
share in the tasks of maintaining the system and controlling the allocation
of power resources; (3) "middle powers" of regional significance
similar to the dominant state, but unable to challenge the dominant state or
the system structure, and (4) "small powers," the rest. The principle
predictive power of the theory is in the likelihood of war and the stability
of alliances. War is most likely, of longest duration, and greatest
magnitude, when a challenger to the dominant power enters into approximate
parity with the dominant state and is dissatisfied with the existing system.
Similarly, alliances are most stable when the parties to the alliance are
satisfied with the system structure. There are further nuances to the theory:
for instance, the sources of power transition vary in their volitility, population
change being the least volatile and political capacity (defined as the
ability of the government to control resources internal to the country) the
most volatile. (Best single text and the source of the above description: Power
Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century, by Ronald L. Tammen et al.,
published by Seven Bridges Press, 2000.) |
|
Pragmatic
Idealism |
|
Pragmatic
Idealism was first developed as a conceptual and axiological clarification of
'Canadian internationalism' in Costas Melakopides' Pragmatic Idealism:
Canadian Foreign Policy 19945-1995 (McGill-Queens Úniversity Press,
1998). It argued that Canada, along with such 'like-minded middle powers' as
Australia, Denmark, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden, had adopted during the
Cold War a self-conscious departure from classic Realpolitik, through foreign
policies that cultivated moderation, mediation, legal and diplomatic
solutions to international conflicts, and authentic commitment to
peacekeeping, peace-making, human rights, foreign aid, and ecological
rationality. Today, Pragmatic Idealism can be said to characterize any
foreign policy - including the international role of the European Union -
that embraces the aforementioned principles and values. |
|
Prisoner's
Dilemma |
|
Cooperation
is usually analysed in game theory by means of a non-zero-sum game called the
"Prisoner's Dilemma" (Axelrod, 1984). The two players in the game
can choose between two moves, either "cooperate" or
"defect". The idea is that each player gains when both cooperate,
but if only one of them cooperates, the other one, who defects, will gain
more. If both defect, both lose (or gain very little) but not as much as the
"cheated" cooperator whose cooperation is not returned. The problem
with the prisoner's dilemma is that if both decision-makers were purely
rational, they would never cooperate. Indeed, rational decision-making means
that you make the decision which is best for you whatever the other actor
chooses. Suppose the other one would defect, then it is rational to defect yourself:
you won't gain anything, but if you do not defect you will be stuck with a
loss. Suppose the other one would cooperate, then you will gain anyway, but
you will gain more if you do not cooperate, so here too the rational choice
is to defect. The problem is that if both actors are rational, both will
decide to defect, and none of them will gain anything. However, if both would
"irrationally" decide to cooperate, both would gain. |
|
Prospect
Theory |
|
Prospect
theory is a psychological theory of decision-making under conditions of risk
and derives its name from the tenet that the notion of risk involves some
prospect of loss. Thus prospect theory posits loss-aversion, rather than
risk-aversion (as claimed by rational choice theorists) and takes into account
the psychological primacy of relative positioning. The theory states that
there are two phases affecting decision-making: 1) framing, where perception
or presentation of the situation in which decisions must be made affect the
disposition towards some alternatives over others; and 2) evaluation, where
the decision-maker assesses gains and losses relative to a movable reference
point depending on the perspective of the decision-maker. It helps focus on
how utilities are formed rather than how they are maximised. Prospect theory
originally was called 'value theory' by its founders Kahneman and Tversky in
the late 1970s. (Edited passages from McDermott, R. (ed.). (2004). Political
Psychology. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford). |
|
Psycho-Cultural
Theory |
|
Racial
Internationalism |
|
Rationalism |
|
A
theoretical qualification to the pessimism of realism and the idealism of
liberal internationalism. Rationalists view states as comprising an
international society, not merely an international system. States come
to be a part of an international society by accepting that various principles
and institutions govern the way in which they conduct their foreign
relations. In doing so, it can be argued, states
also display a commitment to the idea that it is inappropriate to promote the
national interest without any regard for international law and morality. |
|
Realism |
|
A
particular view of the world, or paradigm, defined by the following
assumptions: the international realm is anarchic and consists of independent
political units called states; states are the primary actors and inherently
possess some offensive military capability or power which makes them
potentially dangerous to each other; states can never be sure about the
intentions of other states; the basic motive driving states is survival or
the maintenance of sovereignty; states are instrumentally rational and think
strategically about how to survive. |
|
Reflectionism |
|
Regime
Theory |
|
See
International Regime Theory above. |
|
Schema
Theory |
|
Securitization
Theory |
|
Securitization
theory was developed by Buzan and Waever and explores the constructivist
dimension of security. That is, it deals not with security per se, but
the process of securitization. Accordingly, politicians can position certain
facts or problems as existential threats even though they may not be threats
in their own right. Therefore, securitization is the process whereby the
security label is attached to certain phenomena. A good example is airport
security checks: even though their effectiveness may be limited, they are
considered essential for safety by the public and therefore subject to little
doubt or critique. |
|
Security
Dilemma |
|
Robert
Jervis’s “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” explains that the security
dilemma is the key to understanding how in an anarchic international system
states with fundamentally compatible goals still end up in comepetition and
at war. The security dilemma exists when “many of the means by which a state
tries to increase its security decrease the security of others”. A
security dilemma refers to a situation wherein two or more states are drawn
into conflict, possibly even war, over security concerns, even though none of
the states actually desire conflict. Essentially, the security dilemma occurs
when two or more states each feel insecure in relation to other states. None
of the states involved want relations to deteriorate, let alone for war to be
declared, but as each state acts militarily or diplomatically to make itself
more secure, the other states interpret its actions as threatening. An ironic
cycle of unintended provocations emerges, resulting in an escalation of the
conflict which may eventually lead to open warfare. (Kanji, O. 2003.
'Security' in Burgess, G. and H. Burgess (eds.). Beyond Intractability.
Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado). |
|
Social
Contract Theory |
|
The
social contract or political contract is an intellectual device
intended to explain the appropriate relationship between individuals and their governments. Social contract arguments assert that individuals unite into political societies by a process of mutual consent, agreeing to abide by
common rules and accept corresponding duties to protect themselves and one
another from violence and other kinds of harm.[citation
needed] Social
contract theory
played an important historical role in the emergence of the idea that
political authority must be derived from the consent of the
governed. The starting point
for most social contract theories is a heuristic examination of the human condition absent from any political order,
usually termed the “state of nature”. In this condition, individuals' actions are bound
only by their personal power and conscience. From this shared starting point, social contract theorists seek to
demonstrate, in different ways, why a rational individual would voluntarily
give up his or her natural freedom to obtain the benefits of political order. Thomas Hobbes (1651), John Locke (1689), and Jean-Jacques
Rousseau (1762) are the most
famous social contract thinkers. Each drew quite different conclusions about
the nature of political authority. Hobbes advocated absolute monarchy, Locke advocated natural rights, and Rousseau advocated collective sovereignty in
the name of "the general will".[citation
needed] The Lockean concept of the social contract was
invoked in the United States Declaration of Independence, and social contract notions have recently been
invoked, in a quite different sense, by thinkers such as John Rawls. |
|
Social
Constructivism |
|
Social
constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international
life. As such, constructivism rests on an irreducibly intersubjective
dimension of human action: the capacity and will of people to take a
deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance.
This capacity gives rise to social facts, or facts that depend on human
agreement that they exist and typically require human institutions for their
existence (money, property rights, sovereignty, marriage and Valentine's Day,
for example). Constructivists contend that not only are identities and
interests of actors socially constructed, but also that they must share the
stage with a whole host of other ideational factors emanating from people as
cultural beings. No general theory of the social construction of reality is
available to be borrowed from other fields and international relations
constructivists have not as yet managed to formulate a fully fledged theory
of their own. As a result, constructivism remains more of a philosophically
and theoretically informed perspective on and approach to the empirical study
of international relations. (Edited passage from Ruggie, J. 'What Makes the World
Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge', International
Organization 52, 4, Autumn 1998). |
|
State
Cartel Theory |
|
State
cartel theory is an institutionalist approach with a focus on regional
integration. It imports its terminology from the classical cartel theory of
economic enterprises. Realising that the benefits of cooperation most often
outweigh the costs of conflict, states are willing to cartelize political
issues in international institutions. A members’ assembly is the primary
institution, with further organisations being an expression of the will and
needs of members. A good example is the Council of the European Union and its
allied European Commission and European Court. |
|
Structural
Idealism |
|
Structuralism |
|
Supranationalism |
|
Supranationalism
entails a formal transfer of decision-making and law-making from the state to
an institution or international organization. The notion is to ‘pool
sovereignty’ in order to prevent war by integrating sovereign states
economically, politically and socially. Decision-making involves national
governments using voting procedures other than unanimity but also that the
new supranational institutions have the ability to take or enact decisions
without the need for government votes. An example of supranationalism is the
European Union in which various powers and functions of member states have
been transferred to EU institutions. This means that the EU is ‘above the
state’ in many key areas. |
|
Traditionalism |
|
An
approach to international relations that emphasises the studying of such
disciplines as diplomatic history, international law, and philosophy in an
attempt to develop better insights. Traditionalists tend to be skeptical of
behavioralist approaches that are confined to strict scientific standards
that include formal hypothesis testing and, usually, the use of statistical
analysis (Viotti, P. and M. Kauppi, (eds.). 1987. International Relations
Theory. Macmillan Publishing Company, New York). |
|
Transnational
Historical Materialism |
|
Transnational
historical materialism falls within the Marxist tradition. This comtemporary
Marxism takes its inspiration from Antonio Gramsci and gives greater
significance to the role of culture and ideas, along with focussing on
economic aspects of order and change. It is seen as a corrective to the
economism of classical Marxism. |
|
Transnationalism |
|
Interactions
and coalitions across state boundaries that involve such diverse
nongovernmental actors as multinational corporations and banks, church
groups, and terrorist networks. In some usages, transnationalism includes
both nongovernmental as well as transgovernmental links. The term transnational
is used both to label the actor (for example, a transnational actor) or a
pattern of behavior (for example, an international organisation that acts transnationally
- operates across state borders). Theorists focusing on transnationalism
often deemphasise the state as primary and unitary actor (Viotti, P. and M.
Kauppi, (eds.). 1987. International Relations Theory. Macmillan
Publishing Company, New York). |
|
Two-World
Order |
|
Virtual
Theory |
|
World
Capitalist System |
|
An
approach to international relations that emphasises the impact of the world
wide spread of capitalism. It focuses on class and economic relations and the
division of the world into a dominant centre or core of industrialised
countries, a subordinate periphery of less developed countries and a
semi-periphery of countries that occupy an intermediate position between core
and periphery (Viotti, P. and M. Kauppi, (eds.). 1987. International
Relations Theory. Macmillan Publishing Company, New York). |
|
World-Systems
Analysis |
|
World-systems
analysis is not a theory or mode of theorizing, but a perspective and a
critique of other perspectives within social science. Its social origins were
located in the geopolitical emergence of the Third World in the late 1960s
and the manifest insufficiencies of modernization theory to account for what
was happening. The unit of analysis is the world-system rather than a state
or society, with particular emphases on the long-term history and totality of
the system. The notion of totality (globality, unidisciplinarity and holism)
distinguishes world-systems analysis from similar approaches such as global
or international political economy which look at the relationships between
the two segregated streams of politics and economics. Proponents of
world-systems analysis also regard it as an intellectual movement,
capable of transforming social science into a vehicle for world-wide social
change. |
First published Tue Jul
24, 2007
Kant
wrote his social and political philosophy in order to champion the
Enlightenment in general and the idea of freedom in particular. His
work came within both the natural law and the social contract traditions.
Kant held that every rational being had both a
innate right to freedom and a duty to enter into a civil condition governed by
a social contract in order to realize and preserve that freedom.
His
writings on political philosophy consist of one book and several shorter works.
The "Doctrine of Right", Part One of his two-part Metaphysics
of Morals and first published as a stand-alone book in February 1797,
contains virtually every directly political topic he treats. Other
shorter works include a useful short summary of his discussion of the basis and
role of the state in the second section of the essay "Theory and
Practice", an extended discussion of international relations in the essay
"Toward Perpetual Peace", and the essay "An Answer to the
Question: What is Enlightenment?." Other published material relevant to the topics include material on history,
on practical philosophy in general, and, for his social philosophy, his work on
religion and anthropology. Kant also offered a biannual lecture course on
"Natural Right", a student's (Feyerabend) transcript of which is
forthcoming in English translation.
Kant's
political philosophy is a branch of practical philosophy, one-half of one of
the broadest divisions in Kant's thought between practical and theoretical
philosophy. This division between practical and theoretical strictly
speaking holds only for the system of pure philosophical cognitions, the whole
of which is distinct from the preparatory philosophical project of critique
that investigates pure human faculties, in particular, reason (A841 / B869).
Kant's three critiques, according to this description, are neither
practical nor theoretical but are all collectively critical. Only the
systematic metaphysical works, such as the Metaphysics of Morals,
would properly speaking be considered practical.
While
political philosophy is part of that practical element, it is also to be
distinguished within practical philosophy from both empirical elements and from
virtue proper. The separation from virtue is treated in the next
paragraph. But here it is worth mentioning that practical philosophy, as
the rules governing free behavior of rational beings, covers all human action
in both its pure and applied (empirical, or "impure") aspects.
Pure practical philosophy, alleged to be the rational elements of
practical philosophy in abstraction from anything empirical, is called by Kant
"metaphysics of morals" (4:388). Kant so emphasized the
priority of the pure aspect of political philosophy that he wrote part of his
essay "On the Common Saying: That May be Correct in Theory, but it
is of No Use in Practice" in opposition to the view he associates with
Hobbes that the politician need not be concerned with abstract right but only
with pragmatic governance (8:289-306). Yet Kant also included the more
pragmatic, impure, empirical study of
human behavior as part of practical philosophy. For ethics in
general, Kant called the empirical study of human beings as agents within
particular cultures and with particular natural capacities
"anthropology". Some of Kant's social philosophy fits into this
rubric (See section 10). Is there a corresponding applied political philosophy
for Kant? The advice he gives rulers regarding perpetual peace and some of the
related work on history (section 8) is as close as Kant gets to an anthropology
of political right.
Kant's
practical philosophy and the categorical imperative that governs it were
intended to form the basis not only of what is thought today to be ethics
proper but also with everything that broadly speaking had to do with the
deliberative human behavior. He defined practical philosophy as that concerned
with "rules of behavior in regard to free choice", as opposed to
theoretical philosophy that concerned "the rule of knowledge" (Kant
27: 243). Practical philosophy provided rules to govern human deliberative
action. The Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals provided Kant's
main arguments that the categorical imperative is the supreme rule for human
deliberative action. In its Preface, he notes that the Groundwork is
to be a preparatory book for a future Metaphysics of Morals. Twelve
years later he published that Metaphysics of Morals in two parts, the
"Doctrine of Right" and the "Doctrine of Virtue". Both are
equally parts of Kant's practical philosophy, and both thus have the
categorical imperative as their highest principle, although there is some
scholarly disagreement about this relationship.
The
book Metaphysics of Morals had two distinct parts: the "Doctrine
of Right" and the "Doctrine of Virtue". Kant sought to separate
political rights and duties from what we might call morals in the narrow sense.
He limits right by stating three conditions (6:230) that have to be met for
something to be enforceable as right: first, right concerns only actions that
have influence on other persons, meaning duties to the self are excluded,
second right does not concern the wish but only the choice of others, meaning
that not mere desires but only decisions which bring about actions are at
stake, and third right does not concern the matter of the other's act but only
the form, meaning no particular desires or ends are assumed on the part of the
agents. As an example of the latter he considers trade, which for right must
have the form of being freely agreed by both parties but can have any matter or
purpose the agents want. These criteria appear to be less rigid than Kant
ultimately intends, for they would include under Right actions even those
imperfect duties that "influence" others by improving their lot, such
as benificent acts of charity. John Stuart Mill's "harm principle"
does not face this problem since it specifies that the influence to be subject
to law is always negative. In addition to these three conditions for right,
Kant also offers direct contrasts between right and virtue. He thinks both
relate to freedom but in different ways: right concerns outer freedom and
virtue concerns inner freedom (being master of one's own passions) (6:406-07).
Right concerns acts themselves independent of the motive an agent may have for
performing them, virtue concerns the proper motive for
dutiful actions (6:218-221). In another formulation (6:380-81) he says that
right concerns universality as a formal condition of freedom while virtue
concerns a necessary end beyond the mere formality of universality, thus
appearing to tie the distinction to the first two formulas of the categorical
imperative in the Groundwork. In yet another he says that right
concerns narrow duties and virtue wide duties (6:390). In the Feyerabend
lectures, Kant notes that right is the subset of morally correct actions that are
also coercible (27:1327). These various alternative formulations of the
distinction would exclude imperfect duties not because imperfect duties do not
"influence" others (they do) but because, as imperfect, they cannot
be coerced in particular instances, since imperfect duties always allow for the
moderating role of an individual's inclinations. While these various
formulations of the distinction appear to be quite different, they can in
general be summarized by saying that right concerns outer action corresponding
to perfect duty that affects others regardless of the individual's internal
motivations or goals.
"There
is only one innate right," says Kant, "Freedom (independence from
being constrained by another's choice), insofar as it can coexist with the
freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law" (6:237). Kant
rejects any other basis for the state, in particular arguing that the welfare
of citizens cannot be the basis of state power. He argues that a state cannot
legitimately impose any particular conception of happiness upon its citizens
(8:290-91). To do so would be for the ruler to treat citizens as children,
assuming that they are unable to understand what is truly useful or harmful to themselves.
This
claim must be understood in light of Kant's more general claim that moral law
cannot be based upon happiness or any other given empirical good. In the Groundwork
Kant contrasts an ethics of autonomy, in which the will (Wille, or
practical reason itself) is the basis of its own law, from the ethics of
heteronomy, in which something independent of the will such as happiness is the
basis of moral law (4:440-41). In the Critique of Practical Reason he
argues that happiness (the agreeableness of life when things go in accordance
with one's wishes and desires), although universally sought by human beings, is
not specific enough to entail any universal desires in human beings. Further,
even were there any universal desires among human beings, those desires would,
as empirical, be merely contingent and thus unworthy of being the basis of any
pure moral law (5:25-26). No particular conception of happiness can be the
basis of the pure principle of the state, and the general conception of
happiness is too vague to serve as the basis of a law. Hence, a "universal
principle of right" cannot be based upon happiness but only on something
truly universal, such as freedom. The "universal principle of right"
Kant offers is thus "Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone's
freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of
choice of each can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a
universal law" (6:230).
This
explains why happiness is not universal, but not why freedom is universal. By
"freedom" in political philosophy, Kant is not referring to the
transcendental conception of freedom usually associated with the problem of the
freedom of the will amid determinism in accordance with laws of nature, a
solution to which is provided in the Third Antinomy of the Critique of Pure
Reason. Rather, freedom in political philosophy is defined, as in the
claim above about the only innate right, as "independence from being
constrained by another's choice". His concern in political philosophy is
not with laws of nature determining a human being's choice but by other
human beings determining a human being's choice, hence the kind of freedom
Kant is concerned with in political philosophy is individual freedom of action.
Still, the universality of political freedom is linked to transcendental
freedom. Kant assumes that a human being's use of choice is (at least when
properly guided by reason) free in the transcendental sense. Since every human
being does enjoy transcendental freedom by virtue of being rational, freedom of
choice is a universal human attribute. And this freedom of choice is to be
respected and promoted, even when this choice is not exercised in rational or
virtuous activity. Presumably respecting freedom of choice involves allowing it
to be effective in determining actions; this is why Kant calls political
freedom, or "independence from being constrained by another's
choice", the only innate right. One might still object that this freedom
of choice is incapable of being the basis of a pure principle of right for the
same reason that happiness was incapable of being its basis, namely, that it is
too vague in itself and that when specified by the particular decisions
individuals make with their free choice, it loses its universality. Kant holds
that this problem does not arise for freedom, since freedom of choice can be
understood both in terms of its content (the particular decisions individuals
make) and its form (the free, unconstrained nature of choice of any possible
particular end) (6:230). Freedom is universal in the proper sense because,
unlike happiness, it can be understood in such a way that it is susceptible to
specification without losing its universality. Right will be based on the form
of free choice.
The
very existence of a state might seem to some as a limitation of freedom, since
a state possesses power to control the external freedom of individual citizens
through force. This is the basic claim of anarchism. Kant holds in contrast
that the state is not an impediment to freedom but is the means for freedom.
State action that is a hindrance to freedom can, when properly directed,
support and maintain freedom if the state action is aimed at hindering actions that themselves would hinder the freedom of others. Given a
subject's action that would limit the freedom of another subject, the state may
hinder the first subject to defend the second by "hindering a hindrance to
freedom". Such state coercion is compatible with the maximal freedom
demanded in the principle of right because it does not reduce freedom but
instead provides the necessary background conditions needed to secure freedom.
The amount of freedom lost by the first subject through direct state coercion
is equal to the amount gained by the second subject through lifting the
hindrance to his actions. State action sustains the maximal amount of freedom
consistent with identical freedom for all without reducing it.
Freedom
is not the only basis for principles underlying the state. In "Theory and
Practice" Kant makes freedom the first of three principles (8:290):
1.
The freedom of
every member of the state as a human being.
2.
His equality with
every other as a subject.
3.
The independence
of every member of a commonwealth as a citizen.
Equality
is not substantive but formal. Each member of the state is equal to every other
member of the state before the law. Each has equal coercive right, that is, the
right to invoke the power of the state to enforce the laws on her behalf. (Kant
exempts the head of state from this equality, since the head of state cannot be
coerced by anyone else). This formal equality is perfectly compatible with the
inequality of members of the state in income, physical power, mental ability,
possessions, etc. Further, this equality supports an equality of opportunity:
every office or rank in the political structure must be open to all subjects
without regard for any hereditary or similar restrictions.
Independence
concerns a citizen being subject to laws he gives himself, i.e. as
co-legislator of the laws. While this principle appears to require universal
democratic decision making for particular laws, Kant instead understands this
principle on two levels, one of which is not universal and the other of which
is not for particular laws. All members of the state, as subjects of the law,
must be able to will the basic law that governs them. This basic law is the
"original contract" and will be discussed in the next section. The basic
law is willed by each subject in the sense that the "will of all" or
a "public will", or "general will" (Kant uses Rousseau's
term) determines the basic law. Particular laws, in contrast, are to be
determined by a majority of the citizens with voting rights, as will be
discussed in section 4.
Kant
provides two distinct discussions of social contract. One concerns property and
will be treated in more detail in section 5 below. The second discussion of
social contract comes in the essay "Theory and Practice" in the
context of an a priori restriction on the legitimate policies the sovereign may
pursue. The sovereign must recognize the "original contract" as an
idea of reason that forces the sovereign to "give his laws in such a way
that they could have arisen from the united will of a whole people and to
regard each subject, insofar as he wants to be a citizen, as if he has joined
in voting for such a will" (8:297). This original contract, Kant stresses,
is only an idea of reason and not a historical event. Any rights and duties
stemming from an original contract do so not because of any particular
historical provenance, but because of the rightful relations embodied in the
original contract. No empirical act, as a historical act would be, could be the
foundation of any rightful duties or rights. The idea of an original contract
limits the sovereign as legislator. No law may be promulgated that "a
whole people could not possibly give its consent to" (8:297). The consent
at issue, however, is also not an empirical consent based upon any actual act.
The set of actual particular desires of citizens is not the basis of
determining whether they could possibly consent to a law. Rather, the kind of
possibility at issue is one of rational possible unanimity based upon fair
distributions of burdens and rights in abstraction from empirical facts or
desires. Kant's examples both exemplify this consideration of possible rational
unanimity. His first example is a law that would provide hereditary privileges
to members of a certain class of subjects. This law would be unjust because it
would be irrational for those who would not be members of this class to agree
to accept fewer privileges than members of the class. One might say that
empirical information could not possibly cause all individuals to agree to this
law. Kant's second example concerns a war tax. If the tax is administered
fairly, it would not be unjust. Kant adds that even if the actual citizens
opposed the war, the war tax would be just because it is possible that the war
is being waged for legitimate reasons that the state but not the citizens know
about. Here empirical information might cause all citizens to approve the law.
In both these examples, the conception of "possibly consent" abstracts
from actual desires individual citizens have. The possible consent is not based
upon a hypothetical vote given actual preferences but
is based on a rational conception of agreement given any possible empirical
information.
Kant's
is similar to the social contract theory of Hobbes in a few important
characteristics. The social contract is not a historical document and does not
involve a historical act. In fact it can be dangerous to the stability of the
state to even search history for such empirical justification of state power
(6:318). The current state must be understood, regardless of its origin, to
embody the social contact. The social contract is a rational justification for
state power, not a result of actual deal-making among individuals or between
them and a government. Another link to Hobbes is that the social contract is
not voluntary. Individuals may be forced into the civil condition against their
consent (6:256). Social contract is not based on any actual consent,
one might say the voluntary choice to join a society. Since the social contract
reflects reason, each human being as a rational being already contains the
basis for rational agreement to the state. Are individuals then coerced to
recognize their subjection to state power against their will? Since Kant
defines "will" as "practical reason itself" (Groundwork,
4:412), the answer for him is "no." If one defines "will"
as arbitrary choice, then the answer is "yes." This is the same
dichotomy that arises with regard to Kant's theory of punishment (section 7). A
substantial difference between Kant and Hobbes is that Hobbes bases his
argument on the individual benefit for each party to the contract, whereas Kant
bases his argument on Right itself, understood as freedom for all persons in
general, not even just for the individual benefit that each party to the
contract obtains in his or her own freedom. To this extent Kant is influenced
more by Rousseau's idea of the General Will.
Kant
was a central figure in the philosophy of the Enlightenment. One of his popular
essays, "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" discusses
Enlightenment in terms of the use of an individual's own reason (8:35f). To be Enlightened is to emerge from one's self-incurred minority
(juvenile) status to a mature ability to think for oneself. In another essay,
"What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in
Thought?" Kant defines Enlightenment as "the maxim of always thinking
for oneself" (8:146). "What is Enlightenment" distinguishes
between the public and private uses of reason. The private use of reason is,
for government officials, the use of reason they must utilize in their official
positions. For example, a member of the clergy (who in Kant's Prussia were
employees of the state) is required to espouse the official doctrine in his
sermons and teachings. The public use of reason is the use an individual makes
of his reason as a scholar reaching the public world of readers. For example,
the same member of the clergy could, as a scholar, explain what he takes to be
shortcomings in that very same doctrine. Similarly, a military officer can,
using public reason, question the methods and goals of his own military orders,
but in his function as an officer, using private reason, is obliged to obey
them. Since the sovereign might err, and individual citizens have the right to
attempt to correct the error under the assumption that the sovereign does not
intend to err, "a citizen must have, with the approval of the ruler
himself, the authorization to make known publicly his opinions about what it is
in the ruler's arrangements that seems to him to be a wrong against the
commonwealth," writes Kant in "Theory and Practice" (8:304).
One
would expect from this emphasis that Kant would insist that the proper
political system is one that not only allows individuals to think for
themselves about political issues, but also contains a mechanism such as voting
to translate those well reasoned opinions into government policy. One would be
wrong. Kant does not stress self-government. In his discussion in
"Perpetual Peace" of the traditional division of the types of
government Kant classifies governments in two dimensions (8:352). The first is
the "form of sovereignty", concerning who rules, and here Kant
identifies the traditional three forms: either rule by
one person, rule by a small group of people, or rule by all people. The second
is the "form of government" concerning how those people rule, and here Kant offers a variation on the traditional
good/bad dichotomy: either republican or despotic. By "republican,"
Kant means "separation of the executive power (the government) from the
legislative power". Despotism is their unity such that the regent has
given laws to himself and in essence made his private will into the public
will. Republics require representation in order to ensure that the executive
power only enforces the public will by insisting that the executive enforce
only laws that representatives of the people, not the executive itself, make. But a republic is compatible with a single
individual acting as legislator provided that others act as executives; for
example, a king would issue laws in the name of the people's will but the
king's ministers would enforce those laws. Kant's claim that such a government
is republican (see also 27:1384) showcases his view that a republican
government need not require actual participation of the people in making the
laws, even through elected representatives, as long as the laws are promulgated
with the whole united will of the people in mind. Kant does, nonetheless, think
that an elected representative legislator is the best form of a republic
(8:353). Whether elected or unelected, the moral person who holds legislative
power is representative of the people united as a whole, and is thus sovereign.
The people themselves are sovereign only when they are electing a new set of
representatives.
When
Kant discusses voting for representatives, he adheres to many prevailing
prejudices (8:295). The right to vote requires "being one's own
master" and hence having property or some skill that can support one
independently. The reason given for this, that if someone must acquire
something from another to make a living he alienates what belongs to him, is so
vague that Kant himself admits in a footnote "It is, I admit, somewhat
difficult to determine what is required in order to be able to claim the rank
of a human being who is his own master." Kant also leaves women out of the
voting populations for what he calls "natural" reasons but does not
specify.
Kant's
state, then, does not require that actual decisions are made by the people at
large, even through elected representatives. He holds that a single individual
or small group can themselves adequately represent the people at large simply
by adopting the point of view of the people. Insistence on a representative
system (8:353) is not insistence on an elected representative system.
Nonetheless it is clear that Kant holds that such an elective representative
system is ideal. Republican constitutions, he claims, are prone to avoid war
because, when the consent of the people is needed, they will consider the costs
they must endure in a war (fighting, taxes, destruction of property, etc),
whereas a non-republican ruler has no such concerns. In the "Doctrine of
Right" he also notes that a republican system not only represents the
people but does so "by all the citizens united and acting through their
delegates" (6:342). These indications are not definitive but do point toward
Kant favoring elected representatives.
The
book "Doctrine of Right" begins with a discussion of property,
showing the importance of this right for the implementation of the innate right
to freedom. Property is defined as that "with which I am so connected that
another's use of it without my consent would wrong me" (6:245). In one
sense, if I am holding an object such as an apple, and another snatches it out
of my hands, I have been wronged because in taking the object from my physical possession,
the other harms me (Kant does not specify whether this harm is because one's
current use of the apple is terminated or because one's body is affected, but
the latter fits the argument better). Kant calls this "physical" or
"sensible" possession. It is not a sufficient sense of possession to
count as rightful possession of an object. Rightful possession must be
possession of an object without holding it so that another's use of the object
without my consent harms me even when I am not physically affected and not
currently using the object. Kant calls this "intelligible
possession".
His
proof that there must be this intelligible possession and not merely physical
possession turns on the application of human choice (6:246). An object of
choice is one that some human has the capacity to use for his purposes.
Rightful possession would be the right to make use of such an object. Suppose
that for some particular object, no one has rightful possession. This would
mean that a usable object would be beyond possible use. Kant grants that such a
condition does not contradict the principle of right because it is compatible
with everyone's freedom in accordance with universal law. But putting an object
beyond rightful use when humans have the capacity to use it would "annihilate"
the object in a practical respect, treat it as nothing. Kant claims that this
is problematic because in a practical respect an object is considered merely as
an object of possible choice. This consideration of the mere form alone, the
object simply as an object of choice, cannot contain any prohibition of use for
an object, for any such prohibition would be freedom limiting itself for no
reason. Thus in a practical respect an object cannot be treated as nothing, and
so the object must be considered as at least potentially in rightful possession
of some human being or other. So all objects within human
capacity for use must be subject to rightful or intelligible possession.
Intelligible
possession, then, is required by right in order for free beings to be able to
realize their freedom by using objects for their freely chosen purposes. This
conclusion entails the existence of private property but not any particular
distribution of private property. All objects must be considered as potential
property of some human being or other. Now if one human being
is to have intelligible possession of a particular object, all other human
beings must refrain from using that object. Such a one-sided relation
would violate the universality of external right. Kant
further worries that any unilateral declaration by one person that an object
belongs to him alone would infringe on the freedom of others. The only
way that intelligible possession is possible without violating the principle of
right is when each person agrees to obligate mutually all others to recognize
each individual's intelligible possessions. Each person must acknowledge that
he is obligated to refrain from using objects that belong to another. Since no
individual will can rightfully make and enforce such a law obligating everyone
to respect others' property, this mutual obligation is possible only in
accordance with a "collective general (common) and powerful will", in
other words, only in a civil condition. The state itself obligates all citizens
to respect the property of other citizens. Without a state to enforce these
property rights, they are impossible.
This
creation of a civil condition is Kant's first manner of discussing a social
contract mentioned in section 3. Prior to a social contract the only manner in
which human beings can control things is through empirical possession, actual
occupation and use of land and objects. In order to gain full property rights
to land and objects, individuals must all agree to respect the property rights
of others in a social contract. They are in fact required, as a duty, to enter
into a social condition in order to defend their own and everyone's property
rights. Only in such a society can persons exercise their freedom,
that is their pursuit of ends, by legitimately using objects for their
own purposes without regard for others. Hence a social contract is the rational
justification of the state because state power is necessary for each individual
to be guaranteed access to some property in order to realize their freedom.
While the discussion in "Theory and Practice" of a social contract as
an idea of reason constrains the sovereign in promulgating laws, it does not
explain why the state is necessary in the first place. The discussion in
"Doctrine of Right" of property as the basis of a social contract
explains why individuals are in fact rationally required to enter into a social
contract.
A
puzzle arises here with regard to property. If individuals are not able to have
any intelligible property prior to the existence of a state, yet the state's
role is to enforce property rights, where does the original assignment of
property to individuals occur? John Locke had famously avoided this problem in
his theory of property by making property a product of a single individual's
activity. By "mixing" one's labor with an object in the commons, one
comes to have property in the object. Kant objects to Locke's theory of
property on the grounds that it makes property a relation between a person and
a thing rather than between the wills of several persons (6:268-69). Since
property is a relation of wills that can occur only in a civil condition under
a common sovereign power, Kant suggests that prior to this civil condition
property can be acquired only in anticipation of and in conformity with a civil
condition. Provisional property is initial physical appropriation of objects
with the intention of making them rightful property in a state (6:264, 267).
Property
is of three types for Kant (6:247-48, 260). First is the right to a thing, to
corporeal objects in space. Examples of these things include land. The second
is the right against a person, the right to coerce that person to perform an
action. This is contract right. The third is the
"right to a person akin to a right to a thing", the most
controversial of Kant's categories in which he includes spouses, children, and
servants. Of these three types, the first has already been discussed in
relation to acquisition. The middle of these, contract right, involves the
possession by one person of the "deed" of another (6:274). One person
is able to control the choice of another in order to apply the other's causal
powers to some end. At first glance this contract right appears to violate the
second formula of the categorical imperative which states that persons are to
be treated always as ends and never merely as means. A contract appears to be a
case in which an individual is used merely as a means. A homeowner, for
example, hires a repair specialist specifically as a means for repairing his
house. Kant turns the tables on this problem by showing that a contract is
"the united choice of two persons" and thus treats both parties to
the contract as ends. For example, he notes that the repair specialist who is
contracted to work on a house has agreed to the exchange in order to obtain an
end of his own, namely, money (27:1319). Each party to the contract is both
means for the other and an end. In the third category, the right to a person
akin to a thing, Kant argues that some contracts or rightful obligations such
as the parent-child relation allow one party to the contract to control not
only the choice of the other, but also to possess some power over the body of
the other, such as the power to insist that the other remain in the household.
His discussion of the legal relation of marriage treats marriage as reciprocal
access to the other's sexual organs; here, despite his personal sexism, he
describes this legal relation as equal.
The
very idea of a right to rebel against the government is incoherent, Kant
argued, because the source of all right is the actually existing state. By this
he did not mean that any actually existing state is always completely just, or
that merely by virtue of having power, the state could determine what justice
is. He meant that a rightful condition, the opposite of the state of nature, is
possible only when there is some means for individuals to be governed by the
"general legislative will" (6:320). Any state embodies the general legislative
will better than no state. While such reasoning seems pragmatic, it is not. It
is instead based upon the claims above that a rightful condition requires the
centralizing of coercive power in a state as the only means to bring about
reciprocal coercion and obligation. Kant also argues that a right to rebel
would require that a people be authorized to resist the state. This kind of
authorization for action, however, is an exercise of sovereign power, and to
any people who claimed such a right would be claiming it (the people) rather
than the state embodies sovereign power. It would thus "make the people,
as subject, by one and the same judgment sovereign over him to whom it is
subject" (6:320). This is a contradiction. The nature of sovereignty is such
that sovereign power cannot be shared. Were it shared between the state and the
people, then when a dispute arose between them, who would judge whether the
state or the people are correct? There being no higher sovereign power to make
such a judgment, all other means for resolving the dispute fall outside of
rightful relations. This role of judgment relates to the judgment that Kant
discusses with regard to the social contract. Under the idea of a social
contract, the sovereign legislator may not make a law that the people could not
make for itself because it possesses irrational,
non-universal form. The state, not the people, is the judge of when a law is
rational (8:297). People who argue for a right to
revolution, Kant claims, misunderstand the nature of a social contract. They
claim that the social contract must have been an actual historical occurrence
from which the people could withdraw (8:301-02). But since the social contact
is only an idea of reason which sets moral limits to the sovereign's legislative
acts, and the sovereign's judgment alone determines how these limits are to be
interpreted, there is no independent contractual agreement to which the people
could refer in its complaints. Citizens are still allowed to voice their
grievances through their use of public reason, but they can do nothing more
than attempt to persuade the sovereign to alter his decision.
While
the people cannot rebel against the state, Kant does not insist that citizens
always obey the state. He allows at least for passive civil disobedience. This
comes in two forms: in a republican representative system such as England's,
there can be "a negative resistance, that is, a refusal of the people (in
parliament) to accede to every demand the government puts forth as necessary for
administering the state" (6:322). In the context of this discussion it is
clear that Kant is referring to the use of the power of the legislature to
refuse funding, and therefore approval, of actions of the executive. He
clarifies that the legislature is not allowed to dictate any positive action to
the executive, its legitimate resistance is only
negative. A second form of acceptable resistance applies to individuals. Kant
mentions that citizens are obligated to obey the sovereign "in whatever
does not conflict with inner morality" (6:371). He does not elaborate on
the term "inner morality".
Nor
does Kant always reject the actions of revolutionaries. If a revolution is
successful, citizens have as much obligation to obey the new regime.as they had
to obey the old one (6:323). Since the new regime is in fact a state authority,
it now possesses the right to rule. Further, in his theory of history, Kant
argues that progress in the long run will come about in part through violent
and unjust actions such as wars. Kant even takes it as a sign of progress that
spectators of the French Revolution have greeted it with "a wishful
participation that borders closely on enthusiasm" (7:85). Kant is not
pointing to the revolution itself as a sign of progress but to the reaction of
people such as himself to news of the revolution. The spectators endorse the
revolution not because it is legitimate but because it is aimed at the creation
of a civil constitution. Revolution, then, is wrong but still contributes to
progress.
In
fact, Kant did believe that the French Revolution was legitimate, and a look at
his argument illuminates some of his complex terminology. The French king
possessed sovereignty until he convened the Estates General as representative
of the people, at which time sovereignty "passed to the people" even
though the king had intended for the assembly to resolve specific problems and
then return the reins of power to him (6:341-2). Further, the king could not
have any power to restrain the actions of the assembly as a condition for it
being given the sovereign power, for there can be no restrictions on this
sovereign power. This understanding of sovereignty shows the difference between
a rebellion against authority and an election. In an election, sovereignty is
passed back to the people, so there is nothing wrong with the people replacing
the entire government. Without an election (or similar method of designating
the return of sovereignty to the people), any action aimed at replacing the
government is wrong.
Kant
was long considered to be an exemplar of the retributivist theory of
punishment. While he does claim that the only proper justification of
punishment is guilt for a crime, he does not limit the usefulness of punishment
to retributivist matters. Punishment can have as its justification only the
guilt of the criminal. All other uses of punishment, such as rehabilitation
(the alleged good of the criminal) or deterrence (alleged good
to society) uses the criminal merely as a means (6:331). Once this guilt is
determined, however, Kant does not deny that something useful can be drawn from
the punishment. In Feyerabend lectures on Natural Right, Kant is clear that the
sovereign "must punish in order to obtain security", and even while
using the law of retribution, "in such a way the best security is
obtained" (27:1390-91). The state is authorized to use its coercive force
to defend freedom against limitations to freedom; more particularly, since
right does not entail that each citizen must limit his own freedom but only
that "freedom is limited" by conditions of right, it is right for
another, i.e. the state, to actively limit citizens freedom in accord with
right (6:231). The state is authorized to use force to defend property rights
(6:256). Kant's view, then, is that punishment of a particular individual can
serve deterrent functions even when it cannot be based on deterrence as its
justification.
Retributivist
theory holds not only that criminal guilt is required for punishment, but that
the appropriate type and amount of punishment is also determined by the crime
itself. Traditionally this is the heart of the ancient injunction "an eye
for an eye". Kant supports this measurement for punishment because all
other measurements bring into consideration elements besides strict justice
(6:332), such as the psychological states of others that would measure the
effectiveness of various possible punishments on deterrence. As a principle,
retribution grounds but does not specify the exact punishment. Kant recognizes
that "like for like" is not always possible to the letter, but
believes that justice requires that it be used as the principle for specific
judgments of punishment.
The
retributivist theory of punishment leads to Kant's insistence on capital
punishment. He argues that the only punishment possibly equivalent to death,
the amount of inflicted harm, is death. Death is qualitatively different from
any kind of life, so no substitute could be found that would equal death. Kant
rejects the argument against capital punishment offered earlier in his century
by the Italian reformer, the Marchese Cesare Beccaria, who argued that in a
social contract no one would willingly give to the state power of his own life,
for the preservation of that life is the fundamental reason one enters a social
contract at all. Kant objects to Beccaria's claim by distinguishing between the
source of a social contract in "pure reason in
me" as opposed to the source of the crime, myself as capable of criminal
acts. The latter person wills the crime but not the punishments, but the former
person wills in the abstract that anyone who is convicted of a capital crime
will be punished by death. Hence one and the same individual both commits the
crime and endorses the punishment of death. This solution mirrors the claim
that individuals can be coerced to join a civil condition: reason dictates that
entering the civil condition is mandatory even if one's particular arbitrary
choice might be to remain outside it (see section 3).
Kant
complains that the German word used to describe international right,
"Völkerrecht", is misleading, for it means literally the right of
nations or peoples. He distinguishes this kind of relation among groups of individuals,
which he discusses as Cosmopolitan Right and will be covered in Section 9, from
the relations among the political entities, which would better be called
"Staatenrecht", the right of states. (Kant still uses the phrase
"right of nations" and also discusses a "league of
nations", although it is clear that he is referring not to nations as
peoples but to states as organizations; this article will strictly adhere to
the term "state" even when Kant did not.)
States
must be considered to be in a state of nature relative to one another. Like
individuals in the state of nature, then, they must be considered to be in a
state of war with each other. Like individuals, the states are obligated to
leave this state of nature to form a union under a social contract, in this
case, a league of states. Before the creation of such a league of states,
states do have a right to go to war against other states if another state
threatens it or actively aggresses against it (6:346). But any declaration of
war ought to be confirmed by the people "as colegislating members of a
state" (6:345). Rulers who wage war without such consent are using their
subjects as property, as mere means, rather than treating them as ends in
themselves. This claim is one of Kant's strongest statements that actual voting
by citizens is required: citizens "must therefore give their free assent,
through their representatives, not only to waging war in general but also to
each particular declaration of war" (6:345-46). Once war has been declared,
states are obligated to conduct the war under principles that leave open the
possibility of an eventual league of states. Actions that undermine future
trust between states, such as the use of assassination, are prohibited.
States
are obligated to leave this state of nature among states and enter into a
congress, or league, of states. In his 1797 Metaphysics of Morals,
Kant argues that this organization must be a voluntary coalition among states
rather than a federation, or state of states, which would be indissoluble.
Hence Kant holds that the league among nations is only analogous, not
equivalent, to a state created by citizens, since each particular civil state
is indisolluble. But in his essay "Toward Perpetual Peace" two years
earlier, Kant had advocated a state of nations as the best possible relation
among states (8:357). This state of nations would entail states subjecting
themselves to public coercive laws. Kant recognizes that states will balk at
such a surrender of their sovereign power, so accepts that the second best
option, a league of states in which each state retains the right to leave, must
be adopted. In a league of states, wars are replaced with negotiated
settlements of differences.
In
the essay "Toward Perpetual Peace", Kant offers a set of six
"preliminary articles" which aim to reduce the likelihood of war, but
cannot by themselves establish permanent peace (8:343-47). These are a ban on
making temporary peace treaties while still planning for future wars, the
prohibition of annexation of one state by another, the abolition of standing
armies, the refusal to take on national debts for external affairs, a ban on
interference by one state in the internal affairs of another, and a set of
limits on the conduct of war that disallows acts that would breed mistrust and
make peace impossible. These six articles are negative laws that prohibit
states from engaging in certain kinds of conduct. They are not sufficient by
themselves to prevent states from lapsing back into their old habits of warring
on one another. To institute an international order that can genuinely bring
about perpetual peace, Kant offers three "definitive articles". The
first of these is that every state shall have a republican civil constitution
(8:348, discussed in section 4 above). In a republican constitution, the people
who decide whether there will be a war are the same people who would pay the
price for the war, both in monetary terms (taxes and other financial burdens)
and in flesh and blood. Republican states will therefore be very hesitant to go
to war and will readily accept negotiations rather than resort to war. This
consideration is Kant's most important contribution to the debate about
securing peace. He believes that when states are ruled in accordance with the
wishes of the people, their self-interest will provide a consistent basis for
pacific relations among states. The second definitive article is that each
state shall participate in a a federalism of states
(8:354, discussed in the previous paragraph). The third definitive article
advocates a cosmopolitan right of universal hospitality (8:357, discussed in
section 9 below).
Kant's
view of historical progress is tied to his view of international relations. He
actually presents several versions of his argument for the progress of humanity
toward the ideal condition in which states, each governed by a republican civil
constitution and thus each providing maximal consistent freedom for its
citizens, all cooperate in a league of states. In his essay "Idea for a Universal
History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View" (8:15-31), he takes the basis
of his claims for historical progress to be the culmination of the human
ability to reason, which, as a natural property of human beings, must be worked
out to perfection in the species. He argues that incessant wars will eventually
lead rulers to recognize the benefits of peaceful negotiation. They will
gradually increase the freedoms of their citizens, because freer citizens are
economically more productive and hence make the state stronger in its
international dealings. Importantly he claims that the creation of civil
constitutions in particular states is dependent upon the creation of an
international league of states, although he does not elaborate on this
reasoning. In "Toward Perpetual Peace" Kant reverses that order,
claiming that some particular state may, through "good fortune",
become a republic and then act as a focal point for other states to join in
peaceful relations, and that gradually such cooperation can spread to all
states (8:356).
Relations
among the states of the world, covered above, are not the same as relations
among the peoples (nations, Volk) of the world. Individuals can relate
to states of which they are not members and to other individuals who are
members of other states. In this they are considered "citizens of a
universal state of human beings" with corresponding "rights of
citizens of the world" (8:349, footnote). Despite these lofty sounding
pronouncements, Kant's particular discussion of cosmopolitan right is
restricted to the right of hospitality. Since all peoples share a limited
amount of living space due to the spherical shape of the earth, the totality of
which they must be understood to have originally shared in common, they must be
understood to have a right to possible interaction with one another. This
cosmopolitan right is limited to a right to offer to engage in commerce, not a
right to demand actual commerce. A citizen of one state may try to establish
links with other peoples; no state is allowed to deny foreign citizens a right
to travel in its land. Settlement is another matter entirely. Kant is strongly
critical of the European colonization of other lands already inhabited by other
peoples. Settlement in these cases is allowed only by uncoerced informed
contract. Even land that appears empty might be used by shepherds or hunters
and cannot be appropriated without their consent (6:354).
Cosmopolitan
right is an important component of perpetual peace. Interaction among the
peoples of the world, Kant notes, has increased in recent times. Now "a
violation of right on one place of the earth is felt in all" as peoples
depend upon one another and know about one another more and more. Violations of
cosmopolitan right would make more difficult the trust and cooperation
necessary for perpetual peace among states.
"Social
philosophy," can be taken to mean the relationship of persons to
institutions, and to each other via these institutions, that
are not part of the state. Family is a clear example of a social institution
that transcends the individual but has at least some elements that are not
controlled by the state. Other examples would be economic institutions such as
businesses and markets, religious institutions, social clubs and private
associations created to advance interests or for mere enjoyment, education and
university institutions, social systems and classifications such as race and
gender, and endemic social problems like poverty. It is worth noting a few
particulars, if only as examples of the range of this topic. Kant advocated the
duty of citizens to support those in society who could not support themselves,
and even gave the state the power to arrange for this help (6:326). He offered
a biological explanation of race in several essays and also, certainly into his
"Critical" period, held that other races were inferior to Europeans.
He supported a reform movement in education based on the principles presented
by Rousseau in "Emile". I will not provide detailed treatement of
Kant's views on these particular matters (some of which are scant, others of
which are irrelevant to his main philosophy) but only focus on the nature of
social philosophy for Kant.
Kant
had no comprehensive social philosophy. One might be tempted to claim that, in
line with natural law theorists, Kant discusses natural rights related to some
social institutions. One might read the first half of the "Doctrine of
Right" as a social philosophy, since this half on "Private
Right" discusses the rights of individuals relative to one another, in
contrast to the second half on "Public Right" that discusses the
rights of individuals relative to the state. Kant even offers an explanation of
this difference by claiming that the opposite of state of nature is not a
social but the civil condition, that is, a state (6:306). The state of nature
can include voluntary societies (Kant mentions domestic relations in general)
where there is no a priori obligation for individuals to enter them. This claim
of Kant's, however, is subject to some doubt, since he explicitly links all
forms of property to the obligation to enter the civil condition (see section 5
above), and his discussion of marriage and family comes in the form of property
relations akin to contract relations. It is thus not obvious how there can be
any social institutions that can exist outside the civil condition, to the
extent that social institutions presuppose property relations.
Another
approach to the issue of social philosophy in Kant is to view it in terms of
moral philosophy properly speaking, that is, the obligations human beings have
to act under the proper maxims, as discussed in the "Doctrine of
Virtue" (see section 1 above). In the "Doctrine of Virtue" Kant
talks about the obligation to develop friendships and to participate in social
intercourse (6:469-74). In the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere
Reason Kant discusses the development of an "ethical
commonwealth" in which human beings strengthen one another's moral resolve
through their participation in the moral community of a church. He also holds
that educational institutions, the subject of his book On Pedagogy,
should be designed to provide for the development of morality in human beings,
who lack a natural disposition for the moral good. In these cases Kant's social
philosophy is treated as an arm of his theory of virtue, not as a freestanding
topic in its own right.
A
third approach to social philosophy comes through Kant's Anthropology from
a Pragmatic Point of View. Kant had envisioned anthropology as an
empirical application of ethics, akin to empirical psychology as a application of pure metaphysical principles of nature.
Knowledge of the general characteristics of human being as well as particular
characteristics of genders, races, nationalities, etc, can aid in determining
one's precise duties toward particular individuals. Further, this knowledge can
aid moral agents in their own task of motivating themselves to morality. These
promises of anthropology in its practical application are disappointed,
however, in the details of Kant's text. He does little critical assessment of
social prejudices or practices to screen out stereotypes detrimental to moral
development. His own personal views, considered sexist
and racist universally today and even out of step with some of his more
progressive colleagues, pervade his direct discussions of these social
institutions.
Kant's
original German and Latin writings are collected in Kants
gesammelte Schriften, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1900-. Most translations
provide the pagination to this edition in the margins, often using volume and
page number. All citations in this article use this method.
English
translations of Kant's primary works are numerous. Recently an exhaustive
series, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant in English,
has been in the process of publishing critical translations of all of Kant's
published works and large selections of his correspondence, lectures, and literary
remains. The following volumes of that series contain relevant material, some
of which is also issued separately:
·
Practical
Philosophy, translated by Mary
Gregor, 1996. Relevant contents: "An Answer to the Question: What is
Enlightenment?," Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals, "On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in
Theory, But it is of No Use in Practice," "Toward Perpetual
Peace", and the Metaphysics of Morals.
·
Religion and
Rational Theology, translated Allen Wood and George di Giovanni, 1996.
Relevant Content: Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason,
"Conflict of the Faculties"
·
Anthropology,
History, and Education, translated by
Robert Louden and Guenther Zoeller (forthcoming 2007). Relevant contents:
"Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim," Anthropology
from a Pragmatic Point of View, and "Lectures on Pedagogy"
·
Lectures and
Drafts on Political Philosophy, translated Frederick Rauscher and Kenneth Westphal (in
preparation). Relevant contents: "Naturrecht Feyerabend" course
lecture, fragments on political philosophy, and drafts of works in political
philosophy.
·
Arendt, Hannah,
1982. Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy. Chicago: Chicago UP.
·
Bialas, Volker und
Hans-Juergen Haessler (eds.), 1996. 200 Jahre Kants Entwurf ‘Zum ewigen
Frieden’. Wuerzburg, Koenigshausen & Neumann.
·
Beiner, Ronald and
William James Booth (eds.), 1993. Kant and Political Philosophy: The
Contemporary Legacy. New Haven: Yale UP.
·
Beiser, Frederick,
1992. Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism: The Genesis of Modern
German Political Thought 1790-1800. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP
·
Fleischacker,
Samuel, 1999. A Third Concept of Liberty: Judgment and Freedom in Kant and
Adam Smith. Princeton: Princeton UP
·
Flikschuh, Katrin,
2000. Kant and Modern Political Philosophy. New York: Cambridge UP
·
Gregor, Mary,
1963. Laws of Freedom: A Study of Kant's Method of Applying the Categorical
Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
·
Guyer, Paul, 2005.
Kant's System of Nature and Freedom. Oxford: Oxford UP
·
Höffe, Otfried,
2006. trans. Alexandra Newton. Kant's Cosmopolitan
Theory of Law and Peace. New York: Cambridge UP
·
Höffe, Otfried,
2002. trans. Mark Migotti. Categorical Principles
of Law. State College: Pennsylvania State UP
·
Kaufman,
Alexander, 1999. Welfare in the Kantian State. New York: Oxford UP.
·
Kersting,
Wolfgang, 1984. Wohlgeordnete Freiheit. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
·
Kleingeld,
Pauline, 1995. Fortschritt und Vernunft: Zur Geschichtsphilosophie Kants.
Wuerzburg: Koenigshausen und Neumann.
·
Kneller, Jane and
Sidney Axinn (eds.), 1998. Autonomy and Community: Readings in Contemporary
Kantian Social Philosophy. Albany: SUNY Press
·
Losonsky, Michael,
2001. Enlightenment and Action from Descartes to Kant: Passionate Thought.
New York: Cambridge UP
·
Louden, Robert,
2000. Kant's Impure Ethics. New York: Oxford UP.
·
Mulholland,
Leslie, 1990. Kant's System of Rights. New York: Columbia UP
·
Murphy, Jeffrie,
1970. Kant: The Philosophy of Right. New York: St. Martin's Press
·
Riley, Patrick,
1983. Kant's Political Philosophy. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and
Littlefield.
·
Rosen, Allen,
1993. Kant's Theory of Justice. Ithaca: Cornell UP
·
Schmidt, James
(ed.), 1996. What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and
Twentieth-Century Questions. Berkeley: U of California Press
·
Saner, Hans, 1973.
trans. E. B. Ashton. Kant's Political Thought: Its
Origins and Development. Chicago: U of Chicago Press
·
Shell, Susan Meld,
1980. The Rights of Reason: A Study of Kant's Philosophy and Politics.
Toronto: U of Toronto Press.
·
Timmons, Mark
(ed.), 2002. Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretive Essays.
Oxford: Oxford UP
·
van der Linden, Harry, 1988. Kantian Ethics and
Socialism. Indianapolis: Hackett.
·
Williams, Howard
(ed.), 1992. Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy. Chicago: U of
Chicago Press
·
Williams, Howard,
1983. Kant's Political Philosophy. New York: St. Martin's Press
·
Williams, Howard,
2003. Kant's Critique of Hobbes. Cardiff: U of Wales Press.
·
Yovel, Yirmiyahu
Yovel, 1980. Kant and the Philosophy of History. Princeton: Princeton
UP